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
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
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# THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

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## UTILITARIANISM AND EXPECTED UTILITY\*

THE literature of economics contains a formal theorem that looks on the face of it like an argument for utilitarianism. It would be remarkable if a formal argument could establish a moral theory. This one does not; but I think it can contribute to our understanding of utilitarianism. This paper explores its contribution.

Granted some superficially plausible assumptions, the theorem shows that a utility function representing "social preferences" can be written as a sum of utility functions representing the preferences of individuals. As it stands, this theorem is uninformative, because the notion of social preferences is obscure. And I shall be showing that, when the notion is elucidated, the assumptions lose their plausibility. I shall therefore reinterpret the theorem in terms of *good* rather than *preferences*, in a way that makes the assumptions reasonably acceptable. The reinterpreted theorem shows that a utility function representing general good can be written as a sum of utility functions representing the good of individuals. This seems to suggest that good is the total of individual good, so there is no value in equality in the distribution of good. I shall be considering how far the theorem really licenses this utilitarian conclusion.

### 1. THE FORMAL THEOREM

Suppose there are  $h$  people. Each has preferences among a set of alternative prospects, the same set for everyone. Each person's preferences satisfy the axioms of expected-utility theory—I shall call such preferences *coherent*. Expected-utility theory tells us that coherent preferences can be *represented* by a utility function. This function assigns a utility to each prospect in such a way that, of any

\* This is a revision of part of a paper I wrote while I was a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, supported by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. Some of the revision was done while I was a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University. I thank these institutions, and also Martin Browning, Angus Deaton, Jan Graaf, James Mirrlees, Derek Parfit, and Amartya Sen.



two prospects, the preferred one has the higher utility. The function will also be *expectational*, by which I mean that the utility it assigns to a prospect whose results are uncertain is the mathematical expectation of the utility it assigns to the results. If a person's preferences are coherent, there are actually many expectational utility functions that will represent them, all positive linear transforms of each other.<sup>1</sup>

Suppose there are also social preferences among the same set of prospects. If these too are coherent, they can be represented by an expectational utility function. Once again there are actually many expectational utility functions that will represent them, all positive linear transforms of each other.

Suppose next that the social preferences are *Paretian*, that is:

If everyone is indifferent between some pair of prospects, then the social preferences are indifferent too, and, if at least one person prefers the first of two prospects to the second and no one prefers the second to the first, then the first is socially preferred to the second.

The subject of this paper is:

*Theorem 1.*<sup>2</sup> Assume that each person's preferences are coherent, and that social preferences are coherent and Paretian. Then there are expectational utility functions  $U_1, \dots, U_h$  representing the individual preferences, and an expectational utility function  $U_g$  representing social preferences, such that for any prospect  $P$

$$U_g(P) = U_1(P) + \dots + U_h(P)$$

A difficulty in understanding Theorem 1 is that it says nothing about *which* of the many utility functions that represent a person's

<sup>1</sup> In Richard Jeffrey's version of expected-utility theory, *The Logic of Decision*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Press, 1983), a wider range of transformations is allowed. Theorems 1 and 2 below are true within Jeffrey's theory, subject to some extra assumptions (see John Broome, "Bolker-Jeffrey decision theory reveals some cracks in an axiomatic buttress of utilitarianism," Discussion Paper 175, Economics Dept., Univ. of Bristol); but in this paper I confine my attention to more restrictive theories such as Leonard Savage's, see *The Foundations of Statistics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1972).

<sup>2</sup> Among the published proofs of this theorem are: Robert Deschamps and Louis Gevers, "Separability, Risk-bearing and Social Welfare Judgments," in *Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences*, Jean-Jacques Laffont, ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979), pp. 145-160; Peter C. Fishburn, "On Harsanyi's Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Theorem," *Theory and Decision*, xvii, 1 (July 1984): 21-28; Peter J. Hammond, "Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty," *Economica*, xlviii (August 1981): 235-250; Peter J. Hammond, "Ex-post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice under Uncertainty," in *Social Choice and Welfare*, P. K. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983), pp. 175-205; and John C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," *Journal of Political Economy*, lxi, 4 (August 1955): 309-321.



preferences is the one that is added to others to make up social utility. If  $U_1$  is a utility function for person 1, then so is  $2U_1$ . But, if  $2U_1$  were to replace  $U_1$  in the formula above, the weight of person 1's preferences in social preferences would be increased. Social preferences would be more inclined to favor person 1 in the distribution of goods. So the implications of Theorem 1 for distribution are not clear cut.

One conclusion about distribution can be drawn nevertheless. The theorem links people's attitudes to uncertainty with the attitude of social preferences to inequality. The shape of a person's utility function indicates her attitude to uncertainty. But, when people's functions are added up to make social utility, as Theorem 1 says they can be, their shape also indicates the attitude of social preferences to inequality.

Suppose, for instance, that each person cares only about her own wealth and is risk averse about it. Then the utility function representing each person's preferences will be a strictly concave (downwards bending) function of her wealth. The social-utility function, by Theorem 1, will be a sum of such strictly concave functions. A function of this sort tends to favor equality in the distribution of wealth. The tendency may be weak, because the function may give more weight to some people's wealth than other's. But strict concavity amounts to "diminishing marginal utility of wealth," whose egalitarian tendency, though weak, is well known. Contrast it with the case where each person is risk neutral about her wealth. Then each person's utility function will be linear in her wealth. Social utility, by Theorem 1, will be linear in each person's wealth. And a linear function definitely attaches no value to equality in the distribution of wealth.

The linking of attitudes to uncertainty and attitudes to inequality is one remarkable consequence of Theorem 1. And the theorem has also been taken as an argument for utilitarianism.<sup>3</sup> But, as I say, I think it needs to be reinterpreted if its assumptions are to be acceptable. The reinterpreted theorem also makes a link between uncertainty and inequality, which I shall assess. And I also assess how far it supports utilitarianism.

Section II of this paper explains why a reinterpretation is needed. Section III describes the reinterpretation. Sections IV and V assess the theorem's assumptions as reinterpreted. Sections VI and VII consider what conclusions can be drawn.

<sup>3</sup> See John Harsanyi in "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour," *Social Research*, XLIV, 4 (Winter 1977), reprinted in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge, 1982), pp. 39-62.



One preliminary point needs to be made. Many of the proofs of Theorem 1 allow for subjective probabilities. They use versions of expected-utility theory in which the probabilities a person attaches to different events are revealed by her preferences. Different people's preferences may reveal different probabilities attached to the same event. The proofs of Theorem 1, however, also prove<sup>4</sup>

*Theorem 2.* Assume that each person's preferences are coherent, and that social preferences are coherent and Paretian. Then the social preferences and all the individual preferences must agree about the probabilities of every event.

Since it is unlikely that everyone will agree about probabilities, this theorem tells us that, as a general rule, coherent Paretian social preferences cannot exist. But, if they do, then Theorem 1 tells us that they can be represented by a utility function that is the sum of individual-utility functions.

## II. THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT

Are the assumptions of Theorem 1 plausible?

To test the Paretian assumption, consider this example. There are only two people. Both are concerned only about their own wealth, and they are risk neutral about it. One of two possible events will occur. Compare these prospects

|            | Event 1 | Event 2 |
|------------|---------|---------|
| Prospect A | (2,2)   | (2,2)   |
| Prospect B | (3,0)   | (0,3)   |

The parentheses show what wealth will result for the two people from each prospect if a particular event occurs. The first person attaches probability .7 to event 1 and .3 to event 2; the second person .3 and .7. Consequently, both people prefer prospect *B* to *A*. The Paretian assumption says that for this reason *B* is socially preferred to *A*. Can this be justified?

This depends on what, exactly, is meant by 'socially preferred'. Social preference is an ambiguous notion. "*B* is socially preferred to *A*" may mean simply that *B* is better than *A*. Under this interpretation, the Paretian assumption might be defended on the grounds that *B* is better than *A* because it is better for both people. This type of argument is explored in Section III. But it is not really available here because, although both people prefer *B* to *A*, *B* cannot actually be better for both of them. It can only be better for person 1 if event 1 is much more probable than event 2. And then it is not better for person 2.

<sup>4</sup> See the proofs by Deschamps and Gevers and Hammond mentioned in note 2.



Alternatively, " $B$  is socially preferred to  $A$ " may mean that, if society had a choice between  $A$  and  $B$ , it should choose  $B$ . I take this to mean that the social system—perhaps the economic or political system, perhaps the government—should bring about  $B$  rather than  $A$ . There is no necessary implication that  $B$  is better than  $A$ .

It can plausibly be argued that, since both people prefer  $B$  to  $A$ ,  $B$  is socially preferred to  $A$  in this second sense: it should come about rather than  $A$ . The argument is that the role of the social system is to act as a mechanism whereby people's wants get put into effect. So far as possible, it should simply bring about what people want. Normally, people's wants conflict, and then it should act as a fair mechanism for resolving the conflict. But, when there is no conflict, it should simply do what everyone wants. This argument does not insist that  $B$  is better than  $A$ . What it values is the nature of the social system, not its outcome. It says that the social system should be such that  $B$  comes about rather than  $A$ . But the occurrence of  $B$  is not necessarily any benefit added to the existence of the system that brings it about. Someone who accepts this argument might also believe that  $B$  is actually worse than  $A$ .

I call this *the liberal argument*. It supports the Paretian assumption under this interpretation of social preference, and I think it is the only argument that can do so. But someone who used this argument could not then defend Theorem 1's other main assumption that social preferences are coherent. The axioms of expected-utility theory are appropriate for an agent that makes choices, and derives reasons for making them from the value it attaches to their results. But the liberal argument does not conceive social preferences as representing the choices of any agent at all.<sup>5</sup> The social system does not really choose; it is a mechanism through which a result emerges from the choices of many agents. Social preferences represent the results that should emerge from this mechanism. And the reasons why the results should be one thing rather than another are not derived from the value of the results themselves, but from the merits of the mechanism.

Furthermore, anyone who supports the Paretian assumption has to tolerate incoherent social preferences. Theorem 2 says that social preferences, if they are to be Paretian, will be incoherent whenever people disagree about probabilities. Indeed, preferring  $B$  to  $A$  is

<sup>5</sup> A complication is that the working of the social mechanism often depends on the decisions of an agent. For instance, a minister in the government may actually decide between  $A$  and  $B$  in the example. And rationality requires an agent to have consistent preferences. This complication is discussed in my "Should social preferences be consistent?" Discussion Paper 180, Economics Dept., Univ. of Bristol.



already very near to incoherence. Any decent mechanism for resolving conflicting preferences would bring about (2,2) for sure in preference to either (3,0) for sure or (0,3) for sure, because (2,2) has more wealth in total and has it equally distributed. But it then violates the axioms of expected-utility theory<sup>6</sup> for it to bring about *B*, which is a prospect of either (3,0) or (0,3), in preference to *A*, which is (2,2) for sure. Theorem 2 is a snare in the path of any argument designed to justify the assumptions of Theorem 1. It says that the coherence and Paretian assumptions for social preferences are inconsistent with each other, unless people's probabilities coincide. So any argument that supports the Paretian assumption, even when people's probabilities differ, has to give up the coherence assumption as a general rule. It will then be hard for it to explain why coherence should be required in the one special case when people's probabilities happen to agree.

The liberal argument, then, cannot provide a foundation for both the Paretian and coherence assumptions of Theorem 1.

### III. THE REINTERPRETATION

Now I return to the other type of argument that might be used to support the Paretian assumption. It depends on this *principle of personal good*, as I call it:

If two prospects are equally good for everyone, they are equally good, and, if the first of two prospects is better for someone than the second, and at least as good for everyone, then it is better.

In brief: the goodness of a prospect depends only—and positively—on how good it is for people.

This principle does not actually support precisely the Paretian assumption. We have already seen that it does not support it in the example of prospects *A* and *B*. To bring it to bear on Theorem 1 we shall have to reinterpret the theorem. We shall have to replace preference relations with relations of betterness. Instead of "Person *i* prefers *P* to *Q* or is indifferent between them" we must have "*P* is at least as good for person *i* as *Q*." Instead of "*P* is socially preferred or indifferent to *Q*" we must have "*P* is at least as good as *Q*."

These betterness relations ("good relations") may satisfy the axioms of expected-utility theory. If they do—if they are coherent—they can be represented by expectational utility functions. For instance, there will be a utility function  $U_i$  such that  $U_i(P)$  is greater than  $U_i(Q)$  if and only if *P* is better than *Q* for person *i*.

<sup>6</sup> Specifically Savage's sure-thing principle (21–23).



The reinterpreted theorem<sup>7</sup> is:

*Theorem 1'.* Assume that each person's good relation is coherent, and that the general good relation is coherent and satisfies the principle of personal good. Then there are expectational utility functions  $U_1, \dots, U_h$  representing individual good, and an expectational utility function  $U_g$  representing general good, such that for any prospect  $P$

$$U_g(P) = U_1(P) + \dots + U_h(P)$$

This theorem has more acceptable assumptions than the original does. In the rest of this section I explain the reinterpretation in more detail. Then in Sections iv and v I assess the reinterpreted assumptions.

The reinterpretation replaces social preference with general good. This is more a disambiguation than a reinterpretation. As I said earlier, 'is socially preferred to' can in one sense be taken to mean "is better than."

The reinterpretation replaces individual preference with individual good. This is a significant change. I am making it chiefly for the sake of generality. The argument we are discussing aims to say something about how the good of individuals is aggregated together to constitute general good. For that, there is no need to adopt any particular theory about what the good of individuals consists in. One theory is that it consists in the satisfaction of their preferences. This theory is, in a way, built into Theorem 1. But Theorem 1' can accommodate any adequate theory of individual good.

We have seen already, however, that the preference-satisfaction theory of good is not adequate. It cannot be quite right. In the example above,  $B$  is preferred to  $A$  by both people, but it cannot be better for both. So Theorem 1' cannot accommodate precisely this theory. But it may be able to accommodate a modified theory in which a person's good consists in the satisfaction of what her preferences would be if they were "purified" by full information and sound deliberation.

In the example, each person's preference for  $B$  may be rational: she may have judged the probabilities rationally on the information she has. So 'better for' does not mean the same as 'rationally preferred by'. 'Better for' requires that the probabilities, as well as being rationally arrived at, are correct. The principle of personal good,

<sup>7</sup> Peter Hammond also reinterprets the theorem in a way that is, if I understand it, similar to mine; see "On Reconciling Arrow's Theory of Social Choice with Harsanyi's Fundamental Utilitarianism," in George Feiwel, ed., *Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy* (London: MacMillan, 1987), pp. 179-222.



then, works with the correct probabilities, which are the same for everyone, rather than with the probabilities people happen to believe in. In this way it avoids the trap set by Theorem 2; the principle is consistent with assuming that the general-good relation is coherent.

That is an advantage of my reinterpretation. A disadvantage is that it has to assume the existence of correct probabilities, which many subjectivists deny. I have been saying that the term 'better for' presupposes a notion of correctness for probabilities. So these subjectivists ought not to use this term. But the important thing is that they cannot avoid the trap of Theorem 2. Whatever argument they produce for the Paretian assumption or any similar principle, it will have to allow for disagreement about probabilities. And then social preferences will normally be incoherent. The subjectivists' argument will therefore have to tolerate incoherence. So it will not be able to offer a basis for Theorem 1 or any similar theorem.

These subjectivists, then, will not be impressed by a theorem of this sort. I therefore have to part company with them. I continue on the assumption that correct probabilities exist.

#### IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL GOOD

Now I come to assess the assumptions of Theorem 1, starting with the principle of personal good.

Consider first this principle as it applies to outcomes rather than prospects. It might be thought that some outcomes are simply good, or perhaps good for society, without being good for anybody. An example particularly germane to this paper is equality in the distribution of good between people. Two different ideas need to be looked at here.

One is the idea that, for the same total of personal good, it is better for it to be more equally distributed than less. This may suggest that equality is in a sense a good over and above the good of people. Utilitarianism denies this idea, and Theorem 1' seems designed to support utilitarianism in this; section VII considers how far it really does so. Therefore, it had better not be simply an assumption of the theorem that the idea is wrong. And, fortunately, it is not, because the idea is consistent with the principle of personal good. Suppose, for instance, that general good is the product of individual goods— $G_g = G_1 G_2 \dots G_n$ —and that all individual goods are positive. Then, for a given total of individual good, general good is increased by distributing it more equally. But, nevertheless, general good depends only—and positively—on individual good. And this is all the principle of personal good requires.

The second idea is that it is sometimes better to increase equality by taking good from people who have a lot, even if this does not



benefit people who have less. This *does* conflict with the principle of personal good. And I think it is wrong. If such a change is really an improvement, that can only be because it improves fairness. The less well off are more fairly treated. But then this fairer treatment is a sort of good that is done them. Either there is such a good, in which case the change benefits the less well off after all, or there is not, in which case the change is not an improvement.

To speak generally, if any ostensible improvement cannot be pinned down as good for someone, I am not inclined to believe it is really an improvement. And from now on I am simply going to take the principle of personal good for granted when applied to outcomes: for outcomes, good depends only on people's good.

But there is a special difficulty about applying it to prospects. The sense in which the notion of good applies to prospects is a derivative and attenuated one. What is really good is not the prospect but the event it is the prospect of. Suppose some good event is going to happen to me. The prospect of this event is a good prospect. But when the good in my life is catalogued the prospect will not be recorded as an extra item besides the event. Certainly, the good prospect might *cause* some good that must be recorded: enjoyable anticipation, for instance. But it is not because of such effects that the prospect is good; it would still be good even if it did not cause any. Suppose now that some good event is likely but not certain to happen to me. That is a good prospect for me. But, if unluckily the event does not happen, then my life has not been made better by the fact that I once had this good prospect. The fact that something good might have happened is not itself something good that did happen.

Applied to this attenuated sort of good, the principle of personal good encounters a difficulty. Take this example (again, the parentheses show two people's wealth):

|            | Event 1 | Event 2 |
|------------|---------|---------|
| Prospect C | (1,1)   | (1,1)   |
| Prospect D | (0,2)   | (2,0)   |

Suppose that the events are equally probable. Suppose *C* is better than *D* for both people; this will be true if it is good for both of them to avoid risk. (This may be obscure; I shall come back to it.) Then the principle of personal good says that *C* is better than *D* because it is better for both people. Consider an act of choosing *C* rather than *D*. The principle offers as a reason in favor of this act that its consequence will be better for both people. But actually the consequence will be better for one and worse for the other: one will have one unit of wealth when she would otherwise have had nought, but the other



will have one unit when she would otherwise have had two. The principle of personal good is trying to insert between the act of choice and its consequence a sort of quasi consequence, the prospect. And it applies to such quasi-consequences ways of thinking that may be very plausible when applied to real consequences but cannot be taken for granted here. How can it be argued that choosing *C* rather than *D* has results that are better for both people when, plainly, it does not?<sup>8</sup>

To deal with this point, we have to consider in detail what reasons there really are for choosing *C* rather than *D*, or *D* rather than *C*. Generally, we have to consider what reasons should guide choices between uncertain prospects. Talk about the goodness of alternatives ultimately aims to supply reasons for choice. So when the talk about goodness is in doubt we must look directly at the reasons.

To do this properly we need to have in mind a particular agent. It may be that a reason for one agent is not a reason for another, or that different agents should give different weights to the same reasons. So let us fix on an impartial agent with a general duty to act rightly but no special duty to any particular person. Perhaps the government might suit this role.

What reasons might such an agent have for choosing one alternative rather than another? There are, first of all, reasons of the sort that underlie the liberal argument described in section II. Suppose everyone prefers one of two alternatives to the other. Democratic principles suggest that this is the one that should come about, whether or not it is better for everybody, or for anybody. As I said, this is an argument about how the social system should operate as a mechanism. It is not necessarily a reason for any particular agent to bring about this alternative. But our agent may be, like the government, part of the social system. Its decisions may indeed determine what the social system brings about. In that case, these democratic considerations will constitute a reason for the agent to act in a particular way.

But we are not now concerned with reasons of this sort. We are concerned with good, and they are specifically not directed at good. I explained in section II that reasons like these are likely to lead to incoherent preferences, and that is why I turned to consider good instead. So from now on, I shall leave them aside and consider only good-directed reasons.

<sup>8</sup> I asked this, too forcefully, as a rhetorical question in my "Trying to Value a Life," *Journal of Public Economics*, ix (1978): 91-100. There is actually a good answer to it, which I am about to give. But most of that paper is, I still think, correct.



By a "good-directed" reason I mean a reason that is directed toward good in the outcome of a choice. The notion of a good-directed reason, then, does not depend on the notion of good applied to prospects. So I can use it to define good applied to prospects. When I say that one prospect is better than another, I mean that an impartial agent has stronger good-directed reasons for bringing about the first (if it can) than the second. And when I say that one prospect is better for a person than another, I mean that there are stronger reasons directed toward this person's good for bringing about the first than the second.

This way of defining good for prospects meets one essential requirement. Suppose we compare two prospects that each lead for sure to a particular outcome. The better prospect, as I have defined it, is the one that leads to the better outcome. Theorem 1', which is formally about the goodness of prospects, will therefore tell us something about the goodness of outcomes too.

With these definitions, it is easy to produce an argument for the principle of personal good applied to prospects. Suppose two prospects are equally good for everybody. This means that for each person the reasons directed toward her good for bringing about one are exactly as strong as the reasons directed toward her good for bringing about the other. The impartial agent should act rightly, and beneficence is at least a part of acting rightly. So these will all be reasons for the agent too. And, since the reasons directed toward each person's good are evenly balanced, the agent's reasons directed toward everybody's good taken together will be evenly balanced too. As I say, I am taking it for granted that, for outcomes, good depends only on people's good. So these are all the good-directed reasons there are. Therefore, all the agent's good-directed reasons are evenly balanced. That is to say, the two alternatives are equally good. This proves the first part of the principle of personal good. The second part can be proved in a similar way.

I think this argument comes to the right conclusion. But it skips over what is really the main point. We need to consider the weighting of reasons in more detail.

Take the example of prospects *C* and *D*. Person 1's reasons in favor of *C* boil down to this: if event 1 comes about, she will get one unit of wealth instead of nought. Her reasons in favor of *D* boil down to: if event 2 comes about, she will get two units of wealth instead of one. We assumed that *C* is actually better for her. The former reason, that is to say, outweighs the latter. This is because we assumed that it is good for her to avoid risk. The value of risk avoidance appears in expected-utility theory in the form of weights attached to



gains and losses of wealth. Formally it appears in a strictly concave utility function. Here it says that the difference between one unit and nought units has more weight than the difference between two units and one unit. Consequently, the reason in favor of *C* outweighs the reason in favor of *D*.

Our impartial agent has four good-directed reasons to weigh up. Two of them, directed toward person 1's good, are the ones I have just mentioned. And there are two symmetrical ones directed toward person 2's good. How should these reasons be weighed up in determining what the agent ought to do? We do not have to worry here about weighing against each other reasons directed toward different people's good. But I do want to argue that the two reasons directed toward person 1's good must be given the same relative weight as they receive when determining what is best for person 1.

The relative weight given to these reasons in the latter application is the means by which expected-utility theory takes account of whether or not it is good for person 1 to avoid risk, and the degree to which it is good. In our example we are assuming that risk avoidance is indeed good for person 1. So, in determining which prospect is better for her, the reason in favor of *C* outweighs the reason in favor of *D*. If, in determining which alternative our agent ought to choose, we did not give these reasons the same relative weight, the fact that avoiding risk is good for person 1 would not be properly taken account of in our determination. In the example, one reason for the agent to choose prospect *C* rather than *D* is that *C* is less risky for person 1, and avoiding risk is good for person 1. In expected-utility theory this reason appears, not strictly as a separate reason on its own, but in the weighting of other reasons. So this weighting must be preserved.

This is the point of treating prospects as "quasi consequences" and applying the notion of good to them. There is a type of reason for making a choice, namely avoiding risk,<sup>9</sup> which does not appear in the value of true consequences. But it can be represented in the value of prospects.

#### V. COHERENCE

Theorem 1' requires individual and general good to satisfy the axioms of expected-utility theory. I mention here only the ones that are likely to give trouble: the completeness axiom and the various consistency axioms. The completeness axiom says that, of two prospects, either one is better than the other or else they are equally

<sup>9</sup> If, alternatively, it is good for a person to take on risk or to be neutral about risk, that too will be a reason for choice.



good. I do not detail the consistency axioms, except to mention that the most controversial is the axiom of strong independence.

I see no reason to think that either the individual- or the general-good relations are complete. For an individual, it is plausible that there are goods that cannot be weighed against each other. For general good, there is the added difficulty that it may not be possible to weigh one person's good against another's. For the sake of Theorem 1' we shall simply have to assume there are no such intra-personal or interpersonal incommensurabilities. This is a weakness of the theorem.<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, I believe there are good arguments to show that the individual- and general-good relations satisfy the consistency axioms. I have argued in another paper<sup>11</sup> that the preferences of a rational agent will satisfy these axioms. It follows that each individual-good relation will satisfy them, because a person's good relation is what her preference relation would be were she rational and self-interested, and were her probabilities correct.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, the general-good relation would be the preference relation of a rational impartial agent whose preferences were determined by the weighing up of good-directed reasons in the manner described in section IV. So this relation, too, must be consistent.<sup>13</sup>

#### VI. UNCERTAINTY AND INEQUALITY

I have done what I can to justify the assumptions of the reinterpreted Theorem 1'. One source of doubt about them is that they presuppose a notion of correctness for probabilities. Another is that they ignore any problems there might be about the commensurability of goods. But apart from these doubts, I think the assumptions are acceptable.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Jeffrey, in "On interpersonal utility theory," this JOURNAL, LXVII, 20 (October 21, 1971): 647-656, uses Theorem 1 to support the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. I think this is wrong.

<sup>11</sup> John Broome, "Rationality and the Sure-thing Principle," in *Rationality, Self-Interest and Benevolence*, Gay Meeks, ed. (New York: Cambridge, forthcoming).

<sup>12</sup> This does not mean that a person's good consists in the satisfaction of her preferences, a theory about the nature of good mentioned in section III. The determination is in the opposite direction.

<sup>13</sup> The argument of this paragraph is slightly too quick. There might be no such thing as rational self-interested preferences, because it might not be rational to be self-interested. Similarly, it might not be rational for an impartial agent to determine its preferences by the weighing up of good-directed reasons, because, as I explained in section IV, the liberal argument of section II may also supply reasons to such an agent, and these are not good directed. Nevertheless, if a person's preferences were determined by her own interests only, and if an impartial agent's preferences were determined by good-directed reasons only, then these preferences should satisfy the consistency axioms. It is easy to check that my arguments in "Rationality and the Sure-thing Principle" would apply to such preferences.



So, subject to these qualifications, the conclusion of Theorem 1' follows. Individual and general good can be represented by utility functions in such a way that general utility is the sum of the individual utilities. What does this tell us? In section 1, I distinguished two conclusions one might draw from Theorem 1. First, the theorem made a link between people's attitudes to risk and the attitude of social preferences to inequality. Second, the theorem seemed to be an argument for utilitarianism. We must make a similar distinction for the reinterpreted Theorem 1'.

The first conclusion to be drawn from Theorem 1' is that the value of equality is linked with the attitude people should take to uncertainty. If people should be neutral about risks to their wealth, then it is wrong to favor equality in the distribution of wealth. And, if people should be risk averse about wealth, there is some presumption in favor of equality in wealth. This link is explained in section 1. The only difference is that now we are dealing with what is good for people faced with uncertainty, rather than with the attitude they actually take. Notice, though, that what is good for people here need not be determined by anything other than the people's own tastes. A person's tastes help to determine what is good for her.<sup>14</sup> If she likes apples more than pears then, other things being equal, an apple is better for her than a pear. Shifting attention from preferences to good does not deny the importance of tastes.

That inequality should be linked to uncertainty in this way strikes me as a remarkable consequence of Theorem 1'.

#### VII. UTILITARIANISM

Does Theorem 1' give any more general support to utilitarianism?

At most it can support only a part of it. It has nothing to say about the utilitarian thesis that one should act so as to bring about the best result; it is only about what result is best. It has nothing to say about the utilitarian thesis that a person's good consists in pleasure or the satisfaction of her desires; it is only about how different people's good is aggregated. And it simply assumes the utilitarian thesis that goods are always commensurable.

The one part of utilitarianism that the theorem does seem to support is the thesis that general good is the sum of people's good, so there is no value in an equal distribution of good. But so far we are not entitled to suppose it says even this. It says that general utility is

<sup>14</sup> I distinguish tastes from preferences. I think that, other things being equal, satisfying a person's tastes is necessarily good for her. But I do not think the same about her preferences. A taste can supply a reason for a preference, but a preference can also be based on other reasons, or on no reason.



the sum of individual utilities. But utilities have been defined only to represent the *order* of good: of two prospects the one with the higher utility is the better. They do not necessarily represent *degrees* of good.

A case can be made out nevertheless for saying that utilities do actually represent degrees of good. Theorem 1' itself can contribute to this case. But first let us see what argument can be made independently of Theorem 1'.

If a utility function represents the order of a person's good, then so does any linear transform of it. So the most that can be expected of a person's utility function in general is that it should be a linear transform of her good. The characteristic of a linear transformation is that it preserves the order of differences. Take four prospects  $M$ ,  $N$ ,  $P$ , and  $Q$ , each good for a person to some degree. Write these degrees  $G(M)$ ,  $G(N)$ ,  $G(P)$ , and  $G(Q)$ . Then the most that can be expected in general from a utility function for the person is that the utility difference  $[U(M) - U(N)]$  should be greater than  $[U(P) - U(Q)]$  if and only if  $[G(M) - G(N)]$  is greater than  $[G(P) - G(Q)]$ .

Do utilities represent degrees of good to this extent? Suppose a person is faced with a choice between getting one unit of wealth for sure or alternatively taking a gamble at equal odds of either no units or two units. Suppose that

$$U(2) - U(1) < U(1) - U(0)$$

The latter difference in utility outweighs the former, and the best choice is the one unit for sure. Is it then necessarily the case that

$$G(2) - G(1) < G(1) - G(0) \quad ?$$

This will be so if it is best for the person to maximize the expectation of her good.<sup>15</sup> Since utility is defined so that it is best for her to maximize the expectation of her utility, utility will then represent degrees of good to the required extent. But it is quite plausible that it is not best for a person to maximize the expectation of her good. For instance, the notion of degrees of good may not even make sense; good may not be an arithmetic quantity. Or it might be good for a person to be risk averse about good.<sup>16</sup> Then her utility will be a

<sup>15</sup> Many decision theorists seem to have thought people should be expected-good maximizers. Daniel Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk," Louise Sommer, trans. *Econometrica*, xxii, 1 (January 1954): 23-36, thought people should maximize expected *emolumentum*, which the dictionary translates as "benefit or advantage." Jeffrey, *The Logic of Decision*, thinks they should maximize expected "desirability."

<sup>16</sup> Such a view is implicit in Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1963), p. 10.



strictly concave function of her good, so we might consistently suppose in the example that actually, say,

$$G(2) - G(1) = G(1) - G(0)$$

But there is a possible retort to this. It might be said that it is precisely in comparisons of the sort we are making that the notion of degrees of good gets its meaning.<sup>17</sup> In making decisions in the face of uncertainty, gains and losses are weighed against each other. In the example, the possible gain in wealth from one unit to two is a reason in favor of taking the gamble. The possible loss from one unit to none is a reason against. The latter is the stronger reason. This is naturally expressed by saying that the difference between one unit and no units of wealth amounts to a greater difference in good than the difference between one unit and two. According to the supposition in the previous paragraph, these differences in good are actually the same. But what can this mean, if it is not that they are evenly balanced when weighed against each other as reasons for choosing? According to the supposition, the differences are equal but they do not *count* equally as reasons. But maintaining a distinction between amounts of good and how these amounts count looks like an empty gesture.

I think this is a good retort. It is hard to see what use we can have for the notion of degrees of good except when weighing up differences in good as reasons for making a choice. So it is in weighing up differences that we can expect the notion to get its meaning. Decision making under uncertainty, however, is not the only context in which differences in good are weighed against each other. Perhaps the notion gets its meaning elsewhere. Another context where differences of good are weighed is in the distribution of good between people. Let us consider that.

Suppose there is a choice between the distributions of wealth (1,1) and (0,2). A reason in favor of the first is that it gives person 1 one unit of wealth instead of none. A reason in favor of the second is that it gives person 2 two units instead of one. How should these reasons be weighed against each other? This is what Theorem 1' is about. (Remember that it is simply an assumption of the theorem that reasons like these *can* be weighed against each other; interpersonal comparisons are possible.) It says that we can find the right weights from the people's utility functions. To do so, we have to make sure that for each person we have picked the appropriate utility function.

<sup>17</sup> Compare J. A. Mirrlees, "The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism," in Sen and Williams, pp. 63-84.



Each person has many functions representing the order of her good, and the theorem gives no guidance about which is the right one. But it does say that there is a right one. And once we have it, differences in utility determine the weights that should be given to opposing reasons. In the example, once we have functions  $U_1$  and  $U_2$  for the people, we compare  $[U_1(1) - U_1(0)]$  with  $[U_2(2) - U_2(1)]$ . If the former is greater, the distribution (1,1) is better; if the latter, (0,2). This is a context where we are weighing up reasons. So according to what I said above, it gives us grounds for saying that these differences of utility represent differences in degrees of good. Suppose  $[U_1(1) - U_1(0)]$  is greater than  $[U_2(2) - U_2(1)]$ . Then we have grounds for saying that person 1 gains more in good from having one unit of wealth instead of none than person 2 gains from having two units instead of one. Since the same utility functions supply the right weights in any distributional comparison, we have grounds for saying that these functions represent degrees of good.

But these grounds are unlikely to convince a nonutilitarian. They beg the question. They insist that, when weighing reasons, the stronger reason must always be the one that represents the greater difference in good. This simply assumes that the better alternative is always the one with the greater total of good. And that was what had to be proved.

The strength of the utilitarian case, however, is this. The functions  $U_1$  and  $U_2$ , which supply the weights when weighing reasons in distributing wealth, are utility functions for the people. Therefore, they also supply the weights when weighing reasons in making decisions under uncertainty. So these functions serve the same purpose in two contexts. This very much strengthens the claim that they represent degrees of good. This is the effect of Theorem 1'. Theorem 1' provides a strong case for saying that utilities represent degrees of good.<sup>18</sup> And, having done so, it also says that the better of two alternatives is always the one with the greater total of good.

The answer to the nonutilitarian's objection is this. The objection relies on a distinction between degrees of good and how these degrees count in weighing reasons: utility tells us how good counts, but utility may be distinct from good itself. But we have been shown no way of assigning meaning to degrees of good apart from how they count. And, without that, the distinction now seems emptier than ever.

<sup>18</sup> Compare John C. Harsanyi, "Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Professor Sen," in *Foundational Problems in the Social Sciences*, R. Butts and J. Hintikka, eds. (Boston: Reidel, 1977), pp. 293-296.



But this is not the end of the argument. All the nonutilitarian has to do now is supply a suitable way of assigning meaning to degrees of good. What she needs is *another* context in which differences of good are weighed against each other. The one to turn to, I think, is the weighing up of good at different periods of a person's life. I intend to pursue this in another paper.

Imagine for a moment, though, that the argument had come to a decisive end in the defeat of the nonutilitarian. Imagine we had managed to derive from Theorem 1' the utilitarian conclusion that good is the sum of people's good. What would this conclusion now amount to? The way we would have come to it shows it is less significant than it seems. It seems anti-egalitarian. But our argument was simply about meaning. In order to make sense of the question whether or not there is value in an equal distribution of good, we have to assign a meaning to the notion of degrees of good. And it happens that the most natural way of doing that prevents us from attaching value to equality in the distribution of good. That is all. It suggests that the question whether there is value in equality in the distribution of good is unimportant.

Furthermore, the argument also shows that the utilitarian conclusion adds nothing at all to the conclusion we reached in section VIII. There we made a connection between uncertainty and inequality. The same utility functions that represent what is best in the face of uncertainty also represent what is best in distribution between people. And it is simply because the same functions appear in both contexts that we have now decided they represent degrees of good. Theorem 1' gives no more general support to utilitarianism than that.

The argument, to summarize, is not ended. But, if it were, it would have achieved less than might have been expected of it.

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## COMPATIBILISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROM UNAVOIDABILITY\*

IN recent years, a certain type of argument against compatibilism has become prevalent.<sup>1</sup> According to this argument, determinism is demonstrably incompatible with human freedom because determinism entails that our actions result necessarily from laws of nature and past states of the world which are themselves necessary. Since that which results necessarily from something necessary is itself necessary, it follows (given determinism) that our actions are also necessary and, hence, not free.

Though widely discussed, this type of argument has not yet acquired an accepted name. Since the notion of necessity which plays so crucial a role in it seems to be equally well expressed by such terms as 'inevitability', 'uncontrollability', 'inescapability', 'unalterability', or 'unavoidability', any one of these might provide us with a suitable name. Since I shall (for no compelling reason) phrase the argument in terms of unavoidability, I shall christen it the *Argument from Unavoidability*; for purposes of brevity, though, I shall often condense this simply to: the *Argument*.

In section I of this paper, I set forth the Argument from Unavoidability in some detail and show that its success depends upon the incompatibilist's ability to fashion a notion of unavoidability which meets three separate conditions. In section II, I examine various putative analyses of unavoidability to see whether any of them does satisfy our three conditions. My conclusion is that no candidate is likely to pass all three tests unless a certain thesis regarding the prerequisites of power can safely be assumed. I argue in section III, however, that such a thesis cannot safely be assumed in the context of a purported proof of incompatibilism. Accordingly, the Argument

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<sup>1</sup> The argument is perhaps most commonly associated with the name of Peter van Inwagen; see his *An Essay on Free Will* (New York: Oxford, 1983), ch. III; as well as his earlier "The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism," *Philosophical Studies*, xxvii, 3 (March 1975): 185-199. Other versions of the argument are offered by Carl Ginet, "Might We Have No Choice?" in Keith Lehrer, ed., *Freedom and Determinism* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 87-104; James Lamb, "On a Proof of Incompatibilism," *Philosophical Review*, lxxxvi, 1 (January 1977): 20-35; and David Wiggins, "Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism," in Ted Honderich, ed., *Essays on Freedom of Action* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 31-61. Though the argument has received much attention in recent years, it would probably be rash to acclaim it a "new" argument; see Wiggins, p. 59, note 18.



fails. I conclude by briefly commenting on the implications of this failure for the over-all dispute.

## I

*Determinism* is the thesis that the state of the universe at any time is the logical consequence of the state of the universe at any earlier time conjoined with the laws of nature.<sup>2</sup> According to incompatibilists, the truth of this thesis would mean that the belief in human freedom is a delusion; freedom can exist only if the world is *not* deterministic. The Argument from Unavoidability attempts to prove that indeterminism is indeed a necessary condition of human freedom, by showing that any action performed in a deterministic universe would be necessary, or unavoidable, for the agent and, hence, could not rank as a free action.

The heart of the Argument has been nicely summarized by one of its chief critics, Michael Slote<sup>3</sup>:

Given determinism, there will always be some such earlier set of conditions *s* that is connected by laws of nature to any given human action *a* that takes place. But nothing can be done to alter, nothing can be *done* about those laws; and neither, it may be added, can anything be done about *s* at any time when the doing of *a* is immediately in question. Since *s* is thus necessary (e.g., unalterable) at the time when *a* is in question and since a law leading from *s* to *a* is similarly necessary (unalterable) at that time, it would seem to follow that *a* itself is necessary (unalterable, unavoidable) at that time—however ignorant of that fact the agent of *a* may be. Presumably, then, the agent in question does not act freely in performing *a*, and since the argument has been entirely general in its assumptions, one may conclude that no human being ever acts freely in a deterministic universe (6).

Let us try to specify the Argument a bit more formally. Take some everyday action that the compatibilist would want to label free—say, Elfreth's petting his iguana at time *t*. Let '*A*' stand for the proposition that Elfreth pets his iguana at *t*. If determinism is true, *A* is the necessary consequence of any earlier state of the universe; in a deterministic world, the laws of nature—laws which we humans are powerless to break—guarantee that any such previous state ulti-

<sup>2</sup> I am well aware that the definition of determinism offered here might have to be modified to account for various objections—e.g., that it leaves no room for the occurrence of miracles in a deterministic universe. As I am convinced that no such modification would make any difference to our discussion of the Argument and as things are going to get quite complicated enough in the course of that discussion, I have decided to go with the simpler definition.

<sup>3</sup> "Selective Necessity and the Free-will Problem," this JOURNAL, LXXIX, 1 (January 1982): 5–24.



mately leads to that state of the world at  $t$  which includes Elfreth's iguana petting. Thus, if we use 'N' to express the relevant type of necessity and 'S' to stand for a proposition expressing some such prior world-state, we can say that determinism is true only if

$$(1) \quad N(S \supset A)$$

But, at the time  $t$  when Elfreth pets his iguana, there is nothing whatsoever that Elfreth can do about the truth of  $S$ , for humans simply have no power over prior states of the universe. Thus, at  $t$ ,  $S$  was also necessary or unavoidable for Elfreth—that is,

$$(2) \quad N(S)$$

Now, (1) states that a certain conditional is necessary, and (2) tells us that the antecedent of this conditional is also necessary. From this it surely seems to follow that the consequent is necessary as well—i.e., that

$$(3) \quad N(A)$$

is also true. But to say that  $A$  is necessary is to say that it is unavoidable for Elfreth—that there is nothing he can do to keep it from being true. But, if Elfreth is thus powerless with regard to the truth value of  $A$ , it seems clear that his action is *not* a free action.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if determinism is true, Elfreth's action is not free. And, since performing free actions is no more up Elfreth's alley than it is up that of any agent, the upshot of the Argument is that determinism is indeed incompatible with human freedom. To uphold freedom—i.e., to reject (3)—we need to reject either (1) or (2); and, since (2) is clearly true, those who wish to say that humans are free have no choice but to reject (1) and the deterministic thesis from which (1) follows.

The obvious first step for compatibilists seeking to defuse this line of reasoning would be to focus on the notion of necessity employed in the Argument. The use of a necessity operator is, of course, what lends the Argument considerable strength; but is this strength ac-

<sup>4</sup> This conditional may not be an instance of a general truth; there may be cases where powerlessness over the performance of an action does *not* entail that the action is unfree. See Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," this JOURNAL, LXVI, 23 (Dec. 4, 1969): 829–839. Frankfurt's thesis is, of course, a controversial one, but the correct resolution of that controversy is of little or no relevance to the Argument. For Frankfurt's examples cast doubt at most on the principle, "If  $X$  performs  $Y$  freely,  $X$  could have refrained from performing  $Y$ "; they give us no reason at all to doubt the truth of the principle, "If  $X$  performs  $Y$  freely,  $X$  could have refrained from performing  $Y$  freely." But the latter principle is all we need for the Argument, provided that we amend  $A$  to read, "Elfreth pets his iguana freely."



quired legitimately? After all, the main reason we are inclined to think that (3) *does* follow from (1) and (2) is that an inference of the form

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{[A]} \qquad \qquad \qquad N(X \supset Y) \\
 \qquad \qquad \qquad N(X) \\
 \hline
 \qquad \qquad \qquad N(Y)
 \end{array}$$

is evidently valid, provided that the 'N' represents *logical* or *metaphysical* necessity. But the 'N' in the Argument *cannot* be interpreted in such a way—if it were, there would be no reason at all to think that either (1) or (2) is true, and hence the Argument would collapse. Rather, the notion of necessity employed in the Argument is, as was noted, that of unavailability. *Might* it not be, then, that the Argument's *prima facie* force derives in large part from the conflation of the concepts of metaphysical necessity and unavailability?

The easiest way for the incompatibilist to meet this charge of equivocation is simply to dispense with talk of necessity and to present the Argument explicitly and exclusively in terms of unavailability. Hence, using 'U' to stand for unavailability, we can simply amend (1)–(3) as follows:

$$(1) \qquad \qquad \qquad U(S \supset A)$$

$$(2) \qquad \qquad \qquad U(S)$$

and

$$(3) \qquad \qquad \qquad U(A)$$

and thereby escape the possibility of confusion.

This escape, however, is not without cost. For now, the compatibilist can respond, how can we evaluate the Argument until the incompatibilist tells us just how this concept of unavailability is to be understood? So long as the Argument was stated in terms of necessity, the incompatibilist could point to inference form [A] as warranting the Argument's claim to validity. But now that talk of necessity has been abandoned, the relevant rule of inference is not [A] but

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{[B]} \qquad \qquad \qquad U(X \supset Y) \\
 \qquad \qquad \qquad U(X) \\
 \hline
 \qquad \qquad \qquad U(Y)
 \end{array}$$

And why should we accept [B] until we are told just what unavailability amounts to? Indeed, in the absence of such an explication, can we even be sure that either (1) or especially (2) is true, or that the



truth of (3) really would imply that Elfreth's action was unfree? In sum, is not the Argument's luminosity all but extinguished when we move from the (comparatively) clear land of necessity to the uncharted realm of unavoidability?

The compatibilists' response here amounts to a challenge to the incompatibilist, a challenge to provide a definition (analysis, characterization) of unavoidability such that that part of the Argument whose conclusion is (3)—a subargument henceforth to be called the *Subargument*—is clearly (i) valid, (ii) sound, and (iii) relevant to the issue of freedom. Unless such a definition can be offered, compatibilists might say, why should we think that the Argument is of any force at all against compatibilism?

It seems to me that the compatibilists' challenge here is appropriate. For the Argument to be a success, the incompatibilist needs to offer an understanding of unavoidability which satisfies the three requirements just mentioned. Let us consider each of the three in turn.

(i) *Validity*. The Argument alleges that (3) follows from (1) and (2). But this allegation is defensible only if inference form [B] is valid. Now, as Slote has noted, the most obvious way to argue for the validity of [B] is by assuming that unavoidability is both *agglomerative* (i.e., closed with respect to conjunction introduction) and *closed under entailment* (i.e., under logic implication). For, if agglomerativity holds—i.e., if

$$(\alpha) \quad (Up \ \& \ Uq) \supset U(p \ \& \ q)$$

is true for any  $p$  and  $q$ —then we can legitimately deduce from the two premises of [B] that  $U[(X \supset Y) \ \& \ X]$ . But, of course,  $[(X \supset Y) \ \& \ X]$  entails  $Y$ . So, if unavoidability is also closed under entailment—i.e., if

$$(\beta) \quad (Up \ \& \ p \rightarrow q) \supset Uq$$

is also true for any  $p$  and  $q$ —then we could infer  $U(Y)$  from  $U[(X \supset Y) \ \& \ X]$ , and thereby prove the validity of [B].<sup>5</sup> Since [B] is the only rule of inference upon which the Subargument relies, it follows that incompatibilists can guarantee the validity of the Subargument provided they make sure that their definition of unavoidability makes both  $(\alpha)$  and  $(\beta)$  true.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Slote, pp. 9/10. My [B] corresponds to what Slote calls "the main modal principle."

<sup>6</sup> It is, of course, conceivable that [B] be (demonstrably) valid even though either  $(\alpha)$  or  $(\beta)$  was (demonstrably) false. Slote's point is only that, given the absence of any other plausible means of justifying [B], it would be hard to feel confident of its validity if either  $(\alpha)$  or  $(\beta)$  were in doubt.



(ii) *Soundness*. If the validity of the Subargument has thus been assured, its soundness will follow, provided that the definition of unavoidability employed is one that (given determinism) renders both (1) and (2) true. Of course, a definition could conceivably have *this* effect—render both (1) and (2) true—even though no one could tell (or tell for sure) that it did; but a definition that provided soundness in this minimal sense would be worthless as far as the Argument is concerned. For the Argument is supposed to provide us with a *reason* to reject compatibilism, and an argument whose soundness could not be recognized could hardly offer such a reason.<sup>7</sup> Hence, the Argument will succeed only to the extent that our definition of unavoidability is such that no one who presupposes the truth of determinism could reasonably reject (1) or (2).

(iii) *Relevance*. For the Argument from Unavoidability to succeed, incompatibilists must take care not to define unavoidability in such a way that the Subargument, though valid and sound, is susceptible to the charge of *ignoratio elenchi*. That is, it must be evident that the truth of (3) does indeed entail that Elfreth's action was unfree. If one can plausibly charge that the sense of unavoidability employed in the Argument is not relevant to the question of human freedom, the Argument will have failed to refute compatibilism.

For the Argument to work, then, incompatibilists need to provide an analysis of unavoidability which (i) guarantees the truth of ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ), (ii) makes premises (1) and (2) clearly true if the truth of determinism is assumed, and (iii) assures us that the truth of (3) implies Elfreth's lack of freedom. What are the likely candidates for such an analysis, and how well do they satisfy these three conditions?

## II

Before we look at particular candidates, a couple of general points are in order. First, since the Argument seems to view unavoidability as a property relating to propositions (rather than, say, to states of affairs or events), all the prospective characterizations of unavoidability to be examined will be attempts to define such a property; what is unavoidable, then, will be (the truth of) a proposition. Second, since it is surely conceivable that one agent could have no power over the truth of a proposition while another agent did have such power, it is conceivable that a proposition could be unavoidable for one

<sup>7</sup> Though Wiggins seems more cautious, there can be little doubt that Lamb and van Inwagen do (or at least once did) indeed see the Argument as *proving* or *demonstrating* that compatibilism is false. A glance at the title of Lamb's article, or at the first paragraph of ch. III of van Inwagen's *An Essay on Free Will*, should suffice to establish this point.



agent but avoidable for another. This suggests that unavoidability is most properly seen as a relational property, with agents and propositions as relata.<sup>8</sup> Henceforth, then, let us read ' $Uap$ ' as " $p$  is unavoidable for  $a$ ." In accord with this new reading, we might (letting ' $e$ ' stand for 'Elfreth') reformulate (1)–(3) as

$$(1) \quad Ue(S \supset A)$$

$$(2) \quad Ue(S)$$

$$(3) \quad Ue(A)$$

( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ) would now read:

$$(\alpha) \quad \forall a \forall p \forall q [(Uap \ \& \ Uaq) \supset Ua(p \ \& \ q)]$$

$$(\beta) \quad \forall a \forall p \forall q [(Uap \ \& \ p \rightarrow q) \supset Uaq]$$

It is fairly easy to find analyses of unavoidability which take account of these general points and which have (at least initially) an air of plausibility, but which fail to satisfy the three conditions noted in section 1. Take, for example, the notion of unavoidability favored by Slote. Noting that most proponents of the Argument would insist that the state of the universe specified by  $S$  in (1) and (2) be a state prior to Elfreth's birth, Slote speculates that their reason for so insisting is their wish to make sure that the beliefs, desires, abilities, and the like which Elfreth has at  $t$  form no part of the causal explanation of the truth of  $S$ . This insulation from the causal reach of such factors as current beliefs is, Slote insinuates, what is central to the notion of unavoidability. Hence, he suggests that we define *unavoidability* in something like the following way:

- (D1)  $Uap$  =<sub>df</sub> The state of affairs corresponding to  $p$  was brought about by a causal chain that makes no use of  $a$ 's desires, beliefs, abilities, and the like.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Strictly speaking, there should be a temporal reference as well, for it is eminently plausible to think that a proposition might be unavoidable for an agent at one time, but not unavoidable for that same agent at some other time. To simplify the presentation, I have refrained from including such temporal indices in what follows. For the same reason, I have also adopted the common practice of letting some symbols stand indifferently for sentences or names—compare the use of  $H$  and  $L$  in (22) and (23).

<sup>9</sup> Slote implies only that something *like* (D1) is the appropriate analysis—he acknowledges that it "leaves out some factors relevant to unavoidability." See Slote, p. 19, fn 17. Such an analysis of unavoidability has been implicitly forwarded in recent years by several other compatibilists as well. See Alvin Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 84/5; Anthony Kenny, *Will, Freedom and Power* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975), p. 153; and Daniel Dennett, *Elbow Room* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 118, 127/8.



If (D1) is employed, though, the Argument is obviously a failure, because (D1) renders rule of inference [B], which justifies the move from (1) and (2) to (3), patently invalid. For (given determinism), although Elfreth's current character traits clearly play no causal role in the explanation either of the laws of nature linking *S* to *A* or of *S* itself, they surely do play a role in bringing about Elfreth's act of iguana petting. As Slote puts it, "even if our deliberate actions are determined, that determinism operates, nonfatalistically, by means of (causal chains involving) the approximately coeval desires, abilities, character, and beliefs of human agents" (19). In short, if 'U' is analyzed via (D1), then, assuming determinism, (1) and (2) turn out clearly true, but (3) turns out clearly false. Hence, (D1) fails our first condition for an adequate analysis of unavoidability, for it renders the Argument invalid.

Slote sees the failure of (D1) as implying that the Argument itself is a failure, but such a conclusion is (to put it mildly) premature; for the failure of *one* purported analysis of unavoidability to satisfy our three conditions by no means implies that *no* analysis can succeed. Slote's focusing upon (D1) is all the more surprising given the fact that those who have publicly endorsed the Argument have not kept silent regarding the notion of unavoidability they think is involved. Peter van Inwagen, in fact, has offered us the means to fashion two definitions of the concept.<sup>10</sup> The first can be stated as follows:

- (D2)  $Uap =_{df}$  For any state of affairs *x* such that *a* can (i.e., has the power to) bring about *x*, it is necessarily the case that, if *a* brings about *x*, then *p*.

Suppose we allow 'Pax' to abbreviate "*a* can (has the power to) bring about *x*," and 'Cax' to abbreviate "*a* brings about *x*"; (D2) might then be symbolized:

- (D2)  $Uap =_{df} \forall x [Pax \supset (Cax \supset p)]^{11}$

<sup>10</sup> Van Inwagen talks not of *unavoidable* propositions, but of propositions that we can *render false*. But the two notions are clearly interdefinable, for to say that an agent *s* can render a proposition *p* false is just to say that *p* is *not* unavoidable for *s*; thus, for any analysis of rendering false, the negation of that analysis offers us a corresponding analysis of unavoidability. It might also be noted that each of these concepts is most plausibly seen as applying only to *true* propositions.

<sup>11</sup> See van Inwagen, "Reply to Narveson," *Philosophical Studies*, xxxii, 1 (July 1977): 89–98, p. 93. The actual definition of rendering false offered here by van Inwagen would yield

$$Uap =_{df} \forall x [Pax \supset \sim (Cax \supset \sim p)]$$

as our definition of unavoidability. On this definition, though, unavoidability would not seem to be demonstrably agglomerative, for the compatibilist will presumably say that, provided *a* is a free agent, we can produce a counterexample to (α) by



On the level of *prima facie* plausibility, (D2) would surely strike many as superior to (D1); for it does seem promising to think of something whose truth would be logically guaranteed by *anything* Elfreth might bring about as something that is indeed unavoidable for Elfreth. Furthermore, from the incompatibilist's point of view, (D2) possesses an even more significant advantage over (D1): whereas (D1) failed to make the Subargument valid, (D2) passes the test of validity. For, if 'U' is defined as (D2) suggests, then unavoidability is obviously both agglomerative (if  $p$  is entailed by anything I might bring about, and the same goes for  $q$ , then clearly the conjunction of  $p$  and  $q$  is entailed by anything I might bring about) and closed under entailment (for, if anything I might bring about entails  $p$ , and  $p$  entails  $q$ , then anything I might bring about entails  $q$ ). Given (D2), then, both ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ) hold, and we can be assured of the Subargument's validity.<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, (D2) fares less well when we turn to our second criterion for a successful definition—viz., its ability to render the Argument sound. In fact, given (D2), it seems evident that neither (1) nor (2) is true. For, if there is a state of affairs which Elfreth can bring about, surely there is a state of affairs which he can bring about such that his bringing it about *entails* neither that  $S$  implies  $A$  nor that the world was once as  $S$  says it was. So, although a definite improvement over (D1), (D2) is not the definition that the incompatibilist needs.

Perhaps the defect in (D2) can be corrected by merely building the past and the laws of nature into our definiens. A proposition that is unavoidable for Elfreth may not be, simply, the logical consequence of anything he brings about—that is the moral of (D2)'s failure—but will it not be the logical consequence of anything he brings about *given that* the world has had a certain *history* and that certain *laws of nature* hold? Reflections of this sort lead to a second analysis of unavoidability suggested by van Inwagen, namely:<sup>13</sup>

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replacing  $p$  with  $H$  (the history of the world) and  $q$  with  $L$  (the laws of nature). Hence, I have changed the consequent of the definiens to  $Cax \rightarrow p$ , so as to produce the more formidable (D2).

<sup>12</sup> (D2) would also satisfy the relevance criterion, for it would be eminently unreasonable to accept (3) according to (D2) and also hold that Elfreth could have refrained from petting his iguana.

<sup>13</sup> See his *An Essay on Free Will*, p. 68. Van Inwagen's definition of rendering false is disanalogous to (D3) in two major respects: (i) it is couched in terms of an agent's "power to arrange or modify the concrete objects that constitute his environment," rather than in terms of one's power to bring about states of affairs; and (ii) it makes no explicit reference to the laws of nature in the definiens. Since the change in locution noted in (i) seems unmotivated and since talk of bringing about



- (D3)  $Uap =_{df}$  For any state of affairs  $x$  such that  $a$  can bring about  $x$ , it is necessarily the case that, if  $a$  brings about  $x$  (given the laws of nature and the history of the world), then  $p$ .

Let ' $H$ ' stand for a proposition specifying the history of the world. (Intuitively, one might think of this as a conjunctive proposition, the conjuncts of which are, like  $S$ , descriptions of the world at particular times.)<sup>14</sup> Similarly, let ' $L$ ' stand for a proposition expressing all the laws of nature. (D3) might then be presented more perspicuously as

$$(D3) \quad Uap =_{df} \forall x \{ Pax \supset [(H \& L \& Cax) \rightarrow p] \}$$

Is (D3) a genuine improvement upon (D2)? Let us consider how well it satisfies our three criteria of validity, soundness, and relevance.

First, would (D3) make the Subargument valid? That is, would ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ) both be true given (D3)? Consider first ( $\alpha$ ). Suppose  $Uap$  and  $Uaq$ ; would  $Ua(p \& q)$  follow? Clearly, it would. For, given (D3), ' $Uap$ ' is identical with

$$(4) \quad \forall x \{ Pax \supset [(H \& L \& Cax) \rightarrow p] \}$$

whereas ' $Uaq$ ' is identical with

$$(5) \quad \forall x \{ Pax \supset [(H \& L \& Cax) \rightarrow q] \}$$

Now, from (4) and (5), one can easily derive

$$(6) \quad \forall x \{ Pax \supset [(H \& L \& Cax) \rightarrow (p \& q)] \}$$

which, given (D3), is identical with ' $Ua(p \& q)$ '. So ( $\alpha$ ) is indeed true—' $U$ ' is indeed agglomerative—if (D3) is our definition.

What, then, of ( $\beta$ )? Does it also turn out to be true given (D3)? Yes, it does. Suppose  $Uap$  and  $p \rightarrow q$ . As we have seen, ' $Uap$ ', given (D3), is identical with (4). Instantiating, we can derive

$$(7) \quad Paz \supset [(H \& L \& Caz) \rightarrow p]$$

states of affairs seems clear enough, I have not followed van Inwagen's new way of speaking; however, readers who wish to may do so, I think, without substantially affecting the discussion of (D3). As for (ii), a definiens which *does not* refer to the laws of nature would be open to objections very similar to the Nostradamus counterexample mentioned by van Inwagen (67). Finally, in order to assure agglomerativity, I have made a change in the definiens of the same type as that mentioned above in note 11.

<sup>14</sup> I am presuming that the history of the world is inclusive enough so that compatibilists and incompatibilists may differ over whether that history plus the laws of nature determine the future, but is *not* so inclusive as to make that history *by itself* determinative of the future. Hence, the history of the world is not to be thought of as including future-tense propositions. For a detailed explication of the Ockhamist notion of history being presupposed here, see Alfred J. Freddoso, "Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism," this JOURNAL, LXXX, 5 (May 1983): 257–278.



from (4). But (7), combined with our supposition that  $p \Rightarrow q$ , patently entails

$$(8) \quad Paz \supset [(H \& L \& Caz) \Rightarrow q]$$

which (via universal generalization) yields

$$(9) \quad \forall x \{Pax \supset [(H \& L \& Cax) \Rightarrow q]\}$$

But, given (D3), (9) is identical with 'Uaq'. So (D3) assures us that, if  $Uap$  and  $p \Rightarrow q$ , then  $Uaq$ —i.e., it assures us that 'U' is closed under entailment.

Since ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\beta$ ) both turn out true on (D3), there can be no doubt that (D3) guarantees the Subargument's validity. Does it, though, also guarantee the Subargument's soundness? That is, does it render (1) and (2) beyond reasonable doubt if determinism is assumed? Consider (1) first. For (1), interpreted via (D3), to be false, there would have to be some state of affairs (call it  $z$ ) which Elfreth can bring about such that

$$(10) \quad \sim [(H \& L \& Cez) \Rightarrow (S \supset A)]$$

Now, if determinism is true, then the history of the world and the laws of nature together entail that Elfreth pet his iguana at  $t$ . So the determinist will affirm

$$(11) \quad (H \& L) \Rightarrow A$$

But, of course, since

$$(12) \quad A \Rightarrow (S \supset A)$$

it follows that the determinist is also committed to

$$(13) \quad (H \& L) \Rightarrow (S \supset A)$$

Since antecedents of entailments can always legitimately be strengthened, (13) in turn entails

$$(14) \quad (H \& L \& Cez) \Rightarrow (S \supset A)$$

But (14) is simply the negation of (10). Since, given (D3), the affirmation of (10) is required if one is to deny (1), and, since, as we have just seen, anyone assuming determinism to be true is committed to affirming (14) and thus to rejecting (10), it follows that, given determinism, (1) is indeed true if (D3) is our analysis of unavoidability.

Is (2) similarly beyond dispute? Clearly, it is. For, given (D3), (2) could be false only if there were some state of affairs  $z$  which Elfreth can bring about such that

$$(15) \quad \sim [(H \& L \& Cez) \Rightarrow S]$$



But, since  $H$  specifies the complete history of the world, it will surely include that description of the world at a certain time which  $S$  provides. In other words,  $H$  by itself will entail  $S$ . But then, of course,  $H$  conjoined with anything whatsoever will also entail  $S$ . So there is simply no way in which (15) could be true. And, since (2) could be false only if (15) were true, it follows that (D3) does indeed guarantee the truth of (2).

Thus far, (D3) has been most accommodating to the incompatibilist. As we have seen, provided that we understand the Argument as speaking of unavoidability in the sense offered by (D3), we can demonstrate conclusively that both of the inferential rules presupposed by the Subargument are valid, and that both of the premises it employs are true if determinism is true. But, if the line of reasoning given in the Subargument is thus valid and sound, the compatibilist has little choice but to concede that (3) is true as well. That is, the compatibilist is committed to saying that, in the sense given by (D3), it is indeed unavoidable for Elfreth that he pet his iguana at  $t$  if determinism is true.

Rash incompatibilists might be tempted to claim victory at this point, for (they might claim) if Elfreth's act of iguana petting was unavoidable, he could not have refrained from performing it, and, if he could not have refrained, his action was not free. Circumspect compatibilists, however, would not surrender so easily. True, they might say, (D3) does indeed satisfy the validity and soundness criteria; but does it satisfy the relevance criterion? All that has been proved thus far is that it was unavoidable *in the sense given by (D3)* that Elfreth pet his iguana. But how do we know that unavoidability *in this sense* is inimical to freedom? Might it not be that, even though (3) is true *in the sense given by (D3)*, it is also true that Elfreth could have refrained from petting his iguana? The use of the word 'unavoidable' might *incline* us to think that the truth of (3) is injurious to Elfreth's freedom, but that merely shows the rhetorical craftiness of the incompatibilist. Is there any *reason* to regard (3) interpreted according to (D3) as relevant to the question of freedom?

The incompatibilist might try to show that it is. What the compatibilist is requesting is a demonstration that it follows from (3) that Elfreth could not have refrained from petting his iguana. Now, presumably, Elfreth could have refrained from petting his iguana if and only if Elfreth had the power to bring about that state of affairs which corresponds to  $\sim A$  (i.e., the state of affairs of its not being the case that Elfreth pets his iguana at  $t$ ). Let ' $\bar{A}$ ' stand for this state of affairs. What the compatibilist wants, then, is a reason to think that



$$(16) \quad \sim Pe\bar{A}$$

does indeed follow from (3). Given (D3), (3) is identical with

$$(17) \quad \forall x\{Pex \supset [(H \& L \& Cex) \rightarrow A]\}$$

But why think that (17) entails (16)? Well, (17) obviously implies

$$(18) \quad Pe\bar{A} \supset [(H \& L \& Ce\bar{A}) \rightarrow A]$$

If we could show that the consequent of (18) is false, it would follow that its antecedent is also false; and, since its antecedent is simply the negation of (16), that would suffice to show that (16) does follow from (17).

So the challenge for the incompatibilist is to show that no one could reasonably accept the consequent of (18), namely

$$(19) \quad (H \& L \& Ce\bar{A}) \rightarrow A$$

But why not? Well, a libertarian might argue, if Elfreth brings about  $\bar{A}$ , it clearly would have to be the case that  $\sim A$ . In other words,

$$(20) \quad Ce\bar{A} \rightarrow \sim A$$

is obviously true. But (20) clearly implies

$$(21) \quad (H \& L \& Ce\bar{A}) \rightarrow \sim A$$

Given the truth of (21), (19) could be true only if these two conditionals' common conjunctive antecedent were impossible—i.e., only if

$$(22) \quad \sim \Diamond(H \& L \& Ce\bar{A})$$

Since (22) is false, it follows that (19) is false as well.

Unfortunately, the last step in this argument is little more than blatant libertarian bluster. For why should compatibilists concede that (22) is false? After all, (22) is equivalent to

$$(23) \quad (H \& L) \rightarrow \sim Ce\bar{A}$$

But, far from thinking that (23) is false, will not compatibilists see (23) as a simple and obvious consequence of the deterministic thesis they espouse (or at least countenance espousing)? If, as a matter of fact, Elfreth *did* pet his iguana at  $t$ , then determinism tells us that the history of the world conjoined with the laws of nature entails that he pet his iguana—that is, it tells us that

$$(24) \quad (H \& L) \rightarrow A$$



is true. Since it is clearly the case that  $A$  is incompatible with Elfreth's bringing about  $\sim A$ , the compatibilist will also insist that

$$(25) \quad A \Rightarrow \sim Ce\bar{A}$$

But (24) and (25), of course, patently imply (23) and its equivalent, (22). So compatibilists would seemingly be well within their rights to deny that (22) is false and, hence, to deny that they have been given any reason to think that (17) implies (16). And, in the absence of such a reason, they would no doubt remind us, the truth of (3) would appear to be fully compatible with the truth of compatibilism.

Is (D3), then, ultimately a failure? The incompatibilist might try one more strategy to show that (D3) passes the relevance criterion—i.e., that (17) does entail (16). For consider the following principle:

$$(26) \quad \forall a \forall p [Pap \supset \Diamond(H \& L \& Cap)]$$

According to this principle, a necessary condition of an agent's having the *power* to bring about a certain state of affairs is that it be *possible*, given the history of the world and the laws of nature, that the agent bring about that state of affairs. Now, such a principle, the incompatibilist might say, is clearly true; for what sense would it make to speak of an agent's having the *power* to do something if the agent *could not actually* do it? In the case of Elfreth and his iguana petting, (26) tells us that

$$(27) \quad Pe\bar{A} \supset \Diamond(H \& L \& Ce\bar{A})$$

Now, the compatibilist was able to accept (17) while rejecting (16) only by insisting that (22) was true. But (22) is simply the negation of the consequent of (27). By endorsing (22), then, compatibilists have committed themselves to denying the antecedent of (27). However, to deny the antecedent of (27) just *is* to affirm (16). So, the incompatibilist might conclude, there is no way of escaping the conclusion that (17) entails (16); and, if it does, then (D3) passes the relevance test and renders the Argument a success.

This argument shows conclusively that, if (26) and (27) are acceptable principles, then (D3) satisfies each of our three conditions; if they are *not* acceptable, though, it is difficult to see how the relevance test can be met by (D3). Now, it might be thought that this reliance upon (26) and (27) is in no sense an essential feature of the Argument; further investigation, one might suspect, would provide us with a definition and an Argument that presupposed the truth of neither (26) nor (27). In fact, however, the more we canvass the plausible candidates for a definition of 'U', the more quixotic it



appears to think that the Argument can get by without something like (26) and (27) as presuppositions.

We might, for example, try exchanging talk of *entailment* in our definiens for talk of *counterfactual* or *subjunctive* implication, thereby arriving at definitions such as

- (D4)  $Uap =_{df}$  for any state of affairs  $x$  such that  $a$  can bring about  $x$ , if  $a$  were to bring about  $x$ , then it would be the case that  $p$ .

or

- (D5)  $Uap =_{df}$  for any state of affairs  $x$  such that  $a$  can bring about  $x$ , if  $a$  were to bring about  $x$  (given the laws of nature and the history of the world), it would be the case that  $p$ .

Given (D4), however, (2) is no longer uncontroversially true; thus, (D4) fails the soundness test.<sup>15</sup> And (D5), though yielding an argument that is demonstrably valid and sound, stands in the same position vis-à-vis the relevance test as (D3): it seems to pass only if (26) and (27) can safely be assumed.

Other definitions of 'U' might be ventured, but none that I have seen or devised manages to give us a successful Argument without employing something along the lines of (26) and (27).<sup>16</sup> Can we *prove* that the Argument tacitly assumes such theses? I doubt it. But, until we are presented with a version of the Argument the success of which *does not* depend upon the acceptability of (26) and (27), it seems fair to assume that they are indeed required.

<sup>15</sup> Most compatibilists, I think, would reject (2) interpreted according to (D4) because they would hold that Elfreth did have the power to refrain from petting his iguana, but would actually have refrained only if  $H$  had been different. On the other hand, compatibilists who feel that worlds with different laws are closer to our world than are worlds with different histories would presumably be inclined, given (D4), to reject (1) rather than (2). It should be noted that neither of these responses need be based on anything so questionable as a wholesale rejection of "backtracking" counterfactuals. For a compatibilist defense of such counterfactuals, see Jonathan Bennett, "Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction," *Philosophical Review*, xciii (January 1984): 57-91.

<sup>16</sup> To mention one prominent example: Wiggins (45/6) suggests a definition such as

- (D6)  $Uap =_{df}$   $p$  holds in every possible world whose history and laws of nature are indistinguishable from the history and laws of nature of the actual world.

Although such a definition evidently yields a valid and sound Subargument, it would appear to pass the relevance test only if a very close relative of (26), namely,

(26\*)  $\forall a \forall p [Pap \supset \diamond (H \& L \& p \text{ occurs})]$   
can be taken for granted. And, of course, compatibilist reservations regarding (26) are equally applicable to (26\*).



## III

Our evaluation of the Argument appears, therefore, to depend crucially upon our verdict regarding (26) and (27). Now, it might be felt that, if these two theses were established, the triumph of the Argument would be unquestioned; and, in a sense, this feeling is surely on target. In another sense, however, it is not. For, if something like (27) can safely be assumed, we can easily and directly refute compatibilism, and refute it without engaging in any complex prestidigitations involving analyses of unavoidability. In fact, we can refute compatibilism without making any reference to unavoidability at all.

Suppose, as the compatibilist thinks we consistently can, that determinism is true and that Elfreth freely pets his iguana at *t*. If so, then Elfreth's iguana petting was the metaphysically necessary consequence of the history of the world prior to *t* and the laws of nature. So, letting 'D' abbreviate the thesis that determinism is true, we know that

$$(28) \quad (D \ \& \ A) \supset [(H \ \& \ L) \rightarrow A]$$

Since, as we have already noted,

$$(25) \quad A \Rightarrow \sim Ce\bar{A}$$

is obviously true, it follows from (28) that

$$(29) \quad (D \ \& \ A) \supset [(H \ \& \ L) \Rightarrow \sim Ce\bar{A}]$$

which is equivalent to

$$(30) \quad (D \ \& \ A) \supset \sim \Diamond (H \ \& \ L \ \& \ Ce\bar{A})$$

Now, suppose it were beyond dispute that

$$(27) \quad Pe\bar{A} \supset \Diamond (H \ \& \ L \ \& \ Ce\bar{A})$$

From (27) and (30) we could then infer

$$(31) \quad Pe\bar{A} \supset \sim (D \ \& \ A)$$

Since compatibilists want to affirm Elfreth's power to do other than he did, they will affirm the antecedent of (31), and so they have no choice but to affirm its consequent—i.e.,

$$(32) \quad \sim (D \ \& \ A)$$

And, since *A* is beyond dispute, compatibilists would be left with no choice but to reject *D*—i.e., to renounce determinism.

Even if (27) were an acceptable starting point for discussion, then, the Argument would have to be judged to be little more than a



convoluted superfluity. True, it would succeed in refuting compatibilism, but it would do so at the cost of introducing a concept (unavoidability), along with definitions and rules of inference for that concept, which were totally unnecessary to effect that refutation. Such an Argument could hardly be seen as throwing light on the issue, or as genuinely advancing the discussion.

Of course, if (26) and (27) were *not* beyond dispute—and, a fortiori, if they were themselves instances of the very type of thesis over which compatibilists and incompatibilists have traditionally wrangled—the Argument would have even less right to be seen as a step in the right direction. Unfortunately for the incompatibilist, this seems to be the case. For, traditionally, compatibilists have tried to reinforce their position by offering conditional analyses of power—i.e., analyses according to which someone like Elfreth had the power to refrain from petting his iguana just in case he would have refrained had such and such been the case. In filling out such an analysis, compatibilists have not felt constrained to guarantee that the consequent of (27) be true—i.e., that Elfreth's refraining might actually have occurred even if nothing else had been different. On the contrary, J. S. Mill, Moritz Schlick, and others have made a point of saying that one who *could* have done otherwise *would* have done otherwise only if some element in the situation (the agent's beliefs, desires, and the like being those most often cited) *had* been different. Those who favor such conditional analyses, then, would not view either (27) or the more general (26) as obvious truths; they would see them, rather, as evident falsehoods.

Now, it is fair to say that no particular way of completing this conditional analysis has garnered anything approaching universal acceptance among compatibilists. It is also fair to say that the most obvious ways of trying to complete it in a way amenable to compatibilists have been subjected to rather severe criticism by J. L. Austin, C. D. Broad, Roderick Chisholm, and others.<sup>17</sup> But it would surely constitute the height of unfairness to say that we can therefore take it as an indisputable starting point in our discussions of freedom that any such analysis must fail; and that is just what we would be doing if

<sup>17</sup> See Austin, "Ifs and Cans," in Bernard Berofsky, ed., *Free Will and Determinism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 295–322; Chisholm, "J. L. Austin's Philosophical Papers," *ibid.*, pp. 339–345; and Broad, "Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism," *ibid.*, pp. 135–159. It is worth noting that not all compatibilists look favorably upon conditional analyses; see, in particular, Keith Lehrer, "An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?", pp. 175–202 in his anthology cited above. Still, there can be little doubt that even Lehrerian compatibilists would hardly find (26) and (27) acceptable.



we were to presuppose that (26) and (27) are beyond dispute. (26) and (27) may well be true—indeed, I believe they are true—but to expect the compatibilist to be moved by an argument that relies upon them is surely to expect a bit too much.

This is not to imply that (26) and (27) have nothing to be said for them or are of no dialectical value. The incompatibilist might well point to them and ask whether, on reflection, we do not just see that (26) *does* express a necessary condition of an agent's having the power to perform a certain action. Some compatibilists—or, more likely, some of those as yet uncommitted to a position—might be led in this manner to accept (26) and (27) and, consequently, to embrace incompatibilism. But it seems doubtful that many compatibilists would be moved in this way; and, if they are not, it is hard to see how the incompatibilist can claim that their position is refuted. If there were some non-question-begging way to prove (26) or if it were a proposition that was manifestly self-evident, things might be different. But (26) does not appear to be self-evident (many people seem to understand it well enough and still reject it), and it is difficult to imagine how one might go about demonstrating it to one who understood it, yet honestly doubted it. Thus, an argument against compatibilism which depends upon (26) cannot be judged to be a refutation of that position. And so the Argument from Unavoidability would appear to be a failure.

#### IV

Can we conclude, then, that compatibilism is irrefutable? Of course not. For all that has been said here, there may well be some other argument that, relying not on (26) or (27) but only on premises that any reasonable compatibilist would accept, succeeds in showing determinism to be incompatible with human freedom. Commendable as the search for such an argument surely is, it may well be that the incompatibilist's best means of fostering philosophical progress lies in a different direction—that of developing a more finely articulated version of incompatibilism and responding to objections that compatibilists or others raise against it.<sup>18</sup> This more positive approach may lack much of the glamor and excitement that attend the search for a refutation of compatibilism, but I suspect that it will in the end prove more fruitful.

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<sup>18</sup> Much of this work has already been done, most notably by Richard Taylor and Chisholm; see especially Taylor's *Action and Purpose* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), and Chisholm's *Person and Object* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1976).



## DECIDING TO BELIEVE WITHOUT SELF-DECEPTION\*

**D**AVID HUME noticed (as have many others) that believing is not directly subject to our conscious control. His account suggests that it is a matter of contingent fact that one's beliefs do not respond to one's will, similar to the way in which hiccoughs do not respond to one's will. Bernard Williams<sup>1</sup> has persuasively argued that our inability to believe at will is not a contingent fact, but a consequence of the conceptual relations among the notions of belief, evidence, and truth. To believe *p* is to believe that *p* is true. But, if I could simply will myself to believe *p*, then I could do so whether *p* is true or not, and I would know that I could do so. Presumably the notion of trying to will myself to believe something would only occur to me when I find the evidence for *p* insufficient to warrant belief in the normal way. So, if it were possible for me knowingly to believe at will, it would have to be possible for me to believe that *p* is true, knowing all the while that the belief is unwarranted by the evidence, that the belief was acquired at will, and that beliefs can be so acquired irrespective of their truth or falsity. Williams rightly judges that this borders on incoherence, and concludes that "With regard to no belief could I know—or, if all this be done in full consciousness, even suspect—that I had acquired it at will" (148).

Having rightly ruled out the possibility of believing "at will, just like that," Williams grants that "there is room for application of decision to belief by more roundabout routes" (149). But the pursuit of belief by such "roundabout routes" is, he says, deeply irrational and can succeed only by means of self-deception. Presumably one would at least have to deceive oneself about the origins of one's belief—i.e., about the fact that one lacked warranting evidence for one's belief and had arrived at one's belief as a consequence of having voluntarily undertaken a program of belief inducement via roundabout routes. This is how Jon Elster<sup>2</sup> interprets Williams's position in his recent discussion of the issue. Elster approvingly states the principle as follows: "one cannot both believe *p* and believe that one's belief that *p* stems from a decision to believe" (50).

David Pears<sup>3</sup> takes a similar position in his discussion of a hard case

\* I am grateful to Michael Phillips, Amelie O. Rorty, Peter Skagestad, Lilly-Marlene Russow, and Michael McPherson for helpful comments at various stages of this paper's development.

<sup>1</sup> "Deciding to Believe," in *Problems of the Self* (New York: Cambridge, 1973).

<sup>2</sup> *Ulysses and the Sirens* (New York: Cambridge, 1979).

<sup>3</sup> "Freud, Sartre and Self-Deception," in Richard Wollheim, ed., *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974), pp. 97–112.



in which an individual believes not- $p$  but finds that belief unacceptable and sets out to induce in himself a belief that  $p$ . After recounting strategies by which one might try to manipulate oneself into holding the desired belief, he states, "At some point in your progress it must become impossible for you to see through what you are doing to your motive for doing it" (108). Later he reiterates, "if this plan is going to succeed, there must come a stage in its execution at which you cannot review it in a way that brings in your motive" (*ibid.*).<sup>4</sup>

Each of these philosophers holds that an effort to induce in oneself a belief in the truth of some proposition that one believes to be false (or, an easier case, a proposition for which one lacks warranting evidence) can succeed only if one manages, somewhere along the way, to forget that one is engaged in such an effort. Although this view has strong intuitive appeal, I think that it is false, and that it can be shown false by example. I suspect that Williams's, Elster's, and Pears's acceptance of the view stems, first, from an underestimation of the extent to which nonevidential factors can influence belief, and, secondly, from a disregard of the fact that one's criteria for evidential warrant are themselves beliefs amenable to manipulation in "roundabout" ways. As the following example shows, it is indeed possible to believe  $p$  while believing that one's belief stems from a motivated decision to believe  $p$ , so long as one manages manipulatively to alter not only one's beliefs about the truth or falsity of  $p$  but also one's criteria for evidential warrant with regard to such beliefs.<sup>5</sup>

Nick is a bright, very ambitious biology major at a small fundamentalist college. He aspires to professional success as a biologist, and is willing to go to great lengths to attain it. He rightly suspects that his professional prospects are minimal so long as he maintains and avows his hitherto lifelong creationist beliefs. He has considered remaining a closet creationist while publicly avowing evolutionary theory, but a life of hypocrisy and deceit is an unappealing prospect. Overall, he judges that the best solution to his problem would be for him to believe that evolution is the correct theory of the development of life forms on earth. So he decides to believe it.

<sup>4</sup> In a passage *a propos* of the case to be considered, Pears qualifies his claim slightly by saying: "In the later stages either my original motives must be screened, or it will come through in a version which does not include my rational tendency to believe not- $p$ " (107). Pears does not explain this, but my example may be a case of what he has in mind. (See footnote 6.)

<sup>5</sup> This example was suggested to me by Peter Skagestad in an unpublished paper on Nietzsche's *Uses and Abuses of History*. Overall, the ideas in this paper have developed in stimulating discussions with Skagestad.



Nick believes (and always has) that revealed scripture, taken literally, is the ultimate arbiter of disputed questions, so it will be difficult for him to induce in himself the desired belief. But he knows something about the way in which nonevidential factors influence beliefs and he works out a project of belief inducement based upon that knowledge. He knows enough about psychology to know about dissonance-reduction mechanisms of the mind which tend to bring belief into consonance with behavior. He knows enough social psychology to know the extent to which our beliefs are influenced, in nonevidential ways, by the people whom we admire and with whom we spend time. He knows enough hermeneutics and philosophy of science to know that the ways in which evidence is interpreted—and even what counts as evidence—is in great part a function of one's guiding theory and interpretive hypotheses. And, finally, he knows enough to know that our selective attention to evidence and employment of interpretive hypotheses are largely a matter of habits—habits which, like other habits, can be cultivated over time.

So, in a move designed both to further his career directly and to bring it about that he accepts evolutionary theory, he decides to go to Harvard for graduate training. Though he believes evolutionary theory to be false, he has decided, on prudential grounds, to believe that it is true, and he is confident that the prestige of his instructors, various social pressures, and the internal dissonance brought on by the need constantly to avow and utilize evolutionary assumptions (in class, in exams, etc.) will ultimately induce in him the desired belief.

According to Williams's and Elster's thesis, Nick will be unable to succeed in his project of belief inducement unless he manages to forget or to deceive himself about his motives and about the origins of his belief. On this view, so long as he remembers that his belief is a consequence of his having employed a roundabout strategy of belief inducement, relying on non-evidential mechanisms and influences, he will be unable really to believe in the truth of the theory of evolution. But to see the falsity of this thesis, we need only fill in the rest of the story:

Six years later, Nick emerges from graduate school, Doctorate in hand, fully versed in and accepting of contemporary biological theory. He remembers quite well the entire story of how he had decided to come to Harvard in hopes that he would be seduced into believing that which he then thought to be false. He smiles inwardly at the benighted bumpkin he was—so benighted that he had thought evidential considerations insufficient to warrant belief in the truth of something as *obviously* true as evolutionary theory.

The point of the story is that Nick has successfully carried out his decision to believe *p* and is fully aware that his belief is a consequence



of a strategically planned "roundabout" program of belief inducement. He has not forgotten anything, and has no need to deceive himself about anything. Thus, Williams's and Elster's thesis is shown to be false.

One might argue that Nick has indeed forgotten something—he has forgotten that revealed scripture is the final arbiter of disputed questions. But, in fact, he has not forgotten this; he holds simply that it is false and that he was mistaken when he held it to be true. Perhaps, then, he has forgotten the evidence that once led him to hold his prior beliefs. But, in fact, he has not forgotten it at all; it is just that now he is inclined to think that evidence very weak and to think that his prior beliefs were mostly without evidential support, resting almost entirely upon ignorance, social pressure, superstition, and unjustified credence given to the views of his fundamentalist parents and teachers. In short, he has not forgotten anything about the past, though his present account of his prior epistemic state is different from the account that he would have offered previously. The story that he now tells about his previous epistemic position is a redescription of that position, but not one which requires either selective forgetfulness or self-deception.

It is important to note that there is a kind of symmetry between Nick's earlier perspective upon his later position and his later perspective upon his earlier position. Referring to him prior to implementation of his strategy of belief inducement as Nick<sub>1</sub>, and upon graduation from Harvard as Nick<sub>2</sub>, this symmetry can be described as follows: Nick<sub>1</sub> views his own beliefs as based upon warranting evidence and foresees Nick<sub>2</sub>'s beliefs to be the results of nonevidential causal influences (professors' prestige, social pressures), prejudicially selective habits of attention, and employment of tendentious interpretive hypotheses. Likewise, Nick<sub>2</sub> views his own beliefs as evidentially warranted and those of Nick<sub>1</sub> as the result of ignorance, distorted perspective, ritual belief reinforcement and other nonrational causal influences. The fact that each can "explain away" the beliefs and the evidential standards of the other provides sufficient "epistemic insulation" between the two to permit Nick<sub>2</sub> sincerely to believe *p* without having to forget or deceive himself about the fact that his belief is a consequence of Nick<sub>1</sub>'s decision to believe *p*. Perhaps this is what Pears had in mind when he suggested that "my original motive must be screened, or . . . come through in a version that does not include my rational tendency to believe not-*p*" (107).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See above footnote 4.



In Nick's case, his original motive "comes through in a version" that includes a memory of having had a tendency to believe not-*p* and having thought it rational, but his present view of that tendency holds it not to have been rational. (Or, if perhaps it was rational given his evidence at the time, that evidence was woefully inadequate—so inadequate that it led him to distorted notions of rational warrant.)

In a sense, the suggested counterexample to Williams's thesis is but an application of the Duhem-Quine thesis, according to which one can hold *any* proposition true if one is willing (and able!) to make sufficient changes elsewhere in one's system of beliefs. Williams might hold that this sort of case is devoid of practical interest precisely because the individual, having had to change his standards of evidential warrant, has also had to change innumerable other beliefs—and this, it might be thought, would be so disruptive that no one would choose to do it. In response, it should first be said that this objection does not affect the conceptual import of the case. Moreover, the extent to which such strategic belief inducement will require alteration of other beliefs will vary widely from case to case. In some cases, massive overhauling of one's belief system might be required; in other cases, the effects of the change might be predictably slight or easily isolable.<sup>7</sup>

I would suggest, in conclusion, that rather than think of what Nick has done as a case of self-deception, we would do better to construe it along the lines of conscious character planning on an Aristotelian model. Suppose that I do not enjoy some *x*, but think that I would be a better person if I did. So I set about to engage in certain patterns of action, the predictable result of which will be my coming to enjoy *x*. In time, a *hexis* develops and I find myself enjoying *x*. In M. F. Burnyeat's<sup>8</sup> felicitous phraseology, I learn to enjoy *x* where that is "not sharply distinct from my learning that *x* is enjoyable." A cynic might say that I had deceived myself about the enjoyability of *x*, but a more charitable account would hold that I had successfully carried out a project of conscious character planning.

<sup>7</sup> It is, after all, quite possible to maintain different criteria of evidential warrant with regard to different aspects of one's life or different subject matters. All that is needed is either failure to notice that one is employing different criteria or some (perhaps quite vague) cover story about the appropriateness of the disparate criteria. Consider also recent suggestions that loyalty consists in part of a willingness to apply more stringent criteria of evidential warrant with regard to unflattering or maligning claims about those to whom one is loyal.

<sup>8</sup> "Aristotle on Learning to be Good," in A. O. Rorty, ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley, Calif.: University Press, 1980), p. 76.



Nick's motives are perhaps not so noble, but the structure of the case is comparable. He set out to engage in a pattern of action, the predictable result of which was his coming to believe a certain theory in biology. In time, a *hexis* developed, and he found himself believing the theory. He learned to believe the theory, where that is not sharply distinct from learning that the theory is believable. One might judge that Nick has deceived himself, but a more charitable account would hold that he has successfully carried out a program of belief acquisition via a roundabout route.<sup>9</sup>

Most of us would probably agree that Nick moved from an unwarranted belief in a false view to a warranted belief in a true one. But our judgment of the force of the example should not be thought to depend on this fact. If Nick had started out as an evolutionary biologist and had had sufficiently strong prudential motives for wanting to believe some fundamentalist/creationist doctrine, he could have done so, and could have done so without self-deception. One's sense for what is believable (otherwise known as one's criterion for epistemic warrant) can be altered in any number of nonrational ways. To the extent that one manages to bring about such an alteration, one's beliefs can be consciously manipulated without the need for self-deception.

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<sup>9</sup> As an aside, I might mention that those with Parfitian inclinations could interpret the apparent absence of self-deception in this case in a different way. It might be thought that there is no single Nick who is both deceiver and deceived, since Nick<sub>1</sub>'s machinations not only produced certain beliefs, but brought into being a different (later) self to hold those beliefs. Thus, though Nick<sub>1</sub> did willfully bring it about that Nick<sub>2</sub> hold beliefs that Nick<sub>1</sub> held to be false, the deception involved here is not self-deception, for the deceiver and the deceived are quite distinct selves.

I have reservations about this way of talking, but the epistemic insulation between Nick<sub>1</sub> and Nick<sub>2</sub>, coupled with the rather patronizing story that each has to tell about the other's epistemic status, suggests that they are ripe candidates for being considered different selves.



# BOOK REVIEWS

*Logic as Grammar*. NORBERT HORNSTEIN. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984. xiv, 176 p. Cloth \$22.50, paper \$6.95.

Hornstein is concerned with properties of natural-language quantifiers and pronouns. The major contrast drawn is between quantifiers represented by 'a certain' and those represented by 'every'. According to Hornstein, the former can, whereas the latter cannot, coindex pronouns that occur (1) to their left, (2) outside their own clauses, or (3) across sentences in a discourse:

- (1a) That *he* might be killed didn't bother *a certain soldier*.
- (b) \*That *he* might be killed didn't bother *every soldier*.
- (2a) If Mary brings *a certain man* to the meeting, then *he* will make things difficult for the lecturer.
- (b) \*If John likes *every dog*, then *it* likes him.
- (3a) Several men chased *a certain woman*. John caught *her*.
- (b) \**Every citizen* can own a gun. However *he* must register it.

Two further contrasts: According to Hornstein, 'a certain woman' unambiguously takes wide scope in (4a); whereas 'every man' can take either wide or narrow interpretive scope in (4b):

- (4a) All men love a certain woman.
- (b) Someone loves every man.

Finally, 'a certain'-quantifiers can take wide interpretive scope over matrix verbs when they occur as subjects of tensed subordinate clauses; 'every'-quantifiers, according to Hornstein, cannot:

- (5a) Everyone believes that a certain woman is flighty.
- (b) Someone believes that every woman is flighty.

In chapters 2 and 3 Hornstein claims that an element exhibiting any of the (positive) properties illustrated by 'a certain' will exhibit all five of those properties, and an element exhibiting any of the (negative) properties illustrated by 'every' will exhibit each of those properties. The former, type 1 quantifiers, are said to include definite descriptions and 'any' (uniformly construed as a universal quantifier). The latter, type 2 quantifiers, are said to include 'everyone', 'someone', 'every  $G$ ', and 'a  $G$ '.

\* This review was written while I was serving as a visiting professor at the University of Washington.



Hornstein uses this tidy classification to motivate a strongly nativist conception of semantic competence. According to this conception, understanding a sentence involves using internalized linguistic rules to derive a psycho-logical form<sup>1</sup> from its internal syntactic representation. Innate constraints on rules and the resulting representations are thought to provide the learner with a highly restricted system for analyzing linguistic data. Exposure to data like (3)–(4) fixes the psycho-logical representation of different quantifiers, which in turn is supposed to determine their other interpretive properties. Only in this way, Hornstein believes, can one explain how speakers acquire such a rich system of semantic competence from the apparently impoverished data available in (first) language learning.

Hornstein's analysis is a version of Noam Chomsky's recent Government and Binding approach, with some extensions and modifications. Hornstein regards it not just as a psychological hypothesis, but also as a theory of meaning. This is striking since there is no room in it for an account of truth conditions or for any other mapping of linguistic expressions onto the extralinguistic reality they represent. Hornstein thinks this is a virtue. He argues that familiar semantic approaches do not explain what semantic competence is and how it is acquired, and concludes that these approaches have no importance for theories of meaning. In their place we get a mapping from English to (uninterpreted) mentalese. Hence the title of the book (with "logic" signifying a central aspect of meaning).

The book contains significant problems of detail. More important, three fundamental difficulties stand out: the quantifier taxonomy is inaccurate; vagueness and equivocation eviscerate the theory's predictive content; and the rejection of truth conditions violates the theory's own requirements.

First, some obvious counterexamples to the taxonomy:

- (6a) That he might be laughed at bothered *at least one performer*.
- (b) That he might be laughed at bothered *a performer I represent*.
- (c) The fact that they are trailing in the polls bothers *several candidates*.<sup>2</sup>

Like 'a certain', each of these quantifiers can coindex a pronoun to its left. Thus, Hornstein is committed to the claim that each is a type 1 quantifier that behaves like 'a certain' regarding all the properties

<sup>1</sup> The representation is supposed to be a logical form that is psychologically real—hence, my terminology, 'psycho-logical form'.

<sup>2</sup> The relevant interpretation of (6c) requires several candidates to satisfy "the fact that  $x$  is trailing in the polls bothers  $x$ ."



illustrated by (1)–(5). These quantifiers, however, are not unambiguously interpreted as having wide scope:

- (7a) Every director wants to sign at least one performer.
- (b) Every director wants to sign a performer I represent.
- (c) Every columnist hates several candidates.

Similar results can be obtained with other properties and quantifiers.

Even more troublesome is the pervasive indefiniteness at the heart of the theory. The interpretive differences between type 1 and type 2 quantifiers are supposed to result (primarily) from their positions in psycho-logical form. Type 2 quantifiers are sentential operators in psycho-logical syntax; type 1 quantifiers, like names, are terms. The key interpretive notion characterizing such terms is “interpretive independence.” We are told that interpretively independent elements “are relatively insensitive to their ‘logical’ environments” (44), that they “are interpreted in a manner functionally independent of the interpretation of other logical operators in the clause” (30), and that in general this means that they are “interpreted as if they had widest possible scope” (44). No more precise characterization is given.

One place where this leads to trouble is in the analysis of ‘any’ as an interpretively independent universal quantifier. Although many sentences with ‘any’ can be represented by treating it as a wide-scope universal quantifier, some, like (8), cannot:

- (8) Someone doesn’t like anyone.

Hornstein handles this case by saying that interpretively independent quantifiers are interpreted as if they were in branching structures. Thus, (8) has the interpretation (9a), which is equivalent to (9b).<sup>3</sup>

- (9a)  $\begin{matrix} \text{someone } x \\ \text{everyone } y \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} \diagup \\ \diagdown \end{matrix} [\text{not } (x \text{ likes } y)]$

- (b) someone  $x$ , everyone  $y$  [not ( $x$  likes  $y$ )]

<sup>3</sup> The analysis of (i) is given by the branching structure (ii), which is equivalent to (iii):

- (i) Everyone dislikes a certain person.

- (ii)  $\begin{matrix} \text{someone } x \\ \text{everyone } y \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} \diagup \\ \diagdown \end{matrix} y \text{ dislikes } x$

- (iii) someone  $x$ , everyone  $y$  ( $y$  dislikes  $x$ ).

The contention is that “interpretively independent” quantifiers uniformly take widest branching, rather than first-order scope.



However, this move cannot be generalized. One cannot account for the examples in (10) by treating 'any' as a wide-scope universal quantifier, whether or not one invokes branching structures:<sup>4</sup>

- (10a) Not many soldiers have tortured any prisoners.
- (b) Few soldiers have tortured any prisoners.
- (c) I didn't say that Sam killed anyone.
- (d) It is unlikely that any ticket will win.

Another distinguishing feature of interpretively independent elements is supposed to be their ability to coindex pronouns outside their own clauses and across sentences in discourse. But what does this amount to? If it is just the ability to serve as antecedents of pronouns in such environments, then type 2 quantifiers also have it:

- (11a) Mary likes *a dog*, and *it* likes her.
- (b) Mary found *a dog*. She told her mother that *it* was lost.

<sup>4</sup> (10a,b) state that the number of soldiers who have tortured even one prisoner is small. This is not the same as (i) [which is equivalent to (ii)], or (iii) [which is equivalent to (iv)].

(i) not  $\begin{matrix} \text{many } x: \text{ soldier } x \\ \text{every } y: \text{ prisoner } y \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} \nearrow \\ \searrow \end{matrix} x \text{ tortured } y$

(ii)  $\sim (\text{many } x: \text{ soldier } x) (\text{every } y: \text{ prisoner } y) (x \text{ tortured } y)$

(iii)  $\begin{matrix} \text{many } x: \text{ soldier } x \\ \text{every } y: \text{ prisoner } y \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} \nearrow \\ \searrow \end{matrix} \sim (x \text{ tortured } y)$

(iv)  $(\text{many } x: \text{ soldier } x) (\text{every } y: \text{ prisoner } y) \sim (x \text{ tortured } y)$

(iii-iv) leave open the possibility that, although many soldiers are not torturers, many are; (10a,b) do not.

The interpretation of these sentences is also not given by (v):

(v)  $\begin{matrix} \text{Few } x: \text{ soldiers } x \\ \text{every } y: \text{ prisoner } y \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} \nearrow \\ \searrow \end{matrix} x \text{ tortured } y$

Since 'few soldiers' is monotone decreasing, whereas 'every prisoner' is monotone increasing, (v) has no coherent interpretation. [See Jon Barwise, "On Branching Quantifiers in English," *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, VIII, 1 (February 1979): 47-80.] By contrast, 'any' in (10a,b) can be analyzed as having the force of an existential quantifier within the scope of negation:

(vi)  $\sim (\text{many } x: \text{ soldier } x) (\text{some } y: \text{ prisoner } y) (x \text{ tortured } y)$

The same point is illustrated by (10c,d), which have the interpretations (vii, viii) rather than (ix, x):

(vii)  $\sim$  I said that [someone  $x$  (Sam killed  $x$ )]

(viii) Unlikely that [(some  $x$ : ticket  $x$ ) (win  $x$ )]

(ix) everyone  $x \sim$  I said that [Sam killed  $x$ ]

(x) (every  $x$ : ticket  $x$ ) unlikely that [win  $x$ ]

In most lotteries each ticket is such that it is unlikely that it will win; however, it is seldom unlikely that there will be a winning ticket. Similarly, for each person, I may not have said that he or she was killed by Sam—even if I have said that Sam killed someone or other. (Contrast with analogous examples containing 'a certain'.)



One might argue that 'it' in (11) does not function as a bound variable, but rather is what Gareth Evans calls an "E-type pronoun."<sup>5</sup> But then one would have to show that pronouns with type 1 antecedents really do function as bound variables. For this, one would need a semantics, not provided by Hornstein, that distinguished variable binding from other types of pronoun/antecedent relations.<sup>6</sup>

The difficulty is especially pressing when it comes to definite descriptions. In chapter 3, Hornstein relies heavily on the fact that definite descriptions can serve as antecedents of pronouns in other clauses and in other sentences. Although some of the examples are candidates for a non-variable-binding analysis, he concludes without argument that they require definite descriptions to be of type 1.

This conclusion leads to the incorrect result that the descriptions in (12) unambiguously take widest interpretive scope:

- (12a) If France is a monarchy and *the king of France* controls the army, then *he* is probably worried about Libya.
- (b) Mitterand is not the king of France.
- (c) Necessarily, the number of planets is greater than 7.
- (d) John said that the largest prime is odd.
- (e) John believed that the murderer of Jones was insane.
- (f) The White House has always been occupied by the President of the United States.

Hornstein does not deny that sentences of this sort may be ambiguous. Rather, he maintains that these ambiguities do not involve

<sup>5</sup> "Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I)," in Mark Platts, ed., *Reference, Truth, and Reality* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). An *E-type pronoun* is a closed singular term whose reference is fixed by a description recoverable from the clause containing its antecedent. If 'it' in (11a) is such a pronoun, then the sentence expresses the conjunction of two independent propositions, rather than the existential proposition to the effect that the (conjunctive) property of being liked by Mary and liking her is possessed by at least one dog.

<sup>6</sup> Hornstein intends his theses about quantifier-pronoun coindexing to cover only non-E-type pronouns. However, he provides no semantics of cross-sentential indexing at all—let alone one demonstrating that pronouns with type 1 antecedents really function as bound variables, whereas those with type 2 antecedents do not. Prospects of doing this are not helped by the fact that some of Hornstein's examples of cross-sentential indexing of pronouns by type 1 quantifiers apparently cannot be genuine instances of variable binding. A case in point is example (6c) on page 44: "Any citizen can own a gun. In some countries *he* must." The truth of this discourse does not require "*x* can own a gun" and "In some countries *x* must own a gun" to be jointly true for each assignment of a citizen (of some contextually salient country) to '*x*'. Rather, what seems to be asserted is that every citizen (of a contextually salient country) can own a gun, and in some countries every citizen (of those countries) must own a gun. But, then, the pronoun in the example does not function as a variable bound by its antecedent. As a result, the alleged distinction between instances of cross-sentential indexing of pronouns by type 1 quantifiers and similar instances involving type 2 quantifiers remains mysterious.







tween large- and small-scope interpretations of descriptions are not ambiguities between referential and attributive understandings.<sup>8</sup> Third, even if an interpretation is sensitive to context, that does not mean that it is nonsemantic—as the proliferation of context-sensitive semantics demonstrates. Fourth, if unspecified nonlinguistic rules of interpretation can save the theory from making false predictions about descriptions, then they can save it from making any predictions at all.

Hornstein uses this prediction-destroying device to deal with other problems, for example, the familiar scope ambiguity in (13):

(13) John believes that a handsome Swede loves Ingrid.

If his theory predicts anything, it predicts that (13) has only a small-scope interpretation. In reality, it also has a large-scope interpretation. Thus, Hornstein claims that the ambiguity is not properly linguistic, but rather is due to unspecified extralinguistic factors (SI-2 rules). Note the contrast. Here the “language faculty” is supposed to provide small-scope interpretations, and the extralinguistic wild card is invoked for large-scope interpretations; in the case of definite descriptions it is the other way around: the “language faculty” provides the allegedly nonsemantic, context-dependent large-scope interpretations, and the extralinguistic wild card is used for the small-scope interpretations. With such versatility the capacity to block predictions may be unlimited.

This presupposes, however, that predictions about interpretations would otherwise be forthcoming; whereas, strictly speaking, they would not. In motivating his account, Hornstein repeatedly appeals to data in which certain quantifiers are said to be unambiguously interpreted as having largest possible scope, while others are capable of taking different, clause-bounded, scopes. Indeed, a central aim of the theory is to predict the interpretive scopes of different quantifiers from their positions in psycho-logical syntax. But predictions

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that at least one Swede be handsome; but so does the truth of (13'), whose linguistic credentials are not questioned:

(13') John believes that a certain handsome Swede loves Ingrid.

Moreover, in chapter 4 Hornstein accepts an analysis according to which (13'') is linguistically ambiguous—despite the fact that its wide-scope interpretation is just the sort that is stigmatized as not properly linguistic in the case of (13).

(13'') John expects a handsome Swede to marry Ingrid.

<sup>8</sup> See Saul Kripke, “Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference,” in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1979).



about interpretive content require a theory of interpretive content, which Hornstein not only fails to provide but rejects in principle.<sup>9</sup>

In some cases this interpretive gap creates the illusion that a coherent analysis has been given, when none has. An example of this involves so-called 'donkey'-sentences, like those in (14):

- (14a) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.  
(b) Some farmer who owned a donkey beat it.

<sup>9</sup> The notion of interpretive scope, crucial to Hornstein's project, is essentially semantic. For example, to say that the italicized expressions in (i) have large scope is, in effect, to say that the rules for these expressions are applied first in determining the truth conditions of these sentences.

- (i)(a)  $S(\text{eve} \neg x:Fx)$  [true iff  $\neg Sy$  is true of each  $F$ ]  
(b)  $\neg S^{\neg}(the\ x:Fx)$  [true iff there is a unique  $F$ -er and  $\neg Sy$  is true of it]  
(c)  $Not\ S(the\ x:Fx)$  [true iff  $S(the\ x:Fx)$  is not true]

Hornstein, however, cannot give these characterizations, since he rejects the notion of truth they employ. Nor can he accept any alternative semantic characterization using the notions, *proposition*, *property*, *object*, *reference*, or *model*, since he also rejects these (in the sense in which they are standardly used in semantics). According to Hornstein, all these notions are dispensable in a proper theory of meaning; moreover, the interpretive properties of quantifiers, including their interpretive scopes, are said to be derivable from a purely syntactic theory of their structural characteristics in psycho-logical form.

There is a problem here, however, that Hornstein fails to acknowledge. A theory cannot make predictions about properties it does not countenance. What then is interpretive scope, if it is not the semantic phenomenon it has always been assumed to be? Although interpretive scope is supposed to be determined by syntactic scope (plus lexical properties) in psycho-logical form, the former is not to be identified with the latter, since various elements are said to have wide-interpretive scope even though they do not have wide-syntactic scope in psycho-logical form. Indeed, Hornstein thinks that interpretive scope is not properly scope at all—the latter being, on his view, a purely syntactic notion (26, 31, 50). Thus, he introduces a label, *interpretive independence*, to take the place of *wide-interpretive scope* (26, 31). But he never defines this term, and, in attempting to explain it, he appeals to Kripke's concept of rigid designation, despite the fact his theory makes no room for such a thoroughly semantic notion (31).

The situation, then, is this: Hornstein makes proposals that attempt to correlate alleged psycho-syntactic facts with well-known interpretive, semantic properties. As long as we retain our grasp on these properties we can evaluate Hornstein's proposals and test them for truth or falsity (where they are stated with enough precision to give clear results). When, however, semantic properties are rejected, with nothing put in their place, the notion of interpretive scope becomes empty, and the predictions Hornstein relies upon to motivate his theory evaporate.

Moreover, there is good reason to believe that any attempt to give content to interpretive properties like scope will reinstate the semantic notions Hornstein rejects. Roughly, for a sentence to have interpretive content is for it to represent the world as being a certain way; representing the world as being a certain way imposes conditions that must be satisfied if the world is to conform to the way it is represented to be. But these are just the truth conditions that Hornstein refuses to accept.



Problems posed by these sentences prompt Hornstein to claim that in (14a) 'a donkey' is a "quasi-generic" quantifier which is both of type 1 and of type 2.<sup>10</sup> This leads him to assign to (14a) a "logical form" consisting of a pair of representations: one in which 'a donkey' is a type 1 quantifier, and one in which it is a type 2 quantifier. By calling it type 1, Hornstein thinks he can explain how it can "bind" the pronoun outside the relative clause. By calling it type 2, he thinks he can explain why its scope is restricted to that clause (83/4). The two structures are supposed to "blend" in some unspecified way into a single interpretation, requiring every owner-donkey pair to be a beater-donkey pair (87/8). No importance is attached to the fact that type 1 and type 2 quantifiers have previously been associated with the incompatible properties of having, respectively, unrestricted and clause-bounded logical scope.

Since no explicit principles of interpretation are ever formulated, no explicit contradiction is forthcoming. By the same token, however, no explicit predictions about interpretations are made. At best, one can get a rough idea of the semantic facts Hornstein is trying to capture—keeping in mind that when things go wrong the rug may be pulled out, leaving it unclear how proposals about psycho-logical syntax are related to facts about interpretations.

In my opinion, these difficulties prevent Hornstein from doing justice to the semantic and psychological questions he raises. The class of data he surveys is rich, and the issues he discusses are worth investigating. He may even be right in thinking that such investigation will require theories of psycho-logical syntax. However, it will certainly require more.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Hornstein provides no way of dealing with (14b).

<sup>11</sup> Space limitations have prevented me from commenting on Hornstein's criticism of representational, or truth-conditional, theories in semantics. The main force of the criticism rests, in my opinion, on an unwarranted demand that semantic theories play direct and central roles in explaining how semantic competence is acquired. For an extended discussion of the relationship between the two, see my "Semantics and Semantic Competence," in Stephen Schiffer and Susan Steele, eds., *The Second Arizona Colloquia on Cognitive Science* (Tucson: Arizona UP, forthcoming).



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# THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

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## FREEDOM AND VALUE

DUPLICATE

I will argue in this essay for an unorthodox necessary condition of free action. I believe that this condition will be an important component of any adequate theory of freedom.

I

In order to begin to construct a theory of free action we need, at the very least, an intuition and a question. Without some initial, relatively fixed beliefs about free action to start with, we would not know what we are theorizing about. And, apart from questions concerning the subject of our theory, we would not have any motivation to theorize; nor would we have much of a clue about how to begin. Part of the reason why free action has been the occasion for such controversy and confusion is that philosophers have not worked hard enough to display the intuitive origins and motivating questions for their favored theories of free action.

The main intuition that my discussion relies on is that, among all our actions, our free actions are fully, or most truly, our own. Our free actions do not merely belong to us as any of our actions must. They belong to us in a particularly intimate way. Obviously these expressions of the intuition can be taken in many senses. But, if there is a coherent concept of free action which typically governs our use of phrases like 'acted freely' in utterances such as "She should not be blamed unless she acted freely," then I claim that there is a sense in which we all would agree that our free actions are fully, or most truly, our own, and that, understood in whatever sense this is, this is one of our firmest and most widely shared convictions about free action.

Judging from the recent literature, this appears to be an intuition that guides most theorizing on the subject. To cite only a few prominent examples: in discussing the unfreedom of a person unwillingly addicted to a drug, Harry Frankfurt<sup>1</sup> writes,

<sup>1</sup> "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," this JOURNAL, LXVIII, 1 (Jan. 14, 1971): 5-20.



The unwilling addict identifies himself . . . through the formation of a second-order volition, with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-order desires. He makes one of them *more truly his own* and, in so doing, he withdraws himself from the other. It is in virtue of this identification and withdrawal . . . that the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the drug is a force *other than his own*, and that it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take it (13; my emphasis).

Wright Neely<sup>2</sup> says in a similar vein, "we must find a way of saying that some desires are more intimately related to the self—are *more its own*—than others without adopting the 'solution' . . . of simply putting another man inside the man" (43; my emphasis). In a critique of Frankfurt's and Neely's accounts, Michael Slote<sup>3</sup> has said that acting of one's own free will "involves something more than willingness taken together with our previous rationality conditions. And I believe that this further condition, in simplest terms, comes down to the requirement that our actions be fully *our own*" (150). Slote continues,

the assumption that acting of one's own free will requires that one's actions be fully one's own also helps to explain what the words 'one's own' are doing in the phrase 'of one's own free will'. . . . In order to act of one's *own* free will, then, one's action must be fully one's own; one must in some sense act autonomously (*ibid.*).

Again, there is a legitimate fear that, by emphasizing such similarity in phraseology, especially when the phrase seems so open to divergent interpretation, broad acceptance of the initial intuition becomes trivial. I will try to dispel this fear below, indicating how the idea that free acts are fully our own may be used to illuminate other settled intuitions about freedom, such as the belief that we act freely only when we have control over whether or not we act as we do.

The question that motivates my theoretical proposals about freedom is this: What general abilities must a person have, beyond whatever abilities agency requires, in order to act freely? This question seems to have informed most theories, since nearly all have maintained—though nearly always without defense—that we act freely just when we have the ability to do otherwise than we do. Curiously, the question has so dominated the subject that, for many, it has ceased to be a live question at all. Its answer (they say) is uninterest-

<sup>2</sup> "Freedom and Desire," *Philosophical Review*, LXXXIII, 1 (January 1974): 32–54.

<sup>3</sup> "Understanding Free Will," this JOURNAL, LXXVII, 3 (March 1980): 136–151.



ingly obvious—the ability to do otherwise. The real question has been thought to be: What limitations, if any, does ability to do otherwise put on possible causal histories of our behavior, and do such restrictions ever actually obtain? The problem of freedom has been the problem of freedom *and* determinism.

One of the drawbacks of this orthodox approach is that it is too rash. Having the ability to do otherwise, in an apparently uncontroversial sense, does not suffice for free action. If I cannot anticipate an immediate consequence of one of my free acts, so that I bring it about unintentionally, then I do not freely bring about that consequence. I do not freely perform the action described in terms of that consequence (spilling the coffee, stepping on a thumbtack, hurting a friend's feelings). Yet I may well have the ability to do otherwise, since I may have the ability to do otherwise than perform the action that generated the unintended effect.

Having the ability to do otherwise in the relevant sense does not distinguish free agents, because it is a necessary characteristic of anyone who does anything intentionally, and intentionality is insufficient for freedom. Briefly, one has the ability to act when one has the power to translate one's will into successful action, other things being equal (i.e., where one has the opportunity to perform the action, one does not change one's mind, one makes a good effort if effort is needed, and so forth). Anyone who does something intentionally has the ability to act at that time, since the action's intentionality means that the behavior resulted from one's will in the appropriate way. The pertinent ability to translate one's will into successful action is nothing other than the ability to act intentionally.<sup>4</sup>

Since acting intentionally suffices for having the ability to act as one did, it also suffices for having the ability to refrain from what one did. For, if one's actual acting depended in the right way on one's will, then one's will to *refrain* from that action would have been enough to bring about intentional refraining (under similar *ceteris paribus* conditions). If my acting owes to my willing, then nothing could stand in the way of my refraining from that act should I have willed to refrain from it.<sup>5</sup> This claim may seem utterly implausible for the garden variety of psychologically compelled action, like acting

<sup>4</sup> I call this sense of ability "ordinary ability." I discuss this and other senses of ability more carefully in "Ordinary Ability and Free Action," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, xvii, 2 (June 1987). My present claims about intentional action and ability to do otherwise are also defended more thoroughly in that article.

<sup>5</sup> I believe that this holds true even where the actual performance is overdetermined. Further discussion is not possible here.



out of drug addiction, irresistible obsession, or hypnotic inducement. But this worry stems from a confusion. Psychological compulsion typically undermines freedom while preserving intentionality. The addict's drug use is the intentional result of her irresistible will to take the drug. Since the addict uses the drug because she wants to (even though she may not ultimately value either the want or the behavior), her having the will not to use the drug instead of her present desire would yield the appropriate refraining. The addiction utilizes the addict's ability to take the drug willfully. That ability cannot be present without the complementary ability to act successfully on a resolute will to refrain.

The addict's problem is that, although her behavior originates with her intentions, she is not in *control* of the intentions that move her to take the drug and so is not in control over whether or not she uses the drug. The addict has the bare ability to do otherwise; or else her drug use would be involuntary, "mere behavior." What she lacks is control over the exercise of this ability. She acts on a will she cannot govern. Her drug use is hers because it is intentional; it is not fully or most truly hers, because she lacks control over whether or not she engages in it.<sup>6</sup>

It will likely be objected that this treatment of the ability to do otherwise cannot be an appropriate response to the orthodox tenet that free agency consists in having that ability. Certainly many have thought that this ability is no trivial thing, as freedom is no trivial thing. But, if persons as unfree as addicts may have this ability, then (the objection runs) the important notion of ability has been passed over and a largely insignificant concept of ability put in its place. If my contention is that ability to do otherwise does not reveal anything special about free action since it is a prerequisite of any intentional action, thus necessary for agency itself whether free or unfree, then the point may be merely verbal. Perhaps the traditional debate over the causal implications of avoidability is really just a debate over what control amounts to. After all, even if the addict has the minimal ability to do otherwise, does she not still lack the ability to do otherwise *in the face* of her desire for the drug?

There are three responses to this worry. First, if traditional claims about freedom and ability to do otherwise are really claims about what I term "control," then, contrary to the tradition, the primary question about the abilities distinctively required for free agency is not only a live question, but one which has not been answered satis-

<sup>6</sup> I explain below why lack of control would make the addict's action less than fully her own even if she relishes her addiction.



factorily. Holding that control over whether or not we act as we do is what matters for freedom, far from answering our question, raises it all over again: What general abilities distinguish agents who have this control? The problem of freedom remains much more than the problem of freedom and determinism, for we still do not understand what abilities freedom involves, much less their implications for determinism.

Second, there is good reason to employ the 'ability to do otherwise' terminology to refer to that power which any intentional agent possesses, reserving 'control' for the more specialized power of free agents. When ability to do otherwise is used perspicuously, it suggests an instance of the ability to act intentionally. Once this connection is made, the ability to do otherwise is naturally seen to consist in some relationship between willing and acting which will be incapable of accounting for defects in agents' relations to their own wills (as in cases of psychological compulsion). Unless 'ability' is going to mean much more than we ordinarily use it to mean, the constitutive features of free agency should not be lumped together under the rubric "ability to do otherwise."<sup>7</sup>

The third reason why the issue I have brought before traditional theories of free action is not trivial is that, even once we adopt the terminology of control or set aside a special use of 'ability to do otherwise', it still is not the case that having control, or this specialized ability to do otherwise, exhausts the content of free agency. The central point of this essay is to argue that, however we understand control, there is a further, equally significant ability necessary for free action. This is an ability to criticize courses of action competently by relevant normative standards. This ability lends normative substance to the idea of free action, for it entails that full freedom of action is impossible without a certain appreciation of values.

The belief that free actions are those which are fully our own has not played any significant role in the argument thus far. I have affirmed that one central condition of freedom is control. Lacking control over our actions is one way in which they can be less than fully our own. As the remarks by Frankfurt and Neely cited above indicate, we can find it helpful to express in terms of their limited ownership of their actions the unfreedom of those who act out of

<sup>7</sup> There is admittedly some unclarity in the terminology of control as well. Being in control of one's conduct can mean that the behavior is habitual or well entrenched, the opposite of impulsive or unpredictable. This has nothing especially to do with freedom. I use 'control' to indicate our control over whether or not we perform a particular action, regardless of that action's being performed in a controlled way.



compulsive motives. This is not yet an argument that control is necessary for freedom. The image of ownership must be clarified first. At best, it gives us a small clue about how to understand the place of control in freedom. For the moment, note that the ownership intuition suggests that free action may not be an all-or-nothing matter. Actions can be our own to a greater or lesser extent. If an action that is fully our own is free unqualifiedly, then perhaps an action that is less than fully ours can be free to some lesser degree. In envisaging an element of freedom beyond control, then, I am not claiming that persons who have control over their actions may be no more free than those who act out of compulsion. I shall argue only that their actions may be less than fully free.

## II

The idea that free action has a normative component, and thus is of direct concern for value theory as well as for metaphysics, has been developed in different ways in two recent and significant essays. My own position will be more intelligible if we look briefly at some of the related claims these papers advance.

The first paper is Gary Watson's "Free Agency."<sup>8</sup> Watson argues that views, like Frankfurt's, which try to comprehend freedom solely in terms of structural features of the will cannot adequately explain the identification of persons with their free actions, until they attend to the place of values in the motivational structure of free action. Watson contends that free agents are set apart by having the ability to do what they most want, or value, all things considered, in the circumstances they face. Whereas intentional action depends on the ability to translate one's will into appropriate behavior, freedom (according to Watson) consists in the further ability to translate one's value judgments into effectual willing, without interference from motives that arise independently of one's values. Elsewhere Watson draws the broader consequence of this for theories of freedom:

Apparently, the belief in free will presumes for human beings a special and puzzling status in the natural world, one that is central to our moral outlook. A convincing treatment of the problem of free will must give an account of the values in question, as well as of this presumed status. For this reason, free will is as much a problem in moral philosophy as in metaphysics. Our view of what free will is depends on our view of what matters (*Free Will*, Introduction, p. 2).

<sup>8</sup> This JOURNAL, LXXII, 8 (April 24, 1975): 205-220. Reprinted in Watson's anthology *Free Will* (New York: Oxford, 1982), pp. 96-110. Page references will be to the former.



Watson's view seems to do rather well as an account of the control that free agents must possess.<sup>9</sup> Watson notes that being able to do what one wants is not distinctive of freedom, because anyone who acts intentionally has this ability (205). In attempting to distinguish free action from merely intentional action on the grounds that a free agent's will is open to the governance of her values, Watson takes a position close to the view on psychological compulsion I sketched above. I argued that, because persons who act out of some psychological compulsion must have the abilities to make willing effective in action which any agent has (abilities which necessarily include ability to do otherwise), the special problem that compulsive motivation poses for freedom concerns the agent's inability to govern her will. Thus, Watson plausibly seeks to locate the difference between freedom and compulsion in the sensitivity of the will to some special source of motivation—in this case values—on which a free agent acts. Valuation seems an especially good candidate for this role, since most cases of unfreedom due to lack of control are cases in which the agent either is unable to do what she thinks best or would have been unable to act on her values had she judged it best to do otherwise. Where I do not know what I am doing or do not mean to do it, lack of intentionality blocks the potential efficacy of my values. Where I do what I am psychologically compelled to do, helplessness with respect to my will blocks the translation of values into action.

My strongest differences with Watson come on two related points. First, Watson seems to think that control is sufficient for freedom. Watson assumes that lack of intention and psychological compulsion ("obstruction by one's own will") are the only sorts of threat to free agency. This leaves no room for the kinds of cases I examine below, in which persons whose conduct is open to the rule of whatever values they might accept nonetheless act unfreely to the extent that they either are not aware of the values that actually apply to their actions or do not appreciate those values well enough. Watson neglects the diminished freedom of the young child or of the person whose moral education was severely deficient.

As a result of Watson's failure to see that freedom requires more than control, he also does not grasp the extent to which a conception of value needs to be drawn into an account of free action. A person

<sup>9</sup> Serious arguments to the contrary have been offered by Christopher S. Hill in "Watsonian Freedom and Freedom of the Will," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, LXII, 3 (September 1984): 294–298. Since my present aim is not to analyze control, I will not deal with Hill's objections here.



who suffers from a severely deprived upbringing may be able to form evaluative judgments and act on them in the way Watson's theory specifies. But this person's actions will be less than fully her own if, for instance, she forms these judgments in deviant ways, being understandably ignorant or unappreciative of the standards of conduct others endorse. Contrary to Watson, I want to argue that freedom is a normative notion to the extent that attributions of free action in any particular context depend for their correctness partly on the *content* of the agent's normative understanding, not just on the agent's having some valuational point of view or other.

Watson's omission of the evaluative substance of freedom is substantially remedied in Susan Wolf's intriguing paper "Asymmetrical Freedom."<sup>10</sup> Wolf also aims to draw the problem of free action further into the arena of moral philosophy. She believes that its treatment as a purely metaphysical issue may be responsible for its apparent intractability (160/1). Unlike Watson, though, Wolf thinks that being able to guide one's conduct by means of the values one accepts is not a strong enough condition of free agency. Freedom, on her account, demands that one hold the values one ought to hold. Quite in line with my differences with Watson, Wolf believes that obstacles to competent appreciation of the norms that apply to our actions are as much impediments to full freedom as are certain obstacles to the expression of our evaluative judgments in our will or certain obstacles to the realization of our will in our conduct.

In defending this point, Wolf takes up the example of someone who deliberately performs criminal acts but who cannot be expected to appreciate their wrongness because his upbringing was seriously deprived. Wolf argues that a deprived childhood diminishes this person's freedom, despite the fact that the internal connections between his judgments, decisions, and behavior are free of abnormal interference. She writes,

. . . he, unlike us, could not have had reasons even though there were reasons around. The problem is not that his reason was functioning improperly, but that his data were unfortunatously selective. Since the world for him was not suitably cooperative, his reason cannot attain its appropriate goal (160).

Wolf comes closer than any other recent writer to illuminating the normative dimension of free action. But her outline of an account of freedom labors under some worrisome difficulties. First, she be-

<sup>10</sup> This JOURNAL, LXXVII, 3 (March 1980): 151-166.



lieves, wrongly I think, that revealing the evaluative character of freedom also helps resolve the question of freedom and determinism. Wolf contends that, if freedom is the freedom to do what there are good and sufficient reasons to do, then an agent who does what is best may (though need not) be psychologically determined to have done so—determined by the action's being best, that is—without being at all unfree. The reverse is true for someone who does what is wrong. The determination of wrong action must upset freedom, Wolf contends, because it prevents an agent from being able to do what is really best. Wolf concludes that both the compatibility of freedom and determinism and the necessity for free agency of the ability to do otherwise are contingent on the moral quality of the agent's conduct.

This argument fails at a number of places. Wolf offers no defense whatsoever for the contention that many cases of right action are instances of determined action. I grant that we can speak of a good person's actions as being in some sense determined by their moral desirability. This shows nothing, however, about the compatibility of freedom and determinism, for what is in dispute in the traditional problem of free will is *causal* determination. As far as I can tell, no one finds a person's freedom to be threatened simply by the sensitivity of the person's behavior to the values that apply to it. The traditional philosophical puzzle concerns *how* values guide the person's life. If the life is the causal product of circumstance, upbringing, and heredity, and these are not within the person's control, then freedom seems absent (so long as one has incompatibilist sentiments or can somehow conjure them up). Even if, as Wolf says (152/3), acting contrary to our interests is normally a sign of insanity and being moved to act without regard to the world outside us would make our lives capricious in a dangerous way, this does nothing to establish that the normal dependence of action on interests and of interests on environment, which Wolf labels "psychological determinism" (152), is causal dependence. As it stands, Wolf's account is irrelevant to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists.

Wolf's confusion about determinism becomes evident when, at the end of the essay, she argues that an undetermined act need not be a mere product of chance, since undetermined decisions normally are not random (165/6). But, if we accepted her earlier point that indeterminism holds out only the possibilities of insanity or whim, then we should not buy this argument. And, if we accept this argument, we should not be ready to admit that good persons are normally determined to act as they do. Why can they not just (indeterministically) decide, on the best of grounds, to do what is best?



Wolf's claim that ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom only where there is good and sufficient reason to do otherwise is similarly weak. She relies heavily on familiar remarks like "He couldn't hurt a fly" for evidence that admirable conduct may remain praiseworthy, hence free, even in the absence of ability to do otherwise (156). Such remarks, taken literally, do not withstand close scrutiny. Wolf must grant that the best sort of person would hurt someone if there were sufficiently good reason to do so. This could not be so unless the person presently has the bare ability to inflict harm, the ability to act on a will to hurt someone. If the person really were unable to hurt anyone, if he could not do it no matter how much he wanted to, then his present peaceable behavior would be involuntary. The behavior might be welcome, but it would not be to the person's credit unless he had somehow cultivated this inability to harm (assuming that this is a good thing). As I argued above, the ability to translate one's will into intentional action suffices for the ability to act on a will to refrain from that course of action.

The sort of person Wolf describes not only has the ability to do otherwise but has control over the exercise of that ability. He absolutely will not hurt anyone without sufficient reason to do so. "Couldn't do otherwise" commonly serves here just to emphasize the person's resolute moral judgment and control over his behavior. The remark means that, as things are and are likely to be, this person can be counted on not to do otherwise.

Perhaps most importantly, Wolf never goes very far in explaining why the notion she is examining is the notion of freedom. At the outset, she says that a free agent is one "whose actions are under his own control," "up to him to decide" (151). However, the freedom she is interested in cannot consist just in control, for the person suffering from a deprived childhood is less than fully free, on Wolf's view, though "this agent seems to have as much control over his life as we are apt to have over ours" (160). Why does this person's moral blindness upset his freedom? The only explanation Wolf gives is that this person is not blameworthy for doing what he cannot be expected to know any better than to do. Apparently Wolf holds that freedom is sufficient for being either blameworthy or praiseworthy, and this is why not being praiseworthy or blameworthy demonstrates unfreedom. But why is this? The connection is usually thought to run in the other direction: desert of praise or blame is sufficient for freedom. What is conspicuously missing from Wolf's essay is any discussion of why specifically *freedom* involves the competent appreciation of value. Maybe Wolf is really only examining praise- and blame-worthiness. In that case, it is neither particularly illuminating nor



controversial to state that agents do not deserve praise or blame if they cannot understand the relevant values. It is generally accepted that we are to be excused for ignorance that we cannot reasonably be expected not to have.

Despite Watson's and Wolf's attempts, we remain in need of an adequate account of how—and why—values figure in free action.

### III

We can gain a clearer sense of the need to supplement the control component of free action if we reflect on why the power of control is so important to us. One reason is this. The values by which our actions—and we ourselves—are assessed typically matter very much to us. This is due in large measure to our deep-seated desire to be able to justify our conduct.<sup>11</sup> But, if the norms governing our actions matter to us, then so will the ability to make our evaluative judgments effective in our actions be important. This ability, at a minimum, requires the power of control. Or, if Watson's view, understood as an account of control, is basically correct, this ability constitutes control. It is natural that the importance of our ability to regulate our conduct by means of our values would depend primarily on the importance we attach to doing what those values dictate we should do.

This explanation of the importance of control indicates why freedom might be thought to involve more than just control and what more it involves. For, if we care deeply about the value of our actions, then we want more than the power to translate our own value judgments into effectual willing. We also want to be able to appreciate the relevant values and arrive at competent appraisals of the alternative courses of action we face. Our concern for those values would be practically impotent if we could not bring them competently to bear in our deliberations about what to do.

We are now in a position to propose a condition of fully free action to supplement whatever condition accounts for control: one's action is fully free only to the extent that one has the ability to appreciate the normative standards governing one's conduct and to make competent critical evaluations, in light of those norms, of open courses of action. I will defend this condition by showing its connection with the still vague but enduring belief that a completely free act is fully our own. In fact, although this intuition can be used to show the appeal of the proposed condition, I will use the condition, in turn, to clarify

<sup>11</sup> Contractualist accounts of morality rightly give this desire a prominent role in moral motivation. For instance, see T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge, 1982), pp. 103–128.



the intuition's content. The result should be a better grasp of the notion of freedom at issue and, furthermore, an argument for an unorthodox condition of full freedom. Alignment of the interpretation of the intuition with the widely accepted necessity of control for freedom will also speak in favor of that interpretation and lend more weight to the proposed condition.<sup>12</sup>

To begin, consider an ordinary enough example. In the course of a game of make-believe, a young child climbs up on my desk when I am not around and begins playing on it. She has not asked me whether she may play on my desk. She knows that I would want her to ask, because she knows that I do not like her to play there. She has played this game before, and I have warned her not to play it again. Of course, this history figures in the appeal the game has for the child on this occasion. The game is a little risky, so all the more entertaining. But, though the child deliberately plays on my desk without asking me, knowing that I really do not like her to do this, she is not mature enough to understand why I do not like her up on my desk or why this dislike, connected with the importance of a private work space, is reasonable. The girl is not just flailing around aimlessly in my office, lost in the "fog" of infancy. She is deliberately playing a game I prohibit. She has no trouble thinking to herself, "I sort of like being bad." Her childishness reveals itself in her inability to appreciate what is serious about my requests, about being "good" or "bad."

Does the child freely play on my desk? Before we answer, we might pause to wonder what there is about the case which should lead us to question the freedom of the child's action. It could seem that the question injects the issue of freedom into the circumstances so artificially as not to be a genuine question at all. And, if it is not really a proper question, then we need not bother trying to answer it.<sup>13</sup>

Even if it were odd to raise the question of freedom in the imagined setting, that would not mean that the question is not worth investigating. In any case, the question of the girl's freedom is not unnatural here. What attitudes I hold toward her (once I find out

<sup>12</sup> If control should turn out to consist in the ability to do what one thinks best, all things considered, then the proposed condition of normative competence, though logically independent of control, would complement the control condition in a natural way. Thus, the plausibility of one condition would significantly enhance the case for the other. A complete defense of each of these conditions would make use of this point. As the present essay concentrates only on the normative-competence condition, however, the defense offered for it here is unavoidably less complete than it would be in the context of a full theory of free action.

<sup>13</sup> This is the kind of stance a Wittgensteinian might take.



what she is doing) may well depend, in part, on what I believe about her freedom on this occasion. And whether or not these attitudes are appropriate can depend partly on the truth of my belief about her freedom. If I am not merely upset with the child and inclined to scold her, but blame her for what she has done and am inclined to punish her for playing the game, then I must believe that the child acted freely. If I am to blame her justifiably and punish her fairly, then my belief about her freedom must be true. In making these claims, I am not supposing that adequate conditions of blameworthiness and justifiable punishment are immediately obvious. My present aim is to enlarge the scope of the traditional problem of free action. Few traditional theories have challenged the necessity of freedom for desert of blame and for justifiable punishment.<sup>14</sup> So, if there are certain attitudes that are standardly characterized in terms of their ties to free action, and the adoption of some of these attitudes may naturally become an issue in the circumstances of our example, then it may be quite appropriate to question the child's freedom.

A different reason for worrying that the question is artificial may be that the child's play seems so obviously free that it would be purely academic, in the most annoying way, to investigate its freedom. It is not because there is nothing to be said about the child's freedom or unfreedom, but because there is nothing very interesting to say about it, that the question may seem contrived. Everything said in describing the child's behavior suggests that it was entirely up to her whether or not she played her game. For all we know about her, she was neither acting on irresistible impulses nor so absorbed in fantasy as to lose control over whether or not she played on my desk. If anyone is ever free to do otherwise, this child seems to be. Indeed, the delight she takes in not heeding my warnings signals her own awareness of her power of relatively unimpeded choice.

I agree that, as far as we can tell, the child is in control of her action, that she is free to do otherwise. It does not follow that she is therefore obviously acting freely when she plays the game on my desk. This will be so only if control exhausts freedom. It is true that most writers have assumed as a matter of course that freedom consists in nothing more than control. We have seen that even Watson and (at least occasionally) Wolf believe this. However, although we

<sup>14</sup> Even the most crudely consequentialist theories of punishment traditionally have interpreted freedom so that the necessity of freedom for justifiable punishment is preserved. See Moritz Schlick's classic paper, "When Is a Man Responsible?" in Bernard Berofsky, ed., *Free Will and Determinism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 54-63.



can grant that the child acts freely in this instance to the extent that she has control over what she does, if we admit that free action is a matter of degree, that our actions can be more or less our own in the pertinent sense, then it is open to us to contend that the child's action is not completely free.

This seems to me to be what we will say, on reflection, about the case. In the sense in which we feel that an unqualifiedly free action is fully the agent's own, the child's action is not fully her own. This is because she does not understand well enough the evaluative claims that attach to her playing on my desk. Believing that the child's freedom is diminished by her lack of competence in evaluating her own conduct is a logical companion for the widespread belief that a deprived childhood reduces freedom. Wolf has shown that we do not need to think that a deprived childhood somehow determines a person's future conduct as an ordinary upbringing does not, in order to sustain the belief that an abnormal upbringing can directly restrict freedom. We need only see that what deprived childhoods are deprived of, in this context, are those things which foster the development of the ability to evaluate our own conduct competently.<sup>15</sup>

The reduced freedom of agents like this child has not been given very close attention in contemporary discussions. Yet it has not been ignored entirely. Frankfurt, for instance, admits the unfreedom of "all very young children" and tries to show how this coheres with his thesis that the possession of second-order volitions is essential both to personhood and to freedom (of action and of the will) (11). Frankfurt maintains that all very young children are "wantons," agents who have no higher-order volitions with respect to their first-order desires. This explains, on Frankfurt's theory, why such children cannot act of their own free will.

Frankfurt's view confirms my sense that mere control is insufficient for complete freedom, young children being a prime illustration of this point. His explanation of it will not do, however. Although he is no doubt correct that we all start out as wantons, the particular case I am considering raises the possibility that our freedom may be incomplete even after we have begun regarding our first-order motives critically. The child playing on my desk may be old enough to begin forming values of her own, however unsophisticated. She may have a crude system of higher-order ends in terms of which she reflects on her ground-level wants. She knows that I some-

<sup>15</sup> See also Irving Thalberg, "Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, VIII, 2 (June 1978): 211-226, esp. pp. 218, 221/2. Thalberg grants that a "brutal or deprived upbringing" lessens freedom, though he is unsure how to explain this.



times disapprove of what she does. I see no reason why it would be impossible for her to begin forming similar attitudes toward her own actions and motives. She could do this before being able to comprehend the values on which my attitudes toward her rest. It seems highly counterintuitive to think that, before a child can move out of thoroughgoing wantonness and begin to develop her own second-order volitions, she has to appreciate adequately the much more sophisticated values of the adults around her. The view that the child, who is no longer a wanton but who cannot comprehend adequately the normative standards that apply to her behavior, is less than a fully free agent seems continuous with the view that no *very* young children can act freely. Frankfurt misses the deeper element of freedom which is at stake in these cases, identifying only one necessary feature of it, the capacity to be critically aware of one's own will (11/2).<sup>16</sup>

Considering the case of the child at play, Wolf's deprived-childhood example, and Frankfurt's wanton children, we become aware of an entire range of hindrances to complete freedom which traditional theories have ignored. Toward one extreme we find persons whose freedom is diminished because mental illness or disability, or sheer lack of needed education or care, makes them ignorant of the standards that apply to their conduct. Toward the middle of the range are persons like the child at play, who are aware of some relevant norms and their ordinary application but fail to appreciate why those values legitimately apply to them. This can also face normal adults when they find themselves in some special setting where they are unfamiliar with what they are expected to do. Nearer the other extreme are cases in which persons adequately appreciate pertinent values but are barred by special circumstances from bringing this to bear in their deliberations. Here freedom is reduced because agents cannot bring their normative insight into play in making the practical judgments that their power of control enables them to act on. This is one way in which the pressure of a dire emergency can restrict our freedom. All the cases in this range seem to fall under the proposed condition of freedom.

#### IV

We should return for a moment to one of the weaknesses I noted above in Wolf's argument. Wolf purports to be providing us with an account of why the power of free action depends on our powers of moral insight. She supplies us with examples, like the victim of the

<sup>16</sup> The ability to form higher-order volitions is necessary for the proposed condition of freedom, because in evaluating courses of action one may have to evaluate motives as well as behavior and its consequences.



deprived childhood, in which praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are undercut by incapacity to evaluate courses of action competently. But why should we think that these examples show anything about freedom? Should we think that freedom is sufficient for blameworthiness, or for accountability in general? These questions also seem to threaten my claims about the necessity of a certain critical normative competence for freedom.

I hope to have advanced the case for the normative content of freedom beyond Wolf's argument by linking free action to the metaphorical—but nonetheless steadfast—intuition that such action is distinguished by being fully one's own, and then using that intuition to force theoretical treatments of freedom to address evaluative appreciation as well as control. Yet this will not dispel the fear that in the process we have strayed past the boundaries of our subject if we cannot say any more clearly what that distinctive sense is in which an unqualifiedly free act is fully the agent's own. Otherwise the alleged intuition will be suspect, perhaps only a thin disguise for our failure to comprehend the concept of freedom or for the incoherence of the subject itself.

It is not difficult to collect clues about what fully owning our actions does *not* involve. We have seen that it need not directly involve constraints on the causal determination of our actions. The question before us concerns the abilities we need to perform actions that fully belong to us. It may turn out that having these abilities entails that our actions are not causally explainable in some circumstances. I doubt that this is so.<sup>17</sup> In any case, this would make restrictions on causal explanation *per se* only indirectly necessary for full ownership of our acts.

It is also fairly clear that approving of our acts or judging them the best that we can do in the circumstances, all things considered, is neither necessary nor sufficient for their being fully our own. It is not necessary because acts that are fully ours may be ones we condemn. Unless weakness of will is an illusion, we can sometimes freely do what we believe we should not, on balance, do. Thinking our actions best is not sufficient because such acts may nonetheless be compelled. I find no reason to disturb the orthodox belief that the sort of intimate ownership of our actions in which freedom consists requires control over them.

An initial defense for the belief could go as follows. A compelled action is not fully ours because, even when we actually approve of it, we would have performed it anyway had we not valued it. The com-

<sup>17</sup> See my "Ordinary Ability and Free Action," *op. cit.*, for extensive argument on this matter.



pulsion dictates that we have the will to perform the action no matter what sort of person we are. The uncontrollable source of the action disallows certain sorts of normative judgment about us from being made on the basis of the action's character. The compulsion blocks the permissibility of inferences from particular kinds of evaluation of the action to corresponding evaluations of us. The action does not fully belong to us because, in the terms of whatever values apply to it, it cannot by itself reveal what kind of person we are.<sup>18</sup> Again, the fact that we might actually happen to endorse a compulsive will does not alter the fact that lack of control restricts agent ownership in this way.

This point moves us closer to an interpretation of the crucial intuition about freedom. Actions are fully our own when they may serve to express what we are like as persons, when they are potential vehicles of self-disclosure. That is, our free acts are suitable grounds on which certain sorts of evaluative appraisals of us may be formed. Free actions are especially our own in that qualities such as their maliciousness or kindness, their ineptitude or grace, their rudeness or courtesy can properly give rise to consonant critical judgments about us (either by others or by ourselves).<sup>19</sup>

One worry about the proposed interpretation of the ownership intuition is that it may not single out specifically free actions. The

<sup>18</sup> The distinction between evaluations of persons and assessments of their conduct which this point presupposes is especially common in the context of moral judgment. Thomas Nagel expresses a closely related distinction in a familiar manner:

Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control. Such judgment is different from the evaluation of something as a good or bad thing, or state of affairs. The latter may be present in addition to moral judgment, but when we blame someone for his actions we are not merely saying it is bad that they happened, or bad that he exists: we are judging *him*, saying he is bad, which is different from his being a bad thing.

See "Moral Luck," in *Mortal Questions* (New York: Cambridge, 1979), p. 25.

<sup>19</sup> Since at first it can seem strange to understand talk of ownership in terms of some notion of self-expression, it is worth recalling that a variety of associations between possession and personal disclosure appear in areas of discourse unconnected with free agency. Dangerous as it can be, we often seek evidence among her belongings about what someone is like as a person. People sometimes refuse to buy a particular sort of car or book or article of clothing for the related reason that "it is not really *them*." Here the language of self-revelation is applied to property in virtue of the latter's potential for disclosure. Elsewhere the language of property can mark self-revelation, as when we distinguish uncharacteristic or affected behavior from more usual or authentic behavior by saying things like, "That's really her laugh," or "Was that tone really his?" Of course, linguistic conventions such as these do not establish my claim about the connection between ownership and normative self-disclosure in the case of free action. They merely suggest a philosophical hypothesis that seems worth exploring for independent reasons.



sorts of action which characterize nervous, excited, or lethargic people, for instance, may properly anchor inferences that they are nervous, excited, or lethargic persons even when those actions are not fully controllable and thus quite unfree. But the inferred assessments are of a kind from which we normally can excuse ourselves. By contrast, we cannot legitimately escape or shake off with pleas for excuse the sorts of potential self-revelation or evaluation which full ownership of our actions makes appropriate. Our free actions permit judgments about us which we can acceptably dodge only by defending against them, by offering justification for the actions that prompted them. Without such justification, we have to accept them. Our free acts are fully our own insofar as they potentially afford appropriate bases for normative assessments of us in the face of which we have no excuse.

This further clarifies why uncontrollable actions are not fully our own, or self-expressive, in the pertinent sense. Such actions may permit some judgments about us as persons—for instance, that we sometimes do things over which we have little control—and these may support various criticisms of us. But our being psychologically compelled to do something malicious, for example, would undercut any potential judgment that we are malicious persons, along with the moral censure that such a judgment might effect or embody. Because of its uncontrollability, our action would not support any moral disclosure of us. It would, therefore, be less than fully our own, not fully free, even if we really were malicious. The meanness of our action would only accidentally correspond to our actual meanness.

Similar reasons establish that the range of cases outlined above, in which agents' ability to evaluate their conduct may be underdeveloped or diminished, displays another dimension along which freedom can be limited. Where agents cannot capably evaluate their conduct, that conduct is not an appropriate basis for making the relevant sorts of assessment of them as persons. Since the child playing on my desk cannot be expected to appreciate why it is wrong to do so without asking me, appropriate evaluations of her conduct cannot properly ground corresponding evaluations of her. She does something that is inconsiderate, disrespectful, unkind. Yet these qualities do not directly express or disclose what sort of person she is; for (from what has been said about her) she is neither inconsiderate nor disrespectful nor unkind. Her action cannot reveal what she is in these terms, because, although her action is inconsiderate and unkind by applicable standards, those standards do not apply to *her*. As the child cannot presently understand what consideration means and why it is valuable, we would get only a distorted picture of her from



the ways in which her actions intrude on others' interests. This is why the child's playing is less than fully her own. Relevant normative criticisms of her conduct cannot reveal who she is in such a way as to permit corresponding criticisms of her, criticisms in the face of which she has no excuse.

It by no means follows that the child's present personal qualities have no explanatory ties to her unwelcome conduct. One reason why the child plays her game is probably that she does not appreciate how it matters to me. In a weak sense, then, the inconsiderateness of the game may express what the child is, for the deficient state of the child's evaluative ability may be an explanation for the shortcomings of her conduct. The stronger sort of self-disclosure which distinguishes fully free action requires that normative judgments of the action can correctly support inferences to evaluations of the person which employ the same terms as the former judgments. An action does not qualify as free merely by showing something or other about its agent. It is compatible with less than fully free action that the action reveal significant features of the agent's will and values. The child's game shows that she wants to play more than she wants to avoid my scolding. It shows that she values the quality of her play more than she values whatever the things on my desk mean to me. These conclusions are possible because of the child's control over her action. And, as we noted above, it is trivially true that even uncontrollable actions can tell us important things about their agents. But our actions cannot be fully our own in the sense freedom demands unless normative properties we possess can be disclosed in corresponding normative properties of our actions. Critical evaluative ability is a condition of freedom in virtue of this dimension of full ownership of action.

This should answer the objection I put before Wolf. Expanding a theory of free action to include a substantive evaluative ability as well as control does not disguise a departure from the original subject. These conditions belong together because both are necessary for fully owning our actions in the specified sense.

Two small clarifications, and the basic case for the proposed condition of freedom is complete (though see fn 12). First, this condition should not be restricted to certain kinds or domains of value. The question of our ownership of our actions can just as reasonably arise against the background of standards like the rules of games or rules for the correct use of a language as against the background of moral standards. Hence, the values that a free agent must appreciate and be able to apply in her deliberations can include values other than moral values. This allows, however, that, if the sort of evaluation of persons we normally most care about is moral evaluation, then moral



understanding would be most important for having the freedom we most care about.

The second point is that the proposed condition does not entail that any free action must actually be a reasonable object of critical appraisal at, or shortly before, the time of its performance. Many of our free acts—drumming our fingers, tying our shoes, ordering coffee instead of tea—are ordinarily so insignificant and plainly acceptable, by whatever standards of conduct apply, that it would be silly to reflect critically on the value of performing them. This is why the proposed condition should be taken to mean only that free acts are potentially reasonable objects of critical evaluation. (For the same reason, I have avoided saying that free actions are always reasonable grounds for making the relevant sorts of assessments of their agents or are always actual vehicles of the relevant sorts of self-revelation.) If it happened that there were some important reason why we should not drum our fingers, then there might be sufficient grounds for reflectively evaluating that action. But, in that case, it would not be the freedom of the action that changed, only the significance of its freedom.<sup>20</sup>

# V

I shall conclude by responding to some likely objections.

One could object that, because the normative-competence condition largely concerns knowledge of applicable norms, it might be merely a special case of the intentionality demanded by control.<sup>21</sup> Having control over whether or not one performs an action demands that one know what one is doing. But, according to this objection, when one is not aware of the norms that apply to one's conduct or does not possess the concepts necessary to understand them, one will not really know what one is doing. One's freedom will be undermined by the unintentionality of one's action (appropriately described), not in virtue of any independent normative condition. The girl playing on my desk is unfree, on this view, because she does not grasp the concept of respecting important work and so damages important work unintentionally.

I accept that some of the things we do may be unintentional if we suffer from underdeveloped or diminished evaluative ability. The objection fails, however, if we can produce cases in which actions fully under their agents' control are less than fully free because of

<sup>20</sup> I am grateful to the editors for prompting me to strengthen the argument of the preceding section.

<sup>21</sup> This objection was suggested to me by Alan Goldman, who commented on the earlier version of this paper delivered at the Central Division Meeting of the APA in May, 1986.



the agents' failure to meet the normative-competence condition. I have produced such a case already. The child may damage important work of mine unintentionally. This is not the action I was specifically concerned with, however. Whether or not she damaged important work (and she might not have), she played on my desk without asking me; she played a game I prohibited. Under these descriptions, the child acted intentionally and was in control of what she was doing. What restricted the girl's freedom was her inability to appreciate the reasons why the game that she knew I disapproved of really was wrong. The required normative competence does not collapse into intentionality.

A second objection is directed at my interpretation of the full ownership of action which intuitively characterizes free action. The objection is that, by associating such full ownership so closely with criticizability for one's conduct, the proposed account dissolves freedom into accountability or responsibility. Many find it implausible that freedom should be sufficient for accountability and absurd that these should be one and the same thing. My argument might be thought to support both of these objectionable claims.

I have already tried to dispel much of the force of this objection. Its appeal seems to derive mostly from the dogmatic conviction that freedom simply cannot consist in anything more than control or ability to do otherwise. The mere mention of evaluative insight triggers the reaction that the topic is really responsibility. My main response has been to link both control and evaluative competence to a shared intuitive background that itself can be understood in a way that reflects why freedom is so important to us. Still, the objection that I have blurred freedom and responsibility is so tenacious that I might say something more in response.<sup>22</sup>

We should attend carefully to the distinction between being potentially open to critical appraisal on the grounds of one's conduct and being a reasonable target of such criticism. I noted earlier that free actions are often not reasonable bases for evaluating their agents; free acts are only *potential* vehicles of the relevant kinds of self-revelation. When we are responsible or accountable, however, there must be something that we can be held responsible or accountable for. There must be a charge for us to answer or something favorable to count to our credit. In general, there must be some reason for us to be appraised because of what we have done, though there need not be sufficient reason to blame or praise, condemn or admire us.

<sup>22</sup> The deep appeal of this objection first became evident to me in discussions I had with T. M. Scanlon.



This is not so, on my view, for merely free acts. These are often so insignificant as to give no reason whatsoever for us to be charged or credited for performing them. Acting freely need not, and commonly does not, give us anything to be responsible or accountable *for*. Admittedly, the interpretation of freedom as an evaluative notion directs our attention to some features of agency which have normally figured in theories of responsibility. But, if theories of free action should begin to draw much more heavily from value theory, as I contend, then trespass of the traditional boundaries between theories of freedom and theories of responsibility is entirely warranted.

A final objection is that the application of the proposed condition of freedom has been left ill defined. In any particular situation, the condition carries specific normative content: the agent must appreciate applicable norms and be able to evaluate alternative courses of action in terms of those norms. But where many distinct sets of standards govern our conduct, as is typically the case, which standards should matter for determining our freedom? Is our freedom less than complete if we are not adequately cognizant of *all* these standards? This is the answer the foregoing discussion suggests, though it may not be satisfactory. If I meet the condition with respect to moral standards, but fail to meet it fully in respect of some other domain, such as etiquette (my childhood may have been deprived of those things needed for the cultivation of a comprehension of correct table manners), then why should my freedom as a moral agent be affected? It seems strange to allow my blindness to what makes for a well-mannered dinner guest, however excusable, to erode my freedom on all those occasions where good table manners are called for.

I do not pretend to have a complete resolution of this issue. I think we should consider the following possibility, however. The normative competence condition rather naturally leads us to believe that the freedom of our actions is most perspicaciously addressed from the standpoint of some specifiable normative domain or other. Confusion about how to apply the condition can be dispelled, then, if we let go of the hallowed idea that the freedom of our conduct is a factual matter independent of the well founded, normative standpoints from which we might be moved to probe into its freedom. There may be no such thing as the freedom of an action *simpliciter*. There may only be freedom in relation to specifiable domains of value. If this is so, then the grammar of freedom is relational.

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# A FIRST LOOK AT THE PORNOGRAPHY/CIVIL RIGHTS ORDINANCE: COULD PORNOGRAPHY BE THE SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN?

FOR a philosopher immersed in the analytic tradition, the "pornography issue" may be puzzling. This issue has been subjected, as the years of its tenure as an issue have increased, to a more and more complex analysis. The very definition of pornography has expanded, almost geometrically, from a few words to a few paragraphs to a few pages.<sup>1</sup> Early in the literature—a literature which now seems as quaint as the cosmological visions of the pre-Socratics—the general motivation for discussion and analysis seemed to be to explain why "dirty pictures," though perhaps not everyone's cup of tea, were not particularly harmful,<sup>2</sup> and were certainly nothing that a sane, liberal-minded society would restrict by law<sup>3</sup> (Lord Devlin's model society not being sane in its reliance on subjectivism and certainly not liberal-minded in its legislation of the good<sup>4</sup>).

In those dear dead days of simplicity, to have suggested that pornography itself (and not its censorship or actionability) had a direct relation not to questions of mere value or virtue but to questions of justice—and justice in the strictest deontological sense, not some utilitarian simulacrum—would have been seen as confused, irrational, or duplicitous.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An example of a fairly standard (medium-length, too) definition of pornography would be Longino's: "Pornography . . . is verbal or pictorial material which represents or describes sexual behavior that is degrading or abusive to one or more of the participants in such a way as to endorse the degradation." Helen Longino, "What Is Pornography," in Laura Lederer, ed., *Take Back the Night* (New York: William Morrow, 1980), p. 43. Some problems with this idea of "endorsement"—problems tangential to my inquiry—are noted by Alan Soble in "Pornography: Defamation and the Endorsement of Degradation," *Social Theory and Practice*, xi, 1 (Spring 1985): 61–87.

<sup>2</sup> And of course some claim these representations are socially and personally helpful, sexually liberating, and so on. See, for example, G. L. Simon's, "Is Pornography Beneficial?" in Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, eds., *Social Ethics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), pp. 243–248.

<sup>3</sup> This is not to say that otherwise sane and liberal-minded societies have not restricted pornography by law, for of course they have. The arguments of liberal theorists—see, for example, Ronald Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1977), especially ch. 10, "Liberty and Moralism"—stress that restrictions against such material, under the aegis of legislating the good, are inconsistent with liberal political theory.

<sup>4</sup> See his *The Enforcement of Morals* (New York: Oxford, 1965), ch. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Again see Dworkin, especially ch. 11, "Liberty and Liberalism," p. 262, on which page Dworkin states that showing the movie *Deep Throat* is not a threat to any principle of justice.



Then feminists began looking at pornography, most of them writing outside the analytic tradition and many writing outside of any (academic) philosophical tradition whatever.<sup>6</sup> Articles were written, definitions abounded, these were criticized and (usually) expanded; pornography was examined from every (as it were) angle. On some accounts, pornography started to look pretty bad.<sup>7</sup> (Of course, in the intervening years, pornography itself had got worse, more violent, more "sick," and so on.) Still, the question of what all this—'this' representing perhaps a state of extreme disvalue—had to do with *justice* was not made clear.

THE ANALYSIS OF PORNOGRAPHY: A HISTORY THAT ENDS IN A CATEGORY MISTAKE?

Now we have, as I see it, the conceptual culmination of this newer feminist investigation into pornography encoded in what is most often referred to as the Dworkin/MacKinnon ordinance.<sup>8</sup> The ordi-

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Susan Griffin's fairly high-flying *Pornography and Silence* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982).

<sup>7</sup> The by-now classic investigation and analysis of pornography is Andrea Dworkin's *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (New York: Perigee, 1981). See also the chapter "Anti-Feminism," in her *Right-wing Women* (New York: Perigee, 1982). *Take Back the Night*, *op. cit.*, is an anthology of women, all self-identified as feminists, writing about and criticizing pornography.

<sup>8</sup> The title "Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance" is preferred by the ordinance's supporters, whereas the title "Dworkin/MacKinnon Ordinance" is preferred by its detractors. I use the two titles interchangeably.

This ordinance implies that there is a connection between pornography and justice, in that producing and selling pornography (as well as other pornographically related activities) is seen as a violation of the rights of (usually) women. I will touch only tangentially upon this question of justice in this essay, since I believe other questions having to do with the possible conceptual status of pornographic representations come first.

The ordinance defines pornography as follows (This is taken from the version—the Ordinance has several versions—reprinted in *Ms. Magazine* (April 1985): 46):

1. Pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words that also includes one or more of the following: (i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or (vi) women's body parts—including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks—are exhibited such that women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or (viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
2. The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in (1) above is pornography for the purposes of this law.



nance was written by Andrea Dworkin, a feminist writer, and Catharine MacKinnon, a feminist lawyer. Dworkin and MacKinnon had been hired by the city of Minneapolis to develop an ordinance that would help the city control the problems related to "adult" material. The ordinance they wrote was passed by the city council, but vetoed by the mayor. It has since gone through various court battles at various levels of the American legal system, being most recently summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. No doubt some form of it will surface again. In any case, it is not the ordinance's legal status that interests me here. I am interested rather in its status as containing a possibly meaningful philosophical claim. "Pornography," the ordinance states, "is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women. . . ." This definition of pornography should make any English speaker sit bolt upright. Note the use of the 'is' of identity between 'pornography' and ' . . . subordination'. Now that is peculiar. And the peculiarity is not, as is usually the case in law, a function of mere legal jargonizing—the party-of-the-first-part sort of talk—but is *conceptual*.<sup>9</sup> And because the peculiarity is conceptual, it is, I think, philosophically interesting.

A befuddled reader might sensibly react to the Dworkin/MacKinnon definition of pornography as she would, say, to the claim, "Green is where the post office can be found." This statement (or "statement") is also conceptually "off," but not *horribly* so. In fumbling with its near-sense, the mind, being the mind, tries to revive the claim, as in, "Well, the remark must here refer to a board game, like Monopoly, and it is upon the green square that the game's post office is situated." Now the mind can rest, having made complete sense of the remark. In the Dworkin/MacKinnon case, the reader striving for sense might translate the given definition by mentally adding a few words, as in "Pornography is the graphic sexually explicit *depiction of the* subordination of women." Now the definition makes perfect sense. But this amended definition is not what the ordinance provides. The ordinance says that pornography is the subordination of

<sup>9</sup> As evidence of the ordinance's conceptual difficulty, one can look to the sympathetic, but adverse, opinion of Judge Frank Easterbrook [quoted in *Off Our Backs* (April 1986): 6]: "Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape on the streets . . . (but) this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech." Clearly, Easterbrook mentally translated the ordinance's definition of pornography into a more sensible form, ignoring the copula of identity between 'pornography' and 'subordination'. The ordinance does not merely say that, in depicting subordination, pornography causes subordination. The ordinance says that pornography *is* subordination.



women. Has the analysis of pornography ended, thanks to these feminists, with something like what Gilbert Ryle<sup>10</sup> called a category mistake or, to use A. C. Baier's term, a "semi-sentence"?<sup>11</sup> Surely, according to what I call the "reasonable view" of pornography, it would seem so.

#### PORNOGRAPHY: THE REASONABLE VIEW

The reasonable view of pornography remains straight and strong, the bones beneath the pile of paper flesh generated on this issue. The reasonable view has an incredibly deep and tenacious hold on our common sense and its near relative, our common moral consciousness. This may be because the reasonable view is true or because, though it is not true, it is conceptually welded to something else which is, and we cannot see the point of separation between this coin's true head and its false tail.

Like all moral views, the reasonable view is not unrelated to an epistemology and a metaphysic,<sup>12</sup> though these are not (as they usually are not) directly stated. The reasonable view is simply this: "Pornography is sexually explicit material—pictures on paper or film, or words on a page. Some people enjoy looking at this material; others do not. To forbid by law the production and dissemination of this material<sup>13</sup> is an act of moralistic piety gone unconscionably governmental—or outright tyranny. If you don't like the words, citizen, just don't read the words. If you don't like the pictures, friend, just don't look at the pictures." With some minor adjustments for principles of public offense<sup>14</sup> and property devaluation,<sup>15</sup> pornography on the reasonable view is rather quickly found to be something outside

<sup>10</sup> *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949).

<sup>11</sup> "To make a new point it may be necessary for the philosopher, as much as for the poet or the scientist, to speak in a new form of words not simply translatable into any of the old forms. But the philosopher who speaks too often in semisentences runs the risk of semiunderstanding from only a semiaudience." See "Nonsense," in Paul Edwards, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: MacMillan, 1967).

<sup>12</sup> In both "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State," in *The Signs Reader* (Chicago: University Press, 1983), pp. 227–256, and "Not a Moral Issue," *Yale Law and Policy Review*, 11, 321 (1984): 321–345, Catharine MacKinnon maintains that objectivity, in the sense of aperspectivity, is the way in which gender males both create and describe the world. From the point of view of such "aperspectivity" only direct, John-hits-Mary causal harm is recognized as the harm that creates injustice. Thus, if no such harm is connected with producing pornography, such production cannot be unjust.

<sup>13</sup> Or—which is different—to make it actionable in the manner of the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance.

<sup>14</sup> See Joel Feinberg's "The Offense Principle," in Mappes and Zembaty, *op. cit.*, pp. 252–257.

<sup>15</sup> See the case of *Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.* described in Archibald Cox's *Freedom of Expression* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1981), p. 34.



the area of deontological note.<sup>16</sup> The ease with which this conclusion is reached might itself give us pause. We might reflect on this ease and we might recall one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's many suggestive remarks: "The decisive moment in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent."<sup>17</sup> So, on the one hand, we have the simple and reasonable view of pornography and, on the other hand, what looks to be a conceptually bizarre view, the Dworkin/MacKinnon view—something coming, almost, from another form of life. And here we may recall another dark saying of Wittgenstein's: "If a lion spoke, we could not understand him" (§7). If Dworkin/MacKinnon is any indication of the radical feminist form of life, some might be tempted to ascribe the same leonine inscrutability to its opaque practitioners.

#### THE LAW OF NONCONTRADICTION APPLIED TO OUR CASE

Now I assume that, unless we adopt some kind of fashionable relativism,<sup>18</sup> if one of these views of pornography is correct—the reasonable view or the Dworkin/MacKinnon view—the other is not. Either pornography is, at worst, a bad thing<sup>19</sup> which we would rather not have about but which justice requires us to tolerate, or it is, in addition to being a bad thing, something whose production or dissemination is an actual injustice of some particular sort in that it violates the rights of (usually) women.

Although I am, like, I imagine, almost everyone else, strongly attracted to the reasonable view (because it *is* reasonable), the bizarre view expressed by Dworkin/MacKinnon is to me of greater philosophical interest, because and not in spite of its conceptual peculiarity. This peculiarity suggests an entirely new paradigm, a virtually different world—or extreme mental confusion. Leaving open the possibility that it might be the former, I have begun an investigation. Naturally, one cannot examine this "different world"

<sup>16</sup> Again, I think that obscenity law, in legislating matters related to the good, is a deontological aberration. The just act/good act distinction is severely sketched by Charles Fried in *Right and Wrong* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1979): "But while the demands of justice are implacable within their proper domain, it is . . . inappropriate and unnecessary to extend them outside of that domain. [There] the scale of judgment is marked, if at all, in degrees of praise only" (173 and 176). In other words, as long as what we do is within the bounds of just action, it is no one else's business adversely to judge, much less to prohibit or restrict, what we do. The production of pornography—as pornography is ordinarily defined by obscenity laws—falls into this realm of personal discretion.

<sup>17</sup> *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. (New York: MacMillan, 3rd ed., 1958), §308.

<sup>18</sup> A sensible non-Platonic defense of normative realism is given by Thomas Nagel in *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford, 1986), especially in the section "Realism and Objectivity," pp. 138–143.

<sup>19</sup> Again, some claim it is a positively good thing.



and its plausibility as a conceptual map all at once. In what follows below, I begin, in a typical, analytic, immoderately small-potatoes way, to begin to try to determine the answer to what seems to me to be a precedential question, viz., Under what conditions, if any, can a representation (here, a pornographic representation) *literally do*<sup>20</sup> what Dworkin/MacKinnon claims pornography does, that is, subordinate women? Whether or not these conditions of subordination do or could hold in this or any other possible world is, naturally, a subject for another time.

#### AN EQUIVALENCE

If, as Dworkin/MacKinnon claims, "Pornography is the . . . subordination of women," then I do believe it follows that pornography subordinates women. (If  $x$  is the subordination of  $y$ , then  $x$  subordinates  $y$ .) And the reverse entailment is also true; that is, if pornography subordinates women, it follows that pornography is the subordination of women. (If  $x$  subordinates  $y$ , then  $x$  is the subordination of  $y$ .) Thus, pornography subordinates women if and only if pornography is the subordination of women. ( $x$  subordinates  $y$  if and only if  $x$  is the subordination of  $y$ .) My reason for pointing out this equivalence is heuristic, since it seems that the "shallow" or ordinary grammatical structure of English makes the ' $x$  subordinates  $y$ ' formulation more linguistically ordinary, more idiomatic, than the ' $x$  is the subordination of  $y$ ' formulation.

#### AN UNWELCOME GUEST

Much to my dismay as an analytic lover of the circumscribed, I found that, in order even to wave at or gesture toward an explanation of either of the above equivalent claims, I was required to turn my attention to the examination of some seemingly unrelated and fairly ragged notions. So now I turn to what I was disgusted<sup>21</sup> to find climbing aboard my conceptual boat—viz., to the notion of a *practice*.

#### PRACTICES AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS

A practice is a socially established, socially orchestrated human activity that aims at certain goals or internal goods.<sup>22</sup> Ideologies<sup>23</sup> provide

<sup>20</sup> Of course, the notions of the literal and the metaphoric are problematic. I am working here with our intuitive and imperfect understanding of these concepts. Unless one wants to stack one's philosophical deck, it is important not suddenly to move the line between what counts as literally subordinating someone (versus metaphorically subordinating her) when examining the case of pornography. Cf. Nan Hunter's comment on the metaphoric nature of pornographic subordination in "Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Pornography?" *Ms.* (April 1985): 123.

<sup>21</sup> Disgust is, of course, the proper analytic response to this ragged world's failure to be amenable to the strengths of one's taxonomic tools.

<sup>22</sup> My notion of a practice draws from that of Alasdair MacIntyre [See his *After*



the conceptual support for practices, and institutions are the arenas in which practices are manifested and which materially support those practices. Although not every human activity is part of a practice, very many, perhaps most, are.<sup>24</sup> Practices may have more or less explicit sets of rules and procedures, be more or less generally recognized as practices, have a more or less direct tie to "natural" needs and desires, and cover a more or less broad area of human endeavor. Examples of practices are baseball, medicine, poetry, film-making, still photography, racism, militarism,<sup>25</sup> and sexuality.<sup>26</sup>

Within every practice, just as within the world at large, there are those things which occur (e.g., events and actions) and those things which exist (e.g., individual persons or objects, states of affairs). To say this is just to say that the world of the practice is categorized by the same ontological cookie cutter as the rest of the world—whatever that cookie cutter is. This is to be expected, since of course the practice is just part of that larger world. The difference, however, between, say, an event that is part of a practice (e.g., striking out in the practice of baseball) and an event that is not part of a practice (e.g., a tree falling on an uninhabited island) is that the former event

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*Virtue* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University Press, 2d ed., 1984), p. 187], but MacIntyre seems to regard practices as functionally related to the human virtues, and I do not.

<sup>23</sup> My (fairly stipulative) notion of an ideology is such that it includes *all* of a practice's conceptual support, such as its rules, principles, value judgments, and purposes. These may or may not be known by the practitioners. Thus, nothing in my notion of an ideology requires that it be either covert or oppressive. This somewhat extended notion of an ideology allows us to see the structural similarity between social units like baseball and social units like racism. It also allows us to see how ideologies partially overlap to link practices together to form a single social reality—e.g., baseball and racism may share some conceptual support in their ideological inclusion of value judgments about the desirability of hierarchy or competition. A concise introduction to both the Marxist and the non-Marxist concepts of ideology can be found in David McLellan's *Ideology* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986).

<sup>24</sup> I do not believe that this near ubiquity extends the concept of a practice into meaninglessness. It is not that the concept is either overbroad or empty, but rather that practices are as common as societies themselves are.

<sup>25</sup> Not everything that is a practice has a convenient, unambiguous English word to refer to it. 'Racism' and 'militarism' for example, might be taken by some to refer to ideologies, rather than practices.

<sup>26</sup> Michel Foucault's writings on sexuality make this point clearly. See his *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1980) and *The Use of Pleasure* (New York: Pantheon, 1985).

To say that an activity is a practice is not, of course, to deny that it incorporates certain "natural" needs and desires. Baseball, though a practice, certainly incorporates certain "natural" needs and desires (e.g., for physical exercise). It is in fact hard to imagine a practice that did not, in some way, incorporate human needs and desires. This incorporation is at least part of the reason the practice exists. If we keep this fact of incorporation in mind, the seeming peculiarity of calling sexuality a practice disappears.



The identity of a practice constituent can be traced backward to its generation by the practice's ideology and forward to a manifestation in the practice's supporting institution(s). For example, in the practice of medicine, the identity of the practice action of surgery—what surgery means within the practice, what counts as surgery, what characterizes surgery as surgery—is generated by an ideology that includes beliefs about the causes of disease, the proper and improper techniques of cure, the paradigm of human health, and so on, and the supporting institutions (e.g., hospitals, doctors' out-patient facilities) display or manifest this practice-identified surgery. Although the practice posits benign intentions on the part of the surgeon, as well as some degree of skill, that the individual surgeon may have neither benign intentions (he intends to make money by performing an unnecessary procedure) nor great skill (he's a bumbler) does not make his action any less surgery. The identity of his action is given by the practice, not by the individual practitioner. Even if he directly intends to kill you, he kills you *by performing surgery*, for that is the practice identity of his action.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> A surgical tool is an example of a context-internalized identity.

<sup>28</sup> A surgical tool is an example of a practice object whose identity, though certainly practice informed, has a connection to the practice's ideology which is both



The practice-informed identity of practice constituents is nonsubjective and determinate. For example, in the practice of baseball, the third futile swing at a good pitch is the practice action of *striking out*. That the third futile swing at a good pitch is that action of striking out is not a matter of individual opinion. (Of course, it may be an open question whether or not the pitch was good.) It is also not a matter of opinion whether the batter who struck out has been bested by the pitcher or not. If he struck out, he has been bested by the pitcher. The practice identity of the action is such that one can say with certainty that the third futile swing at a good pitch is striking out, and that the unfortunate batter who performs this action is in fact bested by the pitcher. The batter on his third futile swing cannot change the identity of his action by closing his eyes and repeating to himself, "I am not striking out, I am not striking out," or by any other change in attitude or behavior.

The nonsubjective identity of practice objects follows this same pattern. In the practice of baseball, a certain type of wooden or metal object is a *bat*. That is the identity of that practice object. To claim, as some might be tempted to do, that the material substratum "beneath" a practice object (or action or event) is its *real* identity—to claim, for example, that a bat is *really* just a piece of wood—is a confusion and sometimes perhaps a lie. There is no more proper, basic, or real identity than practice identity. To provide an extreme example, someone who used an oven from Auschwitz as a punch bowl, claiming it was *really* only a waterproof container, would be someone caught up in this confusion about "real" versus practice identity. Logically speaking, there cannot be many identities for a

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weaker and more indirect than the connection between that ideology and the practice action of surgery. Generally, the connection between an ideology and the identity of practice actions is both more direct and stronger, while the connection between ideology and the identity of practice objects is more indirect and weaker. Put in a linguistic mode, the move from some ideological statement or statements, e.g., 'The purpose of surgery is to cure disease' and 'This is a scalpel' is more roundabout and attenuated than the move from 'The purpose of surgery is to cure disease' and 'This action is surgery'.

The differing degrees of the tightness and strength of these ideological connections is, I believe, revealed in our intuitive, commonsense judgments that, for example, what the surgeon does can only be identified as surgery, while his tools, put to a different use in a different practice, might easily and properly be thought of as having metamorphosed into entirely different things (like garden clippers). Because of what is *in general* this stronger connection between a practice's ideology and practice actions, practice actions (as opposed to practice objects) are not good candidates for an attempted re-identification/metamorphosis through a new practice—for as long as the old practice and its ideology are extant (or even remembered), the metamorphosis to a new identity will be unlikely to occur.



single practice constituent, and, given that we cannot opt out of human practices by fiat, practice identity *is* identity. A bat is, non-subjectively, a bat, not “really” a piece of wood. And the qualities needed in order to be a good bat, or a good batter, are also and similarly nonsubjective practice-functions. In those cases in which it might be said that “the same” object or event is part of two conflicting practices—e.g., a raised arm might be a salute or a request for a teacher’s recognition—the practices themselves will generally have procedures for establishing the legitimacy or precedence of their own informing power. (This stamp of the practice may or may not be governed by explicit rules.) At the mass political rally, the raised arm is a salute<sup>29</sup>; in the classroom it is a request for recognition.

It is possible for two conflicting practices to lay simultaneous claim to an event or object, but, in this conflict of meaning or identity, the victory of the one practice over the other is never complete. The cloud of the lost meaning threatens reidentification at every moment. Survival of an unwelcome practice might actually depend on this very instability and confusion. At the moment the malevolent identity of the practice constituent becomes nearly evident, the unwelcome practice can hide the actual identity of its constituent behind the more palatable identity generated by the conflicting practice. (“No, they are not saluting the Führer, they are merely asking for permission to speak.”) And the wolf in sheep’s clothing looks very like a sheep.

The indications of this dissimulation—of one practice hiding an identity behind another—are various. One clue is the effect of the use of “really” locutions, this effect being the production of an incoherence in a practice-informed explanation. (“If they are *really* just requesting recognition, then why is no one being called upon?”) Another can be found in a break or gap in what is ordinarily a discernible, solid line connecting the practice’s ideology and the alleged identity of the action or object, a break which may itself be recognized by the bizarre effects of the practice constituent (e.g., claims for teacher recognition should not induce mass chanting). Practices that rely on this type of dissimulation are properly suspect. We are led to wonder what practice identities they are hiding, and why.

A point related to the above is this: since the identity of a practice constituent is practice informed, it follows that this identity is a

<sup>29</sup> This may be so even if the agent does not intend to salute. “[T]he fact that an action must be subjectively or intersubjectively meaningful need not be taken to imply that its meaning has to be what the agent thinks it is” (Simon, p. 37).



function of the given, extant practice, whatever it is, and not of some other ideal but nonextant practice, *even if that unrealized practice is objectively preferable*. For example, even if four-strikes-and-then-out baseball might be preferable (morally or rationally) to our present game, the third futile swing at a good pitch is still, nonsubjectively, the action of striking out. To say of a batter on his third futile swing, "He is not *really* striking out because it would be ever so much better if four strikes, not three, were out," is, at best, an extremely misleading way of saying that the present practice of baseball should be altered. And, similarly, to say of this unfortunate batter that he has not *really* been bested by the pitcher because baseball as we play it is a terrible game, or should be abolished, or only placates the workers, or whatever, is just false. The value predicates and characterizations that modify practice constituents are, just like the factual predicates and characterizations, functions of the given practice. A claimed reversion to an *ideal* practice identity for some constituent is the most common form of the type of dissimulation discussed above. But it is foolish and sometimes dangerous to forget that it is the real practice that makes the reality.

#### DEPICTIONS OF PRACTICE CONSTITUENTS

A depiction of a practice constituent, like the practice constituent itself, gains its nonsubjective identity from whatever practice or practices inform it. The fact that the various kinds of depiction making are *themselves* practices entails that the identity of a depiction may be *doubly* practice informed because it exists in an area, if not of *conflict*, then of *overlap* between two practices. The depiction-making practice may add something to the identity of the depicted constituent, or it may function like a blank tablet or mirror on which the depicted practice merely makes its identifying mark. A photo of a baseball bat<sup>30</sup> is a photo of a baseball bat because the practice of baseball informs the identity of that photograph. Because the practice of baseball informs the identity of that photograph, the picture is really a picture of a baseball bat, and not "really" a picture of a piece of wood, just as the bat itself is really a bat, and not "really" a piece of wood. Similarly, a film of a batter on his third futile swing is really a depiction of a batter striking out, and not "really" a depiction of certain body movements of a man in funny pants. Just as, given an extant nondepictionary practice, the practice constituents of that practice are nonsubjectively identifiable and characterizable, so too are depictions of these practice constituents.

<sup>30</sup> The ambiguity of 'of' in the phrase 'picture of a baseball bat' is discussed in the section below, "Material and Depictionary Scenes."



Just as to hold a depictionary mirror up to a pig is to reveal a pig, so too to hold a depictionary mirror up to a batter striking out is to reveal a batter striking out.

Whether the depictionary practice adds to the identity of the depicted practice constituent or not, there is no room for reasonable debate on the identity of these doubly or singly informed depictions. Is the depiction of a batter on his third futile swing at a good pitch a depiction of a batter striking out, or not? is an absurd question. (Again, just as one can question whether or not the pitch is good, one can also question whether or not the depiction is of a good pitch—it might be shown a hair off the plate. *This* indeterminacy does not affect my point.) And, again, even if one can offer good and compelling reasons why four-strikes-and-then-out baseball would be morally or rationally preferable to our present game, the depiction's identity as a depiction of striking out and as a depiction of the batter being bested by the pitcher is a function of the extant, not the ideal, practice. Again, one *cannot* say, "That is not *really* a depiction of a batter striking out or being bested by the pitcher because it would be ever so much better if four strikes, not three, were out." Again, that would be at best an extremely misleading way of saying that the present practice of baseball should be altered. The predicates, including value predicates, that properly and accurately characterize depictions of doubly or singly informed practice constituents are, like those predicates which characterize the nondepictionary practice constituents, functions of the extant, informing practice or practices, not of a material "practice-free" reality, and not of some other ideal or imaginary practice.

Predicates,<sup>31</sup> like 'is striking out', may apply to both practice constituents and depictions of practice constituents. However, what I call the *transfer* of these predicates from constituent to depiction may occur in one of two ways, which I call *direct* and *prepositional*.

#### DIRECT AND PREPOSITIONAL TRANSFER OF PREDICATES

A predicate may be said to *transfer directly* from a practice (or, for that matter, from a nonpractice) object, event, or action to a depiction of that object, event, or action, just in case the given predicate applies both to the action, object, or event and its depiction without equivocation or other change in meaning, and the predicate applies to the depiction because it applies to the object, action, or event. For example, the predicate 'is red' applies to a real rose and may also apply, in the same sense of 'is red' to a depiction of the rose, and it

<sup>31</sup> I use the term 'predicate' to refer to the entire expression that attaches to the subject term. 'Predicate', in this sense, includes the copula.



applies to the depiction because it applies to the rose. In other words, the picture of the rose is red because the rose itself is. Thus, 'is red' is a predicate that transfers directly from the object to the depiction of the object. Or, alternatively, we can say 'is red' is a directly transferring predicate.<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, there are predicates that transfer from the object, event, or action to a depiction of one of these only with the aid of a preposition such as 'of' or 'about'. A predicate transfers only *prepositionally* if, though it does transfer, a direct transfer of the predicate produces a change in the meaning of the predicate, or the predicate does not apply to the depiction because it applies to that which is depicted. For example, the predicate 'is sweet-smelling' applies to a real rose. But this predicate does not transfer directly to a depiction of the rose. The photograph of the rose is not sweet-smelling. Rather, it is a photograph *of* a sweet-smelling flower. Thus, 'is sweet-smelling' transfers from the rose to the photograph of the rose only prepositionally, or, we can say, 'is sweet-smelling' is a prepositionally transferring predicate. (Of course, any predicate that transfers directly will also transfer prepositionally.)

There are also predicates that might be said not to transfer directly *or* prepositionally from objects, events, or actions, to the depictions of these. (I say "might be said" because one can explain the phenomenon of alleged nontransfer by claiming that the predicate in question fails to transfer because it does not in fact apply to the original object or event either). Our understanding of this mechanism of nontransfer is made easier if we recognize the practice-informed nature of the constituents of the various representational practices (film-making, photography, etc.), a nature neither more nor less practice informed than that of other constituents of other practices. In order to emphasize this practice-informed nature and to explain what seems to be a total lack of predicate transfer in some instances,

<sup>32</sup> What will count as a predicate applying to the depiction *because* it applies to the "original" is itself practice mediated. For example, a photo could be taken of a bitter-tasting rose and, in developing the photo, the photographer might take a bite of the rose and its bitter taste might cause her to spill a bitter-tasting fluid on the photograph. It would then be true to say that the photo of the rose was bitter tasting because the rose itself was bitter tasting; that is, the rose's bitterness was part of the causal and explanatory link that produced the bitter-tasting photo of the rose. Nevertheless, 'is bitter tasting' is not here a directly transferring predicate since the practice of photography has no ideological room for this transfer. (That is, the rules and procedures of photography—which are part of its ideology—do not incorporate the concept of taste, though they might come to do so, at which time 'is bitter tasting' might become a directly transferring predicate.) Thus, part of what determines the existence or absence of direct predicate transfer are the (perhaps changing) ideologies of the involved practices.



I distinguish below between what I call "material" and "depiction-ary" scenes.

#### MATERIAL AND DEPICTIONARY SCENES

In one sense of 'of', the question, What is that a depiction of? can mean (using the practice of film-making as the clearest paradigm): What fakery (e.g., ketchup "blood," styrofoam "snow") was used to produce the desired representational effect? What *materially speaking* was before the camera? In this sense of 'of', film footage from a Western may be a picture *of* an actor named John Wayne riding a mechanical horse across a hot, klieg-lit soundstage in southern California. That characterization or identity can be called *the material scene*. In another sense of 'of', the question, What is that a depiction of? means What is the depiction supposed to depict? (What, in my argot, is the practice identity of this constituent?) In this sense of 'of', the answer to that question is: It's a picture of Tex Walker (the character) riding across the snowy plains of Montana on his trusty horse Spike. This is the *depictionary scene*. Clearly, if the material 'of' were what we used in the question, What is that a depiction of? all movies would be movies of actors making movies, which clearly they are not.

This ambiguity creates a problem, or at least a pseudo problem, because predicates that apply to material scenes often do not transfer in any way to depictions of those scenes. For example, if the soundstage in the above-noted scene is very hot because of the klieg lights, the predicate 'is hot' does not transfer, even prepositionally, to the depiction. It is not a depiction of a hot day. It is a depiction of a cold, snowy day.

This ambiguity of 'of' and the choice between providing a material or depictionary description of such scenes is, however, just another (fairly well hidden) example of the same confusion reflected in the Is it really a bat or really a piece of wood? question. The representational arts are *also* practices, and their practice constituents have real identities that are practice informed. The film scene with John Wayne is not "really" a scene of an actor named John Wayne on a mechanical horse any more than a bat is "really" just a wooden stick or a baseball player is "really" just a man in funny pants. The identity of the practice constituent (the scene on film) just *is* its practice identity. There is none more basic or more real. Of course it is a shot of a snowy day. Of course it is a picture of Montana. (Cf. "Of course he is striking out—that's his third swing.") Naturally, *in another practice*, the identity of these constituents changes. But that we already knew. Not that this changed constituent would *look* any different, any more than a bat looks different from a (bat-shaped) piece



of wood. It is the practice that produces the identity of the constituent. Change the practice, and you change the identity.

A complication arises in identifying the practice constituent in those cases in which the representational practice depicts a constituent of another (additional) practice. For example, in a movie about baseball, the identity of a given depiction is a *twin* function of *both* informing practices—here, baseball and film-making. So what might we have a depiction of? An overweight actor pretending to hit a home run with a papier-mâché bat? No, that is the material scene. The practice identity of the depiction (which is to say, its identity) is that it is a depiction of a famous baseball player hitting a home run. What gives the depictionary scene this identity is *both* the practice of film-making and the practice of baseball. That is, the practice of film-making informs the identity of the depiction no less than the practice of baseball. In this practice, a depiction of something made, materially, of papier-mâché is a depiction of a wooden baseball bat, not a depiction of a papier-mâché movie prop.<sup>33</sup> That practice constituents (baseball bats, surgeons' scalpels, KKK crosses) have a practice identity (regardless of their material identity as plaster of paris, tin foil, or cardboard) in fictive settings is no more remarkable than that the English language, spoken in a novel or on film, retains its standard meaning. The sentence, 'He has arrived', spoken on a stage, still means what it does in life, even though no one has arrived

<sup>33</sup> This distinction between material and depictionary scenes is of direct importance in the moral and juridical evaluation of the pornography issue, since it is often said that pornographic portrayals are *really* only of actresses and actors playing scripted parts (tomorrow the porn queen will play Lady Macbeth) and not, say, photos of real rapes or other real crimes against women. But this opinion is the product of a double confusion. It is a confusion because, first, there is a failure to understand the doubly practice-informed nature of these pornographic depictions. A pornographic depiction of a rape is a depiction of a rape, not of an actress pretending to be raped, just as the depiction in the Western film is of Tex riding across Montana on a horse, not of John Wayne on a soundstage in California. A depiction of an actress pretending to be raped is a different scene, though it might not look any different (recall again the bat and the bat-shaped piece of wood). Secondly, those who attempt to ameliorate the possibly severe moral judgment of pornographic depictions also fail to note that, if the stories of the survivors are true, pornographic depictions often have material and depictionary identities that are one and the same. [See for example Linda Marchiano's *Ordeal*, written under her better known name, Linda Lovelace, with Mike McGrady (Seacaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1980)] That is, depictionary scenes of a woman being raped may be produced by filming material scenes of a woman being raped. In some cases, this collapse between material and depictionary scenes is highly contingent (one can easily produce a depictionary scene of a woman being raped without an identical material scene), but, in other cases, the collapse may be all but necessary (How can one produce a photographic depiction of a woman's exposed genitals without an identical material scene?).



and an actor speaks the words without the usual intention. Similarly, a film's practice object, e.g., a cardboard bat, is a baseball bat, not a cardboard movie prop. Like the English language, the bat's identity is its practice identity—and here that identity is a twin function of the practices of baseball and film-making.

#### DIRECT AND PREPOSITIONAL TRANSFER OF VALUE PREDICATES

A *value* predicate is a predicate that ascribes moral or nonmoral goodness or badness itself (where goodness and badness are inclusive of rightness and wrongness) or ascribes that which is morally or nonmorally good or bad to some practice (or nonpractice) object, event, or action. Some value predicates transfer directly from "original" to depiction, and some transfer only prepositionally. An example of a direct transfer of a value predicate from an object to its depiction would be the predicate 'is beautiful' as applied to a rose. This value predicate transfers directly from the rose to a photograph of the rose, since the predicate may apply to the depiction in the same sense in which it applies to the rose, and may apply to the depiction because it applies to the rose. On the other hand, the predicate 'is a valuable floral specimen', transfers only prepositionally to the depiction of the rose. The depiction is not a valuable floral specimen, rather, it is a depiction *of* a valuable floral specimen.

This direct transfer of value predicates may take place between many practice constituents and their depictions. For example, consider the practice of social etiquette. Within this practice, certain actions shame or disgrace the agent of those actions, whereas others bring the agent social approval or even honor. Mistakenly drinking the water in one's fingerbowl, for example (especially if one slurps it loudly and exclaims, "Great soup!") is an action that would surely disgrace the foolish dinner guest. In describing this incident, we might say, e.g., "Clara was disgraced by this action," or, alternatively and equivalently, "This action disgraces Clara." Does the predicate 'disgraces Clara' transfer, though, to a depiction of this unfortunate event? (Let us say that the host's nephew, Elwood, was videotaping the party.) And, if the predicate, 'disgraces Clara', does transfer, does it transfer directly or prepositionally? Is Elwood's videotape footage of Clara slurping the water in her fingerbowl a depiction that disgraces Clara? Or is it merely a depiction *of* an action that disgraces Clara? (Again, if the predicate transfers directly, it also transfers prepositionally.) It goes without saying that drinking water in one's fingerbowl is a practice action; its meaning and significance are a function of its practice membership. In another practice, it might represent the height of sophistication and good manners, a point irrelevant here. I believe that critical reflection reveals that the predi-



cate in the above instance transfers directly from the practice action to the depiction of it. Elwood's videotape footage disgraces Clara. The predicate 'disgraces Clara' is used with the same meaning when applied to both action and depiction, and it applies to the depiction because it applies to the action. It is not the case that Clara is literally disgraced by the actual drinking and only metaphorically disgraced by Elwood's videotape.

The same direct predicate transfer would occur if the fingerbowl-slurping episode were part of a movie, and Clara a character in that movie. The character would be shamed or disgraced by her actions as revealed in the movie. Here the predicate transfers from this constituent of the practice of social etiquette as an extant material and conceptual construct, rather than from a particular, real-life fingerbowl slurping. (Transfers, we might say, from slurping as a type, rather than a token, to a token.) There may be no value-predicate transfer from the material scene of actress Jane Smith pretending to drink water in a fake fingerbowl to the depiction on the screen.

Let us consider another example of direct predicate transfer of a value predicate. A baseball player has the fans standing in the bleachers, applauding his record-breaking home run. Given the conventions of the practice of baseball—given this ovation's practice identity—this group applause is an action that honors this player. A photograph, taken by a local newspaper reporter, which depicts the standing ovation, also honors this player. The predicate 'honors this player' transfers directly from the practice constituent (the ovation) to a depiction of it. Again, there is no change in the meaning of the predicate, and the photograph honors the player because the original action honored him.

The following final example of direct predicate transfer of a value predicate is instructive because it illuminates the relationship between the performative power of certain utterances within certain practices (here, "I award you this medal") and the process of predicate transfer.

In an honor-awarding ceremony in the military, the utterances made are performative; that is, the utterances themselves accomplish the task of bestowing honor. The medal wearer is then honored, or continues to be honored, by wearing the medal bestowed in this ceremony. We might say that the "power" of the bestowal of honor moves, in this practice, from the performative utterance to the related object, the medal itself. The soldier so honored now continues to be honored by wearing his medal. A depiction of the soldier wearing his medal also honors the soldier. 'Honors this soldier' is here a directly transferring value predicate. The picture honors the



soldier in precisely the same sense in which the medal does, and it honors him because the medal does. However, both the medal itself and the photograph honor the soldier in virtue of their relationship to the honor-awarding ceremony of this practice and to the performative utterances of that ceremony.

Generally, as the above examples bear out, the value predicates that directly transfer from practice constituents to depictions are those which have a strong notional component—not that we can mentally assign the predicates or not, as we might with equal facility think of a red or of a green triangle—but that the practice's assignment of the predicate to the practice constituent is locked within and constrained by the real and interrelated meanings of practice experience rather than, say, constrained by physical laws or logical impossibilities. Put another way, we can say that these directly transferring value predicates are more closely related to the real social meanings that create our experience than to the material edges of reality, though it *should not be forgotten* that these material edges do have a bearing on this predicate assignment as well (and that the meaning/material distinction is ultimately specious). Reflection and example might reveal these directly transferring value predicates to include 'shames', 'honors', 'degrades', 'defames', 'exalts', 'elevates', and—significantly for the case under examination—'subordinates'.

#### THE IRRATIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF VALUE PREDICATES TO PRACTICE CONSTITUENTS

Suppose that, as may in fact sometimes be the case, those who receive medals in the military—and that is to say those who are honored—are men who should not, ideally speaking, be honored. (Suppose that they are Nazi soldiers being honored for killing Jewish civilians.) Can we then say, The photo of this Nazi soldier with his medals is not a photo that *really* honors the soldier, because those medals are *really* a sign of dishonor? This claim, like the claim that the baseball player on his third strike is not really striking out, because it would be objectively better if four strikes were out, is a confusion. It is a misleading way of saying that the practice that awards medals for killing Jews should be abolished. We *can* say that the practice, through its constituent (the medal), presents what is evil as good, and that a depiction of the practice constituent also presents what is evil as good. Indeed, it is this axiological transposition that makes a morally unacceptable practice morally unacceptable.<sup>34</sup> In presenting the dishonorable as honorable, the Nazi practice condemns itself. A

<sup>34</sup> The words from Isaiah (5:20–23) are apposite here: "Woe unto you who call evil good, and good evil, who turn darkness into light and light into darkness, who make bitter sweet and sweet bitter. Woe unto you!"



photo of a Nazi wearing all his medals for killing Jews is a photo that honors what is evil and dishonorable. The photo honors what it should not because the medals honor what they should not. To say this is not to say that the photo does not *really* honor the soldier, because it does. We could say that those who are honored by practices that honor the dishonorable are thereby and in fact dishonored by being honored in this way, but the locution 'not *really* being honored' remains misleading, and it in fact *makes inexplicable* our proper value judgment of the depiction. If the Nazi is not really being honored by this photo, then why is this picture contemptible? In looking at the photo of the Nazi with all his medals, we do *not* say, "Ah, finally this swine has received his just deserts," but rather, "How terrible that anyone would choose to honor such a man."

In sum, when a practice makes this type of axiological transposition (viz., presenting evil as good or good as evil), to say that the given practice constituent is not *really* good or not *really* evil is a confused way of saying that the practice has performed an axiological transposition, and that no practice should perform such a transposition. We cannot go on to suggest either that *this* abhorrent practice should not have performed the given axiological transposition or to suggest that the transposition be undone. We cannot suggest that *this* practice should not have performed the transposition because such a statement implies that the transposition is inessential to the practice's identity, when that is not in fact the case. Axiological assignments, transposed or not, are part of what sketch out a practice's identity; e.g., part of what gave Nazism its practice identity just was its axiological perversity. And neither can this transposition be undone. The practice's presentation of evil as good or good as evil presents us with a compound meaning for the given constituent which, like all meanings, can never be erased, though, if the transposition is noted within the context of a morally perspicacious society, we may hope that the presentation of this constituent's perverse meaning will fall into disuse.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> It seems to be possible for some practice constituents, especially practice objects, to be claimed and re-identified by new practices. For example, the naturally "kinky" hair of Black Americans, along with their very skin color, was seized from its racist presentation as shameful and made into a sign of pride and honor. This change in meaning was made possible, however, not by a mere collective mental act, but by the (partial) abolition of the practice of racism and the birth of the social practice of antiracism. It is significant that other practice constituents of racism, such as lynching and insulting forms of address, could not be transformed or re-identified. There is probably no hard and fast rule determining which practice constituents can be re-identified and which not (Could the Nazi swastika ever become a symbol of Jewish self-affirmation?), and the impossibility of re-identifying most practice constituents is certainly not a logical one.



THE MEANING OF 'SUBORDINATION' AS THIS TERM IS USED  
IN THE PORNOGRAPHY/CIVIL RIGHTS ORDINANCE

Not every action that harms women subordinates women, and not all representations that portray women in a negative light—e.g., representations that make women look foolish or stupid or vain—subordinate women. To subordinate an individual or group of individuals—using the term 'subordinate' as I believe it is used within the context of the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance<sup>36</sup>—is to place that person or group of persons socially in the class of those whose intrinsic or inherent moral worth or standing is not of the first rank, and whose rights are thereby of lesser scope, importance, or weight than the rights of others. Such a social placement of women into the class of intrinsic moral inferiors would indeed, as the ordinance also says, represent "a substantial threat to . . . the equality of citizens in the community."<sup>37</sup> The social establishment of a group's intrinsic moral inferiority quite naturally leads to their political oppression, and so close is this relationship between the social stamp of intrinsic moral inferiority and political oppression that it is more illuminating to see these disvalues as twin aspects of a single social coin, rather than as held together by a cause-and-effect relationship.

The social assignment of intrinsic moral inferiority to a group of persons—and, that is to say, their subordination—is quite other than a mere assertion of such inferiority, as would be made by the statement, 'Women are morally inferior to men', or as might be entailed or implied by the assertion, 'Women should be sexually abused by men'.<sup>38</sup> The social assignment of intrinsic moral inferiority to women, the placement of women in the class of intrinsic moral inferiors, the subordination of women, is an actual, empirical, and not merely or essentially linguistic placement, though it is not of course a *physical* placing or moving. One may be assigned a social place without one's body being moved. One may, for example, actually, empirically place or be placed at the bottom of one's graduating class without thereby changing one's spatial-temporal location. One can be subordinated without leaving the house. This fact does not make one's subordination "symbolic" or "metaphorical" any more

<sup>36</sup> See Andrea Dworkin's "A Word People Don't Understand," in *Ms.* (April 1985): 46. Also Catharine MacKinnon in "Coming Apart," *Off Our Backs* (June 1985): 6.

<sup>37</sup> The Pornography/Civil Rights Ordinance, Section One, reprinted in *Ms.* (April 1985): 46.

<sup>38</sup> In "The Minneapolis Ordinance and the FACT Brief," *Women's Review of Books* (May 1986): 8, Rosemary Tong indirectly reveals the irreducibility of such social placement to perlocutionary effect. This particular irreducibility is just a specific instance of the difficulties that follow from the sort of paradigm shifts discussed below.



than the above-mentioned scholastic placement is symbolic or metaphorical.

Although the social assignment of intrinsic moral inferiority to women cannot, by its very nature, be father to the *fact* of women's intrinsic or inherent moral inferiority (that would require some effort of patriarchal genetic engineering in which women were, say, turned into tobacco plants), the assignment to the class of intrinsic moral inferiors is nevertheless a real assignment to a real social category. Such a claim for the existence of an actual social category of intrinsic moral inferiority raises many questions beyond the scope of this article. One question would be that of the ontological or metaphysical status of the entity (society) that allegedly has these categories. We might ask whether or not it would be illuminating to attempt a reduction from the paradigm that speaks of a metaphysically real society to one that speaks only of individuals and their beliefs and attitudes. Briefly, I do not believe that this notion of society and the social can be illuminatingly explained by reference only to individuals and their mental states even if, as is surely the case, society is in some sense made up of individuals. Reductionistic schemes or paradigms are unwelcome if we lose predictive and explanatory power through the reduction—which is to say, if the adoption of the reductive scheme causes us to lose the *desired* epistemic access to the phenomenon under examination, the reductionistic scheme cannot be recommended.<sup>39</sup>

Whether or not a paradigm that has no room for a metaphysically real notion of society does in fact cause us to lose desired epistemic access to some phenomenon (here, the phenomenon of subordination) cannot be decided, one way or the other, by pointing to the odd

<sup>39</sup> Of course, whether or not the access is desired is the question. It is axiomatic that change of one's paradigm destroys a certain type of explanatory power, viz., that of the old paradigm. We cannot, for example, explain the moves of a chess player *as chess moves* by describing the movement of the molecules of her body, even though, as is surely the case, the chess player is made up of molecules. The switch from the "Chess Game Paradigm" to the "Physics Paradigm" destroys the possibility of that old explanation being given. In the new paradigm, chess players assume the status of the metaphoric, and to speak of them as real is a reification. Similarly, we cannot explain the phenomenon of the social placement of women into the class of intrinsic moral inferiors *as subordination* by describing the mental states of individuals, even though society is as surely composed of individuals as the chess player is composed of molecules. The switch from the "Social Paradigm" to the "Individual Paradigm" destroys the possibility of the social subordination explanation being given. In the new, reductionistic paradigm, society assumes the status of the metaphoric, and to speak of it as real is a reification.

A good account of the general debate between methodological individualists and holists is given in Simon, pp. 41–55. For a discussion of the relationship between feminism and various forms of individualism, see "The Critique of Individualism" in Jean Grimshaw's *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986), pp. 162–187.



falls from validity which occur if we reason across paradigms. From 'It is certain that the social placement of some group into the class of moral inferiors is unjust' we cannot infer 'It is certain that  $x-x_n$ 's false belief in  $y-y_n$ 's intrinsic moral inferiority is unjust'. The inference will not hold even if we drop the modal operator, 'it is certain that', since to believe falsely in another's moral inferiority is not unjust, but only bad. This fall from validity only illustrates the problem of choosing a paradigm, but does not decide the outcome of that choice.<sup>40</sup>

#### COULD PORNOGRAPHY BE THE SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN?

If to subordinate someone, in the sense explained, is to place that person socially into the class of intrinsic moral inferiors, then 'subordinate' is a value predicate. It is among those predicates which may transfer directly from a practice constituent to a depiction of such a constituent, provided of course that the conditions for such direct transfer are met. Thus, pornographic depictions could subordinate women, if the predicate 'subordinates' transfers without change of meaning from constituent to depiction and if the predicate applies to the depiction because it applies to the practice constituent.<sup>41</sup> As

<sup>40</sup> This paradigm-related fall from validity is, *qua* fall from validity, like that generated by our inability to substitute in extensionally equivalent expressions in certain contexts. (E.g., John believes that Mark Twain wrote *Tom Sawyer*, but it does not follow that he believes that Samuel Clemens wrote *Tom Sawyer*.) But the opacity of beliefs does not place any object of knowledge beyond our reach (John could come to know that Samuel Clemens wrote *Tom Sawyer*), whereas a change of paradigms does do so. Paradigm changes destroy (and create) epistemic objects: "[T]hough the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world" [Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University Press, 2d ed., 1970), p. 121.] In the case under discussion, the phenomenon of subordination, and its attendant and obvious injustice, can be lost in a paradigm change.

<sup>41</sup> Since, as I have noted above, the representational arts are themselves practices, it can be the case that the identity of one of their practice constituents (e.g., a picture of a chess game) is doubly practice informed, and thus that identity is not entirely a function of the nonrepresentational practice (here, chess). Although it is clear that some value predicates of *nonpractice* objects can be generated by the representational practice alone (e.g., a beautiful picture of rotting fruit), it is not clear that nonaesthetic value predicates relating to a nonrepresentational practice constituent (e.g., a home run) can be so generated, much less gainsaid, by the representational practice, especially if one posits the existence of an overlapping ideology that both the representational and nonrepresentational practice share. Specifically, we might ask if it would be possible for pornographic representations to subordinate women even though the identity of the nonrepresentational practice constituents so represented contributed not at all to women's subordination. [If I follow her correctly, Susanne Kappeler's point in *The Pornography of Representation* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1986) is that the subordination of women may occur through the mechanism of the representational practice alone, regardless of the nonrepresentational practice identity of that which is represented.]

It is certainly the case that the identity of a *depiction* of someone performing practice action  $x$  is other than the identity of someone performing practice action  $x$ .



argued above, a predicate may apply to a practice constituent or to a depiction of a practice constituent, even though the assignment of the predicate is a function of an irrationality that has infected the practice. Just as the Nazi's medals honor what are in fact a despicable man's despicable actions—but honor him nonetheless—so constituents in our practice of sexuality and their pornographic depictions may subordinate, in the sense of placing the subordinated into the class of moral inferiors, those who are in fact moral equals—but subordinate them nonetheless. Of course, it is as irrational to subordinate moral equals as it is to honor despicable actions, but we cannot, on the grounds of this irrationality, say either “the medals do not honor” or “the depictions do not subordinate.”<sup>42</sup>

So it seems that we have an affirmative answer to the precedential question of our investigation into the conceptual structure of the Dworkin/MacKinnon Ordinance, i.e., an affirmative answer to the question, Could pornography be the subordination of women? The seeming conceptual oddity of the ordinance's definition of pornography as “the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women” is revealed as neither odd nor uniquely generated, given the fairly common phenomenon of direct predicate transfer from practice constituents to their depictions.

#### A BRIEF OUTLINE OF SOME NORMATIVE ENTAILMENTS OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS

What is wrong with the reasonable view quoted above is that it fails to allow for direct predicate transfer from practice constituents to their

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the depiction and the doing being informed by two different practices. It seems to me, however, empirically unlikely, if not impossible, that these identities would not influence each other, though the influence of the nonrepresentational practice is not necessarily the greater. [For an account of general representational to nonrepresentational influence on identity, see Robert Schwartz's “The Power of Pictures,” this JOURNAL, LXXXII, 12 (December 1985): 711–720.]

<sup>42</sup> And we could not truthfully make these negating statements about the medals that honor or the depictions that subordinate until such time as these practices have been abandoned as socially real, active practices *and* have either been entirely forgotten, obliterated from human memory, with such total erasure giving their constituents less social meaning than a blade of grass, *or* until they have been entirely replaced by new practices that would generate radically new social meanings. But this entire replacement of one practice by another is problematic. It would require the death of the institutions and ideology of the old practice as well as the complete abandonment of its illegitimate but nevertheless familiar and rewarding (to some) elements. The difficulties here are that, as long as human beings exist, the destruction of practice-generated meaning through social amnesia is a practical impossibility, and the replacement of one practice by another, in that it requires giving up what is perceived by some as familiar and good, is unlikely to occur except through a massive social cataclysm—and the degree of the massiveness of this required cataclysm would be a function of the degree and importance of that perceived good. Given these difficulties, it is more often the case that the “new” practice is not so new after all.



depictions, a failure which is compounded by the reasonable view's implicit adoption of a reductionistic paradigm which destroys epistemic access to the phenomenon of subordination, as such subordination is referred to within the context of the ordinance. Thus, the reasonable view does not have conceptual room for naming the production or dissemination of pornography as an injustice, but can at most see such actions as producing a state of mere disvalue. Since there is a morally relevant difference between producing a state of mere disvalue and bringing about an injustice, as well as a morally relevant difference between the additional and further harm engendered by producing a state of mere disvalue and the harm engendered by bringing about an injustice, the reasonable view will have different normative entailments from the civil-rights view.

On the civil-rights view, the additional harm related to producing or disseminating pornography (such as the harm represented by sex crimes) is directly and relevantly related to the producer's or disseminator's contribution toward the creation of women as a subordinated class, a contribution and creation which is itself an injustice. On the reasonable view, any further harm that is causally related to producing or disseminating pornography is related to the permissible, if devalued, action of producing or disseminating this merely depictionary material. On the civil-rights view, the additional harm is akin to that harm caused by a bank robber's pistol waving, which causes a frightened customer to die of a heart attack. The robber may be held responsible for this death, even though he did not intend it, because it is a causal consequence of a certain faulty and risk-creating aspect of his action. On the reasonable view, the harm caused by pornography is akin to that harm caused by my rude rebuff of a fellow bank customer's friendly greeting, which rebuff causes him to die of a heart attack. I cannot be held responsible for this death because, even though it is causally related to my faulty action, the faulty aspect of my action (its rudeness) did not create the risk of death or the realization of that risk. Rude actions do not ordinarily create such risks; and, if we find them faulty, that is not *why* we find them faulty. In the case of the bank robber, however, we can say that his pistol-waving action violated the rights of the bank customers to (among other things) personal safety in a public place, and it was just this faulty aspect of his action which created the risk and the realization of that risk.<sup>43</sup> Unjust actions often, though not always, create such additional risks. On the civil-rights view, it is the sexual subordi-

<sup>43</sup> I draw this distinction between that which may and may not be imputed to the agents of faulty actions from Joel Feinberg's "Sua Culpā" in his *Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility* (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1970), pp. 187-221.



nation of women that is pornography which grounds and explains the faulty aspect of producing or disseminating it, and this faulty aspect creates an additional and further risk, the risk that members of this subordinated class will become the victims of sex crimes. *Why* the initial act of production or dissemination is faulty (because of its contribution to the creation of a subordinated class of persons) and *how* the additional harm (produced by sex crimes) comes about are linked by the faulty aspect of the original act. Actually to contribute to the creation of a class of subordinated people is concomitantly to create the foreseeable risk that they will be victimized by those who are acting in response and relation to this actual subordination. Contributing to the actual creation of such a subordinated class of people is relevantly different from suggesting or recommending that others engage in certain illicit behavior—although the latter may be within the bounds of just action, the former is not.

On the reasonable view, pornography is merely depictionary material, and, though it may be bad or faulty to produce or disseminate such material, in that the material depicts or recommends the subordination of women, the material does not literally or actually subordinate women, and therefore the producers and disseminators of this material are not bringing about a state of affairs in which women are actually subordinated, but are only bringing about a state of affairs in which women are depicted as subordinated. Therefore, these parties are not responsible, on the reasonable view, for what might happen if they *were* to bring about such a state of affairs of actual subordination, for they have not brought about such a state of affairs. On the reasonable view, mere depictions, as such, do not contribute to the creation of the practice identity of women as a subordinated class; thus, in producing or disseminating such depictions one is not engendering either a state of injustice or even a direct risk for others. Of course, those who hold the reasonable view recognize that agents acting upon the information or recommendations provided by pornographic depictions might harm others. If this occurs, however, the agents of harm are themselves responsible for the harm, not the creators or disseminators of the depictions. One who holds the reasonable view will naturally say that the agents simply should not have acted on the information or recommendations imparted. On the civil-rights view, pornography not only provides information and recommendations, but contributes to the actual and literal creation of women as a subordinated class, a class whose members may then be additionally victimized by those acting in response to this pre-established subordination.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*Hegel*. M. J. INWOOD. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. 582 p. \$45.00.

The subject of this book is Hegel's system, his account of the "fundamental nature of the universe" (1). The first part, an introduction to the system, discusses Hegel's notion of pure thought as distinguished from ordinary concepts and from perceptions (ch. I), the role of pure thought in his conception of the self (ch. II), and his view of the natural sciences (ch. III). The second part, turning to the problems the system was designed to solve, describes Hegel's general idea of philosophical problems and of the task of philosophy (ch. IV) and then deals with two sets of problems in particular, those of epistemology and those concerning infinity. Hegel's rejection of a Kantian epistemology and the epistemological difficulties of his own system are considered under the first heading (ch. V). Under the second, Hegel's "infinite objects" (freedom, spirit, God—see *Encyclopaedia* § 8) and the possibility of a finite cognition of them are investigated (ch. VI). Hegel's view of the traditional proofs for God's existence and his central metaphysical claim that God is spirit receive particular attention (ch. VII). The third part, "The System," covering the second half of the book, discusses Hegel's conception of logic (ch. VIII), the transition from logic to nature (ch. IX), the metaphysical status of finite things (ch. X), and Hegel's views on freedom and 'Ought' (ch. XI).

The book is an argument with Hegel on these matters. Quoting generously, Inwood points out ambiguities in the texts, formulates Hegel's theses, explains the reasons that Hegel does or could put forward, raises objections, considers defenses. Throughout he wants to know not only what Hegel's system is, but also whether it is true.

He finds that most likely it is not. Chapter I: Hegel failed to give a clear meaning to his talk of pure thoughts. Chapter II: the reasons for his conception of the self are weak. Chapter III: his view of the natural sciences is seriously defective. And so on. Not that Inwood is particularly furious in denouncing his author. With the exception of one "elaborate nonsense" (457), the tone of his criticisms is subdued. But the result is devastating. Virtually none of the ideas considered bears scrutiny.

So one wonders why Inwood wrote the book at all. True, "arguments may be novel and interesting and thus worthy of study, even if they are not valid" (520). The trouble with the arguments he dis-



cusses is that they are not even interesting. They are not, because their conclusions are not. Most of the claims in what Inwood takes to be Hegel's system are, from a contemporary point of view, too absurd to merit attention. There is no point in considering, for example, Hegel's grounds for holding that the self is the system of pure thoughts or that the universe is a mind, since most people think that the chance of such statements being true is negligible. Thus there is something dishonest about the book. It purports to be arguing with Hegel in all seriousness, but really nobody can take seriously what the argument is about. Five hundred pages for Hecuba.

"So we may forget about Hegel entirely?"—Not so. The problem lies not with Hegel, but with Inwood's reading of Hegel. Some of the absurd doctrines he claims to find in Hegel are not really there, and plenty of interesting doctrines that are there he fails to find.

For example, Inwood holds (35, 42–45, 88, 308, etc.) that Hegel identified the self with the system of pure thoughts. This reading is based on the following passage (from the preface to the second edition of *Science of Logic*):

Accordingly, we can then much less suppose that the thought-forms which run through all our conceptions . . . serve us, that we have them in our possession and not rather that they have us in their possession; what remains to us against them, how are *we*, how am *I*, supposed to place myself as what is more universal, *beyond* them, when they themselves are the universal as such? When we place ourselves in a sensation, purpose, interest and feel ourselves confined in it and unfree, then the place into which we can extricate ourselves and withdraw into freedom is this place of self-certainty, of pure abstraction, of thinking (Inwood's translation, p. 35).

Inwood's idea seems to be that by the phrase "what remains to us against them?" Hegel is saying that there is no difference between the forms of thought and ourselves. His argument, turning on the universality we allegedly share with the forms of thought, may be obscure. Still, denying the difference, he must mean that we *are* the thought-forms.

This is a misunderstanding. For one thing, Inwood fails to notice that the second sentence of the quotation contradicts his reading. If I can withdraw into thinking, I *am* not the thinking, let alone the forms of thought. But, leaving that aside, the interpretation misses the point of the first sentence, too. Hegel is arguing in this passage against taking the forms of thought as a mere means to be applied in acquiring knowledge. In this context, "what remains to us against them?" does not mean that we and the forms of thought are the same thing. It means that we are not related to the forms of thought in the



way the user is related to what he uses; for we cannot understand ourselves without regard to thinking and hence to forms of thought, whereas the idea of someone's using something requires that we have an idea of the user independent of his using this thing. We are not masters of the forms of thought, because they are involved in whatever conception we can reasonably form of ourselves. As Hegel puts it a few lines later, thinking is our very own and innermost activity ("eigenstes, innerlichstes Tun"). This is different from saying that we are the thinking or the forms of thought. If Hegel is asserting anything here, it is a traditional point: man is essentially a thinking being. To be sure, that may be false. But it is not absurd, as the identification of self and pure thoughts is which Inwood finds in the text and duly refutes. However, the real pity is that the absurd thesis distracts Inwood from the important, if puzzling, things Hegel did say about the self. Most strikingly, the idea (from *Phenomenology*) that to be oneself is to be related to others in desire and mutual recognition, an idea as difficult as it proved seminal, goes unnoticed. But more could be made even of the sentences quoted above. Hegel may be read as saying: Granted the traditional point that we are thinking beings—how are we related to our thinking? Do we employ it? But how are we to describe the "employer," independently of his function? Do we really "have" thoughts? What does "have" mean here? What about the thoughts in whose grip *we* are? And so on. Inwood, bent on expounding a system, is insensitive to the skeptic in Hegel. But that may be the role in which Hegel is most helpful for present thinking.

Things are similar with respect to what Inwood considers to be Hegel's central thesis, viz., that the universe as a whole is a mind (1, 246). He ascribes this view to Hegel on the basis of *Encyclopaedia* § 50, where Hegel says that God is spirit ("Geist"). But this does not mean that the universe is a mind. Substitution of 'the universe' for 'God' is problematic, but let it pass. Substitution of 'mind' for 'spirit' is a mistake. Mind is only what in Hegelian terms is called "subjective spirit." To say that the world is a mind suggests that it is a sort of person, a subject; and Inwood endorses this reading (252, 257). So, according to him, Hegel's metaphysical story is that of a mind projecting objects outside it of which to become conscious, gaining self-consciousness in humans, and increasing it through human history, until complete self-consciousness is achieved and history comes to an end. That story cannot be taken seriously these days. Nor is it Hegel's story. He does not invite us to think of the world on the model of a mind. Describing mind as subjective spirit, he suggests rather that what a mind is can be understood only by reference to an intelligibility comprising both mind and world. This, though unclear



and perhaps false, is yet a candidate for truth worth considering. Again the misreading proves harmful in the consequence. Taking Hegel's "spirit" to be mind only, Inwood pays little attention to what is treated in the philosophy of spirit proper. Hegel on the state and society, on the inferiority of the moral point of view, on the function of art in the modern world, on the philosophical content of Christianity—these are some of the Hegelian contributions that many people still find worth thinking about. A few passing remarks excepted, Inwood does not discuss these matters.

It is probably because he chose the wrong text that Inwood presents Hegel at his most boring. A vast majority of passages referred to come from the *Encyclopedia*, most of these again from the introductory sections 1 to 83. Inwood's preference for this book is understandable. Only here did Hegel actually present the system Inwood is looking for. However, Hegel insists in the prefaces that the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, as the full title runs, is in fact only an outline of the system for the use of his students. It is not only materially incomplete, so that a lot of the more interesting points are merely touched upon or omitted; it also fails to prove statements it makes, in the way scientific philosophy requires. But, since Inwood, when turning to other texts by Hegel, again prefers passages from prefaces and various introductions, the odd result is that, although he prides himself on arguing with Hegel, he never sets his hand to Hegel's arguments. The body of Hegel's thought, the argument of *Logic* and *Phenomenology*, remains unexplored. The book is not really about Hegel's philosophy; it is about Hegel about his philosophy. This is as disappointing as finding an interview with the coaches on TV when you want to watch the game.

Perhaps Inwood's account lacks interest also because he is out of touch with the literature. We are told, as usual, that "my sparse references to the voluminous secondary sources do not reflect the extent of my indebtedness to them" (5f). In fact, there is reason to think that they do. It is true, the quality of studies on Hegel is by and large fairly low. Still, in the last twenty or thirty years people have brought forward a number of good ideas, of which Inwood fails to make use. To take just one example, Inwood's idea of Hegel as "a metaphysician on the grand scale" (1) is naive now that Michael Theunissen<sup>1</sup> has shown how ambivalent and problematic the relationship is between Hegel's *Logic* and his metaphysics.

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<sup>1</sup> *Sein und Schein: Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1978).



*Lebenszeit und Weltzeit.* HANS BLUMENBERG. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. 378 p.

The *Book of Revelation* says of the devil: "he knows that his time is short." With this "one-sentence myth" Blumenberg introduces the long central section of this dense, demanding study of the gap that separates *Lebenszeit* and *Weltzeit*, the necessarily limited time allotted to us and the endless time of a world indifferent to our desires. Are we not like the devil in that we, too, know that time is short? We are given too little time to experience, know, and appropriate what the world has to offer. This lack of time lets us turn to surrogates, myths, and metaphorical substitutes. Impatient, we try to speed things up, to cram more and more into less and less time. But impatience, as René Descartes knew, leads to precipitous, ill-founded judgments. If, as Francis Bacon would have it, truth is the daughter of time, shortness of time is the father of error. Blumenberg goes further when he insists that "shortness of time is the root of evil" (71).

Blumenberg's location of the origin of evil in the experienced disproportion of life-time and world-time recalls Friedrich Nietzsche's discussion of the "spirit of revenge," the "ill will against time and its 'it was'."<sup>1</sup> Unable to accept that every future will some day be past, that we, too, some day will have been, we dream of some paradise not shadowed by the shortness of time, where attempts to realize such dreams are inevitably paid for with a loss of reality.

Yet we find it difficult to renounce such attempts, especially we philosophers. The aura of paradise thus colors Edmund Husserl's construction of the *Lebenswelt*, which, as this so successful coinage suggests, promises to close the gap between life and world and thus to banish oppressive thoughts of times from which we are excluded, raising hopes for a fuller life, a life not estranged from itself by an objectifying rationality which has given us power over nature only to let us lose our place in it. Unfortunately, such constructions cannot quiet concerns about our lack of time. Husserl's life-world gestures toward something from which we are necessarily excluded, no matter how hard we try to fill in what philosophy must leave abstract with images drawn from peasant life, primitive cultures, or the subhistorical everyday. The gap between life-time and world-time is constitutive of human experience.

<sup>1</sup> *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Walter Kaufmann, trans., in *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: Viking, 1954), p. 252.



Blumenberg's study of this gap divides into three parts. Each part, though it casts light on the others, can yet stand by itself. By far the longest of these is the central part, which discusses the nature and history of the ever widening gap between life-time and world-time and tells of some of the strategies meant to close or at least narrow it. Blumenberg here traverses some of the same territory he had covered more fully in the *Genesis of the Copernican World*,<sup>2</sup> although now with a different end in view: ever since the eighteenth century the progress of astronomy has provided a paradigm for those who would understand the nature and progress of scientific understanding or of what we can call "theoretical self-assertion"; Blumenberg appropriates this paradigm, but gives it a special turn by underscoring the time requirements of astronomy and more generally of knowledge. The truth takes more time than is available to us.

Hipparchus already suspected this when, confronted by a new and quickly changing star in Scorpio, wondering whether such phenomena were perhaps more common than had been thought, he decided to count the stars and to leave his catalogue to posterity, which might some day be able to answer the problem he had raised. The same suspicion is communicated by Seneca's question whether the comets, whose unpredictable appearance seemed to deny them a place in the superlunar realm with its regular and therefore calculable motions, might not in fact obey periods of their own, periods so long that a single lifetime would not be sufficient to determine them. In the face of the failure of his predecessors to collect the necessary data, Seneca counseled resignation: human beings should not demand for themselves the possession of the whole of knowledge. The time demands of truth call for an ethos that subordinates the individual's desire to satisfy his demand for knowledge to the ongoing pursuit of knowledge, stretching over generations.

With its concern for individual salvation and its devaluation of time, the Middle Ages left little room for such resignation. Nor is it characteristic of the early modern period. Copernicus thought that enough time had passed to warrant confidence in the observations of the ancients and to allow him to complete astronomy, although, already a hundred years earlier, Regiomontanus had questioned the reliability of such observations and wondered whether it might not become necessary to cast off the burden of the past. Descartes thus was to insist on a new beginning, although he, too, thought his own lifetime sufficient to complete the edifice of science with a definitive morality and a perfected science of medicine which held hope even of a conquest of death. Such hopes were soon to be disappointed.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975).



The completion of science turned out to take much more time than available to one individual or even one generation. Olaf Römer's discovery of the finite speed of light further helped to separate world-time from life-time. "Light, the dominant metaphor of truth and knowledge, transformed itself into an obstacle to both and led to an isolation of that segment of the world accessible from a terrestrial standpoint" (182).

The institutionalization of science may be understood as a response to the widening gap between life-time and world-time. We find consolation in the thought that work we must leave incomplete will be taken up by those who follow us. Placed between life-time and world-time, historical time shields us from the disturbing thought that all we can accomplish will some day be lost forever. Among the most suggestive passages of this book are those where Blumenberg discusses *memoria*, which offers "something like the *intersubjective retention* of the life-time," as "the center of the confrontation of life-time and world-time" (301).

Blumenberg concludes this central part with a chapter "On the Genetic Phenomenology of World-Time." As this title suggests, Blumenberg leaves no doubt concerning his debt to Husserl. But he also forces us to question all attempts to understand world-time as no more than a deficient mode of life-time. Constitutive of our being in the world is the possibility of a self-transcendence that leads equally to the idea of an absolute subjectivity and to the idea of an absolute time; both radically transcend all lived experience. The pursuit of truth is inseparably bound up with such self-transcendence: "The mundane subject completes itself by making the most difficult of all concessions that can be expected of it; to let *its* world become *the* world, to witness the transformation of *its* life-time as only one of many life-times into world-time and as such alienated from itself" (306). Such insight brings with it the recognition that we are not the measure of all things and that it is just this which gives our existence its meaning. "What phenomenology has to observe and to describe is the process of the maturation of subjectivity as the balance it has to find between resignation and fulfillment, renunciation and demand" (306).

Two enormously suggestive essays which engage Husserl's phenomenology in greater detail frame the main body of the book. The first, "The Life-World Misunderstanding," traces the genesis and evolution of Husserl's "conceptual centaur" (19), which makes its first appearance in his 1924 memorial address in honor of Immanuel Kant's 200th birthday. The misunderstanding named by the title is invited by the way the concept of the life-world emerged, not as representing a clearly circumscribed phenomenon, but in response



to a variety of concerns that emerged from within Husserl's phenomenology and to challenges from without, especially from Martin Heidegger's analytic of Dasein with its emphasis on finitude and death. The concept is misunderstood by those who understand the turn to the life-world as a turn away from the all too formal constructions of academic philosophers to the real stuff of our lives. Although the life-world is "describable as a sphere of constant presence" (34), that description is itself a construction of something that we have always already left behind. The life-world is a limiting concept, born of the attempt to think the possibility of an existence truly at one with itself, which has to include the thought of the convergence of life-time and world-time.

In the final essay Blumenberg turns to Husserl's conception of the *Urstiftung*, the primal establishment of the theoretical attitude in early Greek thought which figures so prominently in the *Crisis*,<sup>3</sup> where Galileo and with him modern science are criticized for having strayed from this foundation. Against Wilhelm Dilthey's and Heidegger's more radical understanding of the importance of history, the *Urstiftung* was meant to secure the historical continuity of the "European spirit." To do so, what is thus established has to transcend the contingency of the world. Blumenberg speaks of a "geneticized Platonism" to which "something like a cosmogony of the noetic sphere" would correspond (373). This raises the question of how to understand the genesis of the ideality of the noetic from historical facticity. The old problem of the affinity of the ideal and the factual re-emerges. "This would have to be once more the theme of an unknown '*Urstiftung*': the foundation of an ideality of a higher order, which would make the factual capable of genetic ideality. The phenomenologist is defined by fearlessness before the infinite regress" (374).

Anyone interested in Blumenberg's sympathetic yet profoundly ambiguous relationship to Husserl may well find these two essays the most challenging part of a challenging book. I cannot even begin to do justice here to Blumenberg's often annoyingly terse and yet circuitous observations, but only assert that the reader patient enough to give Blumenberg the necessary time will discover that his questioning treatment of Husserl opens up new directions for phenomenology, where a price to be paid is the renunciation of the hope of ever closing the rift between life-time and world-time, and, that is to say, of ever returning to the life-world.

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<sup>3</sup> *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, David Carr, trans. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern UP, 1970).



## THE JOURNAL OF THE NOTES AND NEWS

The Department of Philosophy of Columbia University is pleased to announce the appointments of David Albert as Assistant Professor, Raymond Geuss as Professor, and Sarah Stebbins as Adjunct Associate Professor, effective July 1, 1987.

The Department of Philosophy of Memphis State University announces its annual Spindel Philosophy Conference, to be held October 9-11, 1987. The topic this year is "Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind." Speakers include William Bechtel (Georgia State), Robert Cummins (Colorado), George Graham (Alabama/Birmingham), Terence Horgan (Memphis State), David Kirsh (MIT/Artificial Intelligence Lab), Paul Smolensky (Colorado/Computer Science), John Tienson (Memphis State), and Michael Tye (Northern Illinois). Further information may be obtained from the Department of Philosophy, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN 38152.

The Department of Philosophy of Yale University announces a conference on Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian science, to be held at the British Art Center, Yale University, November 6/7, 1987. The main speakers will be Peter Achinstein (John Hopkins), Michael Friedman (Illinois/Chicago), Errol Harris (Northwestern), J. E. McGuire (Pittsburgh), Lawrence Sklar (Michigan), and Howard Stein (Chicago). Further information may be obtained from Phillip Bricker, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, Box 3650 Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520.

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The Department of Philosophy of Rutgers University is pleased to announce the establishment for at least three years of an annual international competition for the best essay written by an undergraduate majoring in philosophy. The deadline for the competition will be November 1 of each year. Submissions will be judged by members of the faculty of the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers, and should be sent to Regina Mayer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.



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

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## HUSSERL AND FREGE\*

MANY composers, painters, and writers show their hand in their earliest works, and the difference between Edmund Husserl and Gottlob Frege shows up in an issue that both addressed early in their careers: the philosophical clarification of number.<sup>1</sup> In his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891),<sup>2</sup> Husserl admits that, in most cases, we refer only symbolically to numbers; using counters, we refer to numbers in their absence, and we manipulate the counters according to rules. But the *sense* of what we are doing when we reckon with numerals, he says, comes from those infrequent cases in which we achieve the presence of numbers themselves, when numbers are genuinely given. This presentation, he claims, occurs only for very small numbers. We collect groups and relate them to one another as more or less. We collect this cluster of marbles and that cluster of pencils, and we call the first group "four" and the second "three." It is this sort of collection and comparison which gives us the sense of what we are doing when we talk about 5,794 and 3,296, even though we could never authentically present either of these two numbers. What happens in a genuinely presented group is that "this, this, and this" are grouped, and taken or presented or intended as one, as a whole, and we are the ones who assemble them into a whole. If we want to give a philosophical clarification of what numbers are, we must involve our activity of collecting.

\* To be presented in an APA symposium of the same title, December 28, 1987. Ronald McIntyre will be co-symposiast, and Donn Welton will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 528-535 and 535/6, respectively, for their contributions.

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviations in this paper: CP stands for Frege, *Collected Papers*, Brian McGuinness, ed. (New York: Oxford, 1984); FTL stands for Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Dorion Cairns, trans. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969); HI stands for David W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality* (Boston: Reidel, 1982); HF stands for J. N. Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege* (Bloomington, Ind.: University Press, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, Lothar Eley, ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).

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Frege saw things differently. For him, the number four does not arise through our collecting; the collecting is done by concepts. In his *Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884),<sup>3</sup> Frege speaks of *die sammelnde Kraft des Begriffs* (§48). For example, the concepts "Horseman of the Apocalypse," "cardinal virtue," and "side of a square" each apply to four individuals. The number four thus belongs to each of these concepts and to all other concepts that are equal to these in their extension. And the *concepts* isolate their instances and collect the groups, *we* do not.

Frege thinks it is psychologistic to say that numbers arise through our activity of collecting. He accused Husserl of mixing the logical and mathematical with the psychological (CP 177–179). Frege wants to work only with the objective relationships. Husserl admits that he turns to our collecting activity, but claims he does so in such a way that the objectivity of mathematics, logic, objects, and states of affairs is not compromised: he studies ourselves precisely in our achievement of objectivity, and he studies objectivity precisely as it shows up to us as objective, as reidentifiable and thus transcendent. It seems to me that what Husserl does is to take on directly the problem once admitted by Frege when he said that, when we grasp a thought, "something comes into view whose nature is no longer mental in the proper sense, namely the thought; and this process is perhaps the most mysterious of all." Frege went on to say, "I should say that this question [of how the process takes place] is still far from being grasped in all its difficulty" (CP 145; see Mohanty, HF 37). What Frege called "this process" is what Husserl calls constitution, the achievement of objectivity, the presenting of the objective to us.

As regards the sides of a square, for example, part of their being four is that they can be taken as a group, as one. They have to *be* four for me or anyone else to take them as such; I do not arbitrarily decree that they will be four and only four; but being four they also present themselves as a group of four, and, for them to so present themselves, I or someone like me must be part of the scene as a dative. It would be incomplete to let the concept do all the gathering; *for whom* does the concept gather?

Frege makes the right distinctions, but leaves the things he distinguishes dangling, decontextualized. He distinguishes correctly between signs, referents, senses, and ideas, and also between thoughts, judgments, assertions, and ideas; but he argues only negatively, by retorsion, to the necessity of these distinctions. He shows *that* thoughts could not be ideas, for then there would be no common science; he shows *that* we could not have only ideas, for then there

<sup>3</sup> J. L. Austin, trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959).



would be no bearer of ideas and, hence, no ideas either. His arguments are economical and convincing, but incomplete, for surely something positive could be said about *how* the terms he distinguishes become distinguished from one another. And the something that could be said involves an appeal to the sort of activity we carry out when we allow a sign to be sign, when we let a sense be differentiated from a thing, when we permit a concept to be differentiated from an object.

Every so often the presence of our activity intrudes upon Frege's analysis. In "On Sense and Meaning," for example, he raises the question of how we know that a particular name has a referent (CP 157-177). He answers that, when we use a name, it is not our "intent" (*Absicht*) to talk about our ideas; we do, in fact, presuppose reference (CP 161/2). Thus, it is our "intent" that constitutes a sign as referential. Frege only touches on this intent, this *Absicht*, but it is the kind of issue which Husserl would explore lavishly, indeed, which he did explore at the beginning of the first of his *Logical Investigations*.<sup>4</sup> A sign is a sign because someone uses it as a sign with which to refer to something. Frege himself, earlier in the same essay, mentions the difference between a sign functioning as a sign and a sign collapsing back into being a simple thing (CP 157). We have to *achieve* something to make a sign be more than a mere thing. But to recognize that a sign is an achievement, that it is constituted as a sign, does not make the sign dissolve into mere ideas or mental states. It is this cloth (flag) or those marks (words) that *are* the sign, and I can take something as a sign only if it permits itself to be so taken. But, once I do recognize, philosophically, the constituted character of signs, I can say a lot more about what it is to be a sign and what happens when a sign occurs. The sign does not just dangle there anymore without the context of use.

In "Thoughts," Frege also appeals to an intent, an *Absicht*, in the case of pictures (CP 351-372). A picture is more than a mere object, such as a leaf or a stone, and it is made to be more by our intent that it present something (CP 352). (He adds that even an idea serves to present something only through our intent.) In Husserl's terminology, Frege would here be touching on—but not exploiting—the intentional activity that constitutes or achieves a picture as such, and, once again, the fact that we achieve the picture does not dissolve the objectivity of the picture. It does not turn the picture into a mental state.

Frege's occasional appeals to fiction illustrate how his analysis would be improved by a more adequate recognition of our part in

<sup>4</sup> John Findlay, trans. (New York: Humanities, 1970), pp. 269-275.



what happens. In "Thoughts," he observes that both true and false statements are about things. But sometimes the grammatical subject of our sentence may fail to have a reference, and we may not realize that it has none. In such cases, Frege says we unwittingly and unwillingly slip into fiction (CP 362, 367, 389). Thus, if I mistakenly think there is a man in the car outside the house and say, "The man in the car has a lot of patience," I have wandered into fiction without knowing it. But Frege's analysis is inadequate; no one can enter into fiction without being aware of it. To enter into fiction, a speaker must displace himself from his real context and speak in a fictional context, a fictional world. He must duplicate himself and adopt a fictional voice, in a way analogous to the way we displace ourselves outside our real context when we enter into reverie or imagination. Fiction is not just another way of being straightforwardly in the world, an erroneous way, and we cannot clarify what fiction is by speaking only about words and their sense, their reference, and their truth value. We must also speak about ourselves and our possibilities of displacement.

What shall we say about the interpretation of Husserl's noema and "noematic sense" which has been proposed by Dagfinn Føllesdal,<sup>5</sup> David W. Smith, Ronald McIntyre, and others? I think this interpretation is incorrect, and that it reveals a misunderstanding, not only of the noema, but also of Husserl's idea of intentionality, his transcendental reduction, and his idea of philosophy.<sup>6</sup> I will comment on the interpretation as found in Smith and McIntyre's *Husserl and Intentionality*. I will develop Husserl's ideas as they are found in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, a work that progresses far beyond *Ideas I* and *Logical Investigations*.

Suppose I am addressing a group of people and at one point I say, "The door at the back of this room is open." The listeners can react in at least four different ways. (1) Some of them may just go along with what I say and directly take the door to be open; they may infer or remark that the room will get cold, or that the door should have been shut by the man who came in late. Their thinking and my thinking are concerned solely with a state of affairs, the door's being open, and perhaps with other states of affairs that are related to it. They and I are "believingly" and straightforwardly involved with things in the world.

<sup>5</sup> "Husserl's Notion of 'Noema'," this JOURNAL, LXVI, 20 (Oct. 16, 1969): 680-687; and HI.

<sup>6</sup> For other criticisms of this interpretation, see especially Richard Holmes, "An Explication of Husserl's Theory of the Noema," *Research in Phenomenology*, v (1975): 143-153; Mohanty, HF; Robert Sokolowski, "Intentional Analysis and the Noema," *Dialectica*, xxxviii (1984): 113-129; John Drummond, "Frege and Husserl: Another Look at the Issue of Influence," *Husserl Studies*, ii (1985): 245-265.



(2) Some listeners may be more critical. They do not not just go along with my statement that the door is open. They do not remain simply and believably with the state of affairs. Instead, they take the state of affairs, the one I have articulated, in a new way. They take it as proposed by me (FTL §44). They may have their reasons for being critical—they may have seen the door closed a moment ago, and so what I say conflicts with what they take to be the case, or they may know that the door shuts automatically—or they may have no special reason at all; they may simply be rather hesitant to go along with all that they hear. These people execute what I would call a propositional reflection. Their reflection constitutes the proposition as such, however; it is not the case that the proposition was there all along, and that they now only turn to it. They modify the state of affairs by taking it in a new way. By taking the state of affairs as proposed by me, they “propositionalize” the state of affairs. The very domain of the propositional is constituted by a new reflective stance into which we can enter, a new reflective stance which modifies how the world has been taken and articulated. Furthermore, “sense” also belongs to this domain, either as a whole proposition or as part of one; indeed, Husserl calls this domain “the region of sense” (FTL §48). We do not begin with the proposition or the sense as somehow part of our mental acts, nor do we begin with the proposition or the sense as subsisting in some third realm, nor are the proposition and the sense there as mediators between our acts and the objects to which we refer. Just as a mark becomes a sign when we take it in a special way, so a state of affairs becomes a proposition when we take it in a new way, as being proposed by someone. Now these critical listeners, having propositionalized what I said, can then turn around and see whether or not the door is, in fact, open, and, in doing so, they disquote or depropositionalize, and they confirm or disconfirm what I said. It is in this way that propositions are matched with states of affairs.

(3) A third group of people might adopt still another reflective stance, one that Husserl would call psychological. They would look upon both me and my audience as entities in the world, and they would think about our activities, about what we are doing. They would talk about perceptions, communications, responses, attitudes, motivations, and the like; and they would treat such things just as normal worldly phenomena, as occurrences that have their causal networks, their motivational patterns, their psychophysical and neurological implications. It would be difficult for those who adopt this psychological stance to account for the propositions, senses, states of affairs, and verifications or falsifications which are constituted and achieved by those who enter into propositional reflection; those who



adopt the psychological stance are prone to take, say, a proposition or a sense as a mere subjective viewpoint, as a psychological episode. They do not have the appropriate categories with which to handle verification, truth, meaning, and the like.

(4) Finally, some members of the audience, the philosophers, would adopt what Husserl calls phenomenological reflection. These people are not just naively caught up in things and speeches, as is the first group we described, nor are they engaged in critical reflection and verification, as is the second group, nor are they concerned with pursuing the empirical science of psychology, as is the third. These people enjoy a peculiar detachment and interest. They recognize everything that occurs in all the other stances we have distinguished, and they merely contemplate and describe all these things for what they are, as ways of being known, intended, and presented. These philosophers also examine the various stances we have distinguished as well as the activities executed in them, and they clarify how one and the same self can enter into all these stances and activities. They would describe, for example, the shift in focus which makes a state of affairs become a proposition and the change in intentionality which constitutes an object as a sign. These philosophers would describe the articulative and presentational activity that constitutes a state of affairs on the basis of a perceived thing. They would also examine what it is to be a speaker, what it is to be a listener, what it is to be a perceiver, a rememberer, and so on. Unlike the psychologists, they would have no trouble providing adequate terms to clarify the cognitive and verificational procedures executed by the people who adopt the first and second stances we have described; indeed, the study of truth and falsity on their own terms is the specialty of these philosophers. The philosophers would even discuss what it is for us to be in the world, and what the world is as a general backdrop and matrix for experience and thought. Because they examine what it is to be in the world, they would, in their special reflective stance, have to take a distance to being in the world; as Husserl states it, they would "suspend" world-belief and "bracket" the world and everything in it.

Where is the noema in all this? The noema belongs to the context set up by the fourth stance we have distinguished, the philosophical stance. When we speak of a noema, we mean any thing, state of affairs, feature, aspect, or dimension, insofar as it is examined in its presentability to us and to what we do; and we mean it insofar as it is examined from the stance adopted by the philosophers. The noema is not a component of an act, and it is not, formally, the proposition or the sense constituted in propositional reflection. Everything and anything can be examined noematically: material bodies, for exam-



ple, can be studied noematically. The tree-noema is the tree insofar as it is analyzed as a perceptual object, as articulable in categorial activity, as intendible in absence, as rememberable, and so on. Furthermore, there is also a propositional noema, since we can examine, philosophically, the proposition as it presents itself to a speaker, listener, verifier, and so on; we can examine the proposition in its presentability. Even a sense can be examined noematically, since we can philosophically examine it as it can present itself and be intended, and as it can recur in many different expressions and contexts.

Now, Smith and McIntyre, following Føllesdal, take the noema to be an abstract intensional entity which mediates between an act and the object referred to, an entity which explains how the act is intentional and how it refers to its particular referent as presented in a certain way, with certain predicates (HI 153, 156, 160, 195, 202). They compare the noema with Frege's "sense," the "mode of givenness" of a referent. They explicitly differentiate the noema from the object an act intends. Thus, for them, when one carries out the transcendental reduction and enters the transcendental attitude, one turns away from objects and turns toward subjectivity, and one discovers the noema as a mediating entity between act and object. The object itself drops out of focus. But, for Husserl, the objects remain there for us in our new, philosophical stance, only now we see objects in their correlation with ourselves and our intentionality. We can now analyze objects, but we analyze them noematically, as correlated to noeses. We do not turn away from objects to noemata.

The interpretation of Smith and McIntyre misunderstands the noema, because it fails to see that, in philosophical reflection, we focus on the correlation between object and subject, noema and noesis. They take transcendental reflection as focused just on subjectivity in its intentional structure, and they claim that we discover the noema in its mediating role when we adopt this focus; but they do not preserve the object as part of what the focus can cover (HI 106, 189). If they did preserve the object, they would not need the noema as a mediating entity. There would be only the intentional acts and their correlated objects.

Smith and McIntyre want to use the noema as a device that would explain how consciousness becomes intentional. But Husserl's philosophy is not explanatory in this way; it does not provide devices, it merely describes. What it describes are not "hidden causes" such as abstract entities, but obvious accomplishments such as identifying across presence and absence, the constitution of groups and numbers, the intentional activities that constitute signs, pictures, and remembrances, the achievement of categorial forms, and the like.



There are other issues between Husserl and Frege which deserve deeper exploration. Husserl's notion of syncategorematics can be compared with Frege's discussion of concepts as functions and as unsaturated parts of thoughts: Husserl's notion of categorial intuition provides a much richer context, and a fuller philosophical explanation, of what we mean by parts of a thought and the syntax that binds those parts together. Husserl's categorial intuition, and the difference between vague and distinct judging, can be related to Frege's description of what happens when we "grasp" a thought and when we assent to it. Even Frege's controversial claim that the true and the false are referents of sentences raises some interesting Husserlian questions, since it implies that falsehood is somehow also part of the world, that the world is not just the sum of positive objects, not just the totality of what simply is, but that what is not is also somehow there to be referred to when we speak falsely. Also, Husserl's general theme of empty and filled intentions and identity synthesis can provide a context for many of Frege's analyses, including his treatment of identity at the beginning of "On Sense and Meaning." These are some of the provocative issues to be found in the fine grain of the writings of Husserl and Frege.

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### HUSSERL AND FREGE\*

To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they might exist for and act on one another.<sup>1</sup>

EDMUND Husserl summarized the state of academic philosophy in 1929 with these words; but, from our contemporary perspective, they also sound amazingly prophetic.

Recently, though, there have been efforts to find a "mental space" in which the philosophical insights of Gottlob Frege and Husserl,

\* To be presented in an APA symposium of the same title, December 28, 1987. Robert Sokolowski will be co-symposiast, and Donn Welton will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 521-528 and 535/6, respectively, for their contributions.

<sup>1</sup> *Cartesian Mediations*, Dorion Cairns, trans. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), p. 5.



and also perhaps the traditions they fathered, "might exist for and act on one another." That such a space does exist for Frege and the early Husserl is generally recognized. They studied and criticized each other's works, they corresponded, they were both opponents of naturalism, psychologism, and relativism, and they shared interests in the foundations of logic and mathematics. It is a disputed thesis, however, that Husserl's more distinctively phenomenological views also belong to this same mental space. I believe that they do, and that properly situating them there can improve our understanding of both Husserl and Frege. My focus in this paper is on Frege and the early Husserl, emphasizing especially some issues on which they differed. I contend that Husserl's early project, on which he and Frege clashed, also guides the course of his later work. And so I argue that the issues that bind Husserl and Frege to a common mental space are also relevant to a proper understanding of Husserl's phenomenology, especially his notion of noema and its relation to Frege's notion of *Sinn*.<sup>2</sup>

Let us begin with the period up to 1900, when Husserl and Frege were explicitly interested in the same topics, logic and mathematics, and the issue was—or, for Husserl, became—psychologism. As is well known, Husserl's book on the foundations of arithmetic was reviewed by Frege, who roundly criticized it as psychologistic. Whatever the degree of justice in this charge, Husserl's own terminology and his conception of the project of investigating the foundations of arithmetic invited it. Husserl held that a philosophical understanding of arithmetic requires a clarification of the nature of arithmetical *thinking*, of the mental processes that make it possible for us to have thoughts about numbers and their interrelations. He criticized Frege's explanations of concepts for failing to "enable us to reproduce in ourselves those mental processes which are necessary for the construction of the concept."<sup>3</sup> Husserl himself sought to describe the basic concepts involved in primitive mathematical thinking, as manifested in counting small numbers of perceptible objects, and then to show how the concept of number itself is derived from reflection on such primitive acts of counting. He characterized all

<sup>2</sup> For other relevant discussions, see: Dagfinn Føllesdal, *Husserl und Frege* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1958); Michael Sukale, *Comparative Studies in Phenomenology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976); Tyler Burge, "Sinning Against Frege," *Philosophical Review*, LXXXVIII (1979): 398–432; Hans Sluga, *Gottlob Frege* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); J. N. Mohanty, *Husserl and Frege* (Bloomington, Ind.: University Press, 1982); David W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality* (Boston: Reidel, 1982); and Dallas Willard, *Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge* (Athens, Ohio: University Press, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> Edo Pivcevic, "Husserl versus Frege," *Mind*, LXXVI (1967): 162.



these concepts, including the concept of number, as "contents" of presentations (or acts), and he characterized the enterprise as an investigation of the "psychological origin" of the concept of number. Frege's response, of course, was that Husserl's project conflated concepts, which are objective, and presentations, which are subjective, and so rendered numbers themselves subjective and private affairs of individual thinkers.

Frege's review highlighted a problem for Husserl's conviction that the ultimate concern of philosophy is the analysis of experience: that very conviction threatens to turn philosophy into a study of the subjective, and so to conflict with an objective and nonrelativistic account of knowledge and of things known. However the review may have influenced Husserl's actual views, his subsequent writings are much more sensitive to the issues Frege raised. But there is an important sense in which Husserl never abandons the kind of project which Frege criticized. While agreeing with Frege that concepts and meanings are objective and intersubjective, Husserl never relinquishes his view that they are *contents* of acts. For Husserl, the analysis of concepts remains tantamount to the analysis of experiences. What Husserl does come to see, with or without Frege's help, is the need to develop a nonpsychological notion of content more adequate to his philosophical purposes. Husserl's later work can be seen as increasingly refined attempts to clarify his initial project, to distinguish it from psychology as a new discipline called "phenomenology," and to extend it to the investigation of experiences of objects of all kinds.<sup>4</sup>

The first major revision of this project is Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900),<sup>5</sup> which includes an explicit discussion of linguistic sense. Husserl articulates there a number of theses with which Frege could agree. Senses are distinct from referents and from subjective mental processes. Senses are "ideal," nontemporal and nonspatial, entities. Having a sense is essential to any meaningful expression; having a referent is not. Expressions with different senses may have the same referent. And the sense of an expression determines its referent. But there are also differences in their views; the most significant ones, for our purposes, concern the "ideality" of senses and the relation of senses to acts. For Husserl, senses are *universals* that acts *instantiate*; for Frege, they are *ideal particulars* that acts *apprehend* or "grasp."

<sup>4</sup> See Husserl's reiteration of this project in his *Phenomenological Psychology*, John Scanlon, trans. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 14–33.

<sup>5</sup> John Findlay, trans. (New York: Humanities, 1970). Hereafter abbreviated LI.



Let us consider Frege's views first: there are two conflicting tendencies in what Frege says about the relation of senses to acts, and Husserl's views represent one way of resolving this conflict. On the one hand, Frege takes great pains to deny any ontological relation between senses and acts. Acts exist in the realm of the mental, which he equates with the subjective and private, while senses—though “ideal” rather than spatial or temporal—are just as objective and intersubjective as physical objects. Furthermore, Frege sometimes suggests, when senses do enter into relations with acts, they do so in the same sort of way that physical objects do, i.e., by being *objects* of acts of appropriate sorts. Physical objects can be perceived; “thoughts” can be apprehended and judgments can be made about them. When a thought is apprehended, Frege says, “something in [the thinker's] consciousness must be *aimed at* the thought.”<sup>6</sup> And a thought or sense remains just as “external” to an act of apprehending it as a physical object does to an act of perceiving it:

The expression ‘apprehend’ is as metaphorical as ‘content of consciousness’. . . . What I hold in my hand can certainly be regarded as the content of my hand but is all the same the content of my hand in a quite different way from the bones and muscles of which it is made and their tensions, and is much more extraneous to it than they are (*ibid*, p. 530, n. 7).

And, of course, thoughts and other senses can be referred to just as any other objects can be. On the other hand, Frege sometimes suggests a more intimate relation of senses to acts. Although senses *can* be referred to, that is not their customary semantic role: expressions more frequently refer to ordinary sorts of objects, and the fundamental role of senses is to direct a reader's or hearer's thinking, not to the thought or sense itself, but to these customary referents. In this spirit, Frege relates the sense of an expression to a “mode of presentation” of its referent. And his attempts to show differences in sense among expressions always turn on differences in the cognitive information about the referent that those expressions would ordinarily convey. These aspects of Frege's discussion suggest that senses do not simply play the role of objects in acts in which *senses themselves* are apprehended, but that they also play some role in acts in which other objects, the *customary referents* of expressions, are experienced.

Frege leaves it completely unclear how senses play this second role. They certainly do not do so simply by being apprehended as objects,

<sup>6</sup> “The Thought,” A. M. and Marcelle Quinton, trans., in E. D. Klemke, ed., *Essays on Frege* (Urbana, Ill.: University Press, 1968), p. 531.



for to apprehend a thought is not in itself to know or pass judgment on a truth value, and one can grasp the sense of a singular term without having a presentation of its referent. Nor does it seem plausible to suppose that we intend ordinary objects only by intermediately apprehending a sense and then passing to the object by means of some second act, say an inference or judgment. Thus, it seems that, in addition to being apprehensible objects, senses must also be related in some more intimate fashion to acts in which objects other than senses are intended. For to play the second, and I think primary, role Frege gives to senses, a sense must be "in" an act in a way more like bones and muscles are in the hand: not in it as what it grasps, but as that by virtue of which it grasps what it does. Husserl's explicit concern is to relate senses to acts in this second way, while at the same time preserving their objectivity.

Like it or not, Husserl's account in LI is much clearer on this issue than Frege's. Although linguistic senses can be apprehended in acts that take them as objects, that is not their primary relation to acts. Primarily, senses are *contents* of acts in which ordinary sorts of objects are intended, and linguistic expressions achieve their semantic properties only by virtue of their relation to such intentional presentations. Language is a medium for publicly "expressing our thoughts" and so enabling others to consider the very same object that we are considering. And this is possible because the *sense* we linguistically express is the "intentional *content*" of the underlying act; it is not the *object* of that act, not something that we apprehend or otherwise intend in the act, but that "in" the act which makes it a presentation of a certain object in a certain way. Husserl calls this element of content the act's "*Auffassungssinn*." As content of the act, it gives the act its intentional character; and, as expressed sense, it gives the expression its referential character, its character of referring to a certain object in a certain way. Thus, in Husserl, the relation of sense to "mode of presentation" is explicit.

But, if the sense of a referring expression is tied to a mode of presentation of the referent by being the *content* of an act that presents the referent in that "mode," has Husserl not lost the other tendency in Frege's discussion of sense? Has Husserl not construed senses in some subjective "psychological" way, and so simply given up on their objectivity and given in to psychologism? The answer lies in a distinction Husserl had come to make even prior to LI: a distinction between the "real" and the "ideal" content of an act. Real content is specific and unique to a particular act, while ideal content is independent of that act and shareable by different acts, even acts



of different persons. The sense of an expression is the expressed *ideal* content of an act, and so is not something subjective or private. If this sounds mysterious, Husserl's solution to the mystery is marvelously simple. *Universals* are ideal entities, shareable by the different individuals that instantiate them, and, on Husserl's view, they are ontologically independent of those individuals. The ideal content of an act is a universal, Husserl says, the act's property of presenting a certain object in a certain way; whereas the real content of the act consists of those temporal constituents which literally make up the act and in which that property is instantiated.

LI provides an elegant resolution of the tension in Frege's characterization of senses and in Husserl's own earlier thought. As universals, senses are just as objective, just as ontologically independent of particular acts and particular "thinkers," as Frege's senses. Also, like Frege's senses, they can themselves be apprehended in appropriate acts. (For Husserl, though apparently not for Frege, this apprehension is a type of "intuition.") But, as universals rather than ideal particulars, Husserl's senses also do closer commerce with acts than that: they are *instantiated* in ordinary acts where ordinary objects, not these senses themselves, are intended.

Husserl himself was nonetheless not satisfied with his account of senses, or ideal contents, as act universals. That account yields, in effect, an "adverbial" theory of intentionality (and reference). An act's intending a particular object in a certain way is due, not to there being some relation between the act and an object, but to the act's having a certain nonrelational property: the property of intending such-and-such object in such-and-such way. By the time of *Ideas* (1913),<sup>7</sup> Husserl has replaced this adverbial account with a more detailed explication of how an act comes to have this property: an act is intentional by virtue of a relation between the act and the act's "noema." But this does not mean which Husserl has abandoned all he said about intentionality in LI. Like the intentional content of an act in LI, an act's noema is an "ideal" entity which Husserl characterizes as a sense or Sinn. [Strictly speaking, Husserl calls just one component of the noema—the component that determines which object an act intends and which properties it is intended as having—a "Sinn" or "noematic Sinn" (see esp. §§88, 89, and 91), but he characterizes the whole noema as a sense of another kind, a "Satz"

<sup>7</sup> *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Erstes Buch (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950). Translations from this work are mine; cf. *Ideas*, First Book, Fred Kersten, trans. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982).



(§133).] Thus, as in LI, an act is intentional by virtue of its relation to a sense or Sinn. What has changed is Husserl's conception of the kind of ideal entities senses are: noemata and noematic Sinne are not universals, not properties of acts, but ideal particulars. In this respect, Husserl's conception of sense has moved closer to Frege's. And noematic Sinne are more "Fregean" in another way as well: they are complex structures of senses organized in various syntactic (Husserl says "categorical") patterns (see esp. §§130/1). For Husserl, it is by investigating the complexities of these sense structures that we uncover the complexities in the ways objects are presented to consciousness.

The "Fregean" turn in Husserl's conception of sense necessitates a change in the way senses are related to acts. Since noematic Sinne are not properties of acts, the relation of a Sinn to the act that "has" it cannot be the relation of instantiation. How, then, *are* noemata, and specifically noematic Sinne, related to acts? Are noemata only related to acts as objects toward which acts may be directed? Some interpreters say so. But those interpreters invariably play down Husserl's characterization of noemata as senses, the continuity he sees between this notion of act-sense and the notion of linguistic sense, and the idea that Husserl's notion of sense is interestingly similar to Frege's. And no wonder. For noemata must then either be the objects that our ordinary acts intend or be intermediate objects, the intending of which somehow directs our acts to ordinary objects. To suppose that senses of a Fregean sort play either of these roles in intentionality seems quite bad phenomenology.

But, now, although I believe there are close similarities between Frege's and Husserl's notions of Sinn, what Frege called "aiming at" a Sinn is not the only, or the primary, way that Sinne enter into relations with acts on Husserl's conception of Sinn. Noematic Sinne are not the objects, but the *ideal contents* of ordinary acts in which ordinary objects are intended. On Husserl's conception of content in *Ideas*, the "real content" of an act includes what he now calls a "noesis": it comprises the "phases of experience" which "bear in themselves the specific character of intentionality" (§85, p. 208). The noesis, Husserl says, is a "Sinn-bestowing stratum" in the act. The Sinn itself, the noematic Sinn, is related to this real noetic content, neither as a property that it instantiates nor as an object that it is directed toward, but as the Sinn it "bestows." Husserl introduces the noema and distinguishes it from the noesis in §88 under the heading "Real and Intentional Components of Experience," and he refers the reader to discussions of sense and content in LI. §97 of *Ideas* is entitled "The Hyletic and Noetic Phases as Real, the Noe-



matic as Non-Real, Phases of Experience." In §129, Husserl again correlates the noesis-noema distinction with the discussion of content in LI, and, in §133, he explicitly relates the noema to the earlier concept of ideal content. Husserl distinguishes both the noesis and the noema, as "components" or "phases" of experience, from the object intended in an act, and he says that both are found by reflecting on the act itself (see esp. §§87-90).

Husserl's new conception of intentional content as an ideal particular does, of course, present a problem: the problem of just how real and ideal content are related. To call it the relation of "bestowal" is not in itself very illuminating, but Husserl may simply have thought this relation *sui generis* and so not explicable in more familiar terms. One thing is clear, though: if noemata are ideal contents, then a noema is not an object apprehended or otherwise intended in the act whose content it is. In Frege's metaphor, it is not like the object grasped by the hand, but like the structure of the hand which is necessary for its grasping whatever it does. Husserl's project prior to *Ideas* was to find a way to tie sense to content, and meaning analysis to act analysis, in just this intimate fashion. *Ideas* continues that project.

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### FREGE AND HUSSERL ON SENSE\*

There seem to be three crucial differences between the analyses of Robert Sokolowski and Ronald McIntyre and each of them has to do with their interpretations of Husserl, not of Frege:

(1) While McIntyre, following *Ideas I*, treats senses—viewed as ideal, intensional entities—as features of any and all intentional acts (first level) discovered by a reflection on them (second level), Sokolowski, on the basis of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, rejects this interpretation, and argues that senses are brought about only by a new reflective stance (second level) to straightforward statements about facts offered or taken in a doxic mode (first level). Thus, senses cannot be parts of mental acts, for they come about only by taking in a special way the objects or referents of prior intentional acts.

\* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Husserl and Frege, December 28, 1987, commenting on papers by Robert Sokolowski and Ronald McIntyre, this JOURNAL, this issue, 521-528 and 528-535, respectively.



(2) McIntyre argues that noemata, a term Husserl introduced in *Ideas I*, are to be identified with senses, understood as components of intentional acts, and to be distinguished from objects, understood as the referents of such acts. Sokolowski rejects this identification by further arguing that the reflection through which we come to identify senses (second level) and psychological activities (third level) is different from philosophical phenomenological reflection proper (fourth level). In the latter, we examine all the other levels in terms of the different kinds of objects known or presented, and in terms of the different acts or activities correlative to them. The noema is found only in this context; Sokolowski identifies it neither as a component of an act nor as a mediating entity between act and object, but as any object, including facts and even senses, "insofar as it is examined in its presentability to us" (p. 526).

(3) While intentionality is dyadic for Sokolowski, consisting only of intentional acts and their correlated objects, intentionality is triadic in structure for McIntyre, comprised of acts, senses (as the manner in which objects are taken or given), and objects.

I will look for a way out of this deadlock by (a) returning to a little known passage in which Frege actually attempts to clarify what is meant by the *Sinn* as opposed to the *Bedeutung* of a concept-word; (b) showing that Frege intended his theory of sense and propositions to apply to scientific discourse, not ordinary talk; (c) suggesting that Husserl's interpretation of noema around the time of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* comes to see it as a family of notions, and thus it cannot be reduced to either (i) the object correlate of intentional acts reflected upon philosophically, or (ii) an abstract intensional entity.

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## COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS\*

C OGNITIVE science has had substantial impact on various segments of philosophy. Its greatest influence has been on the philosophy of mind and allied portions of the philosophy of language. I shall not try to trace these significant and ever-widening set of connections. A more recent development is the interface between cognitive science and epistemology. Now there are writers like W. V. Quine who simply identify epistemology with the psychology of belief formation. They seek to replace the older questions of epistemology—questions about skepticism or about the nature and structure of knowledge and justification—with questions about the mechanisms responsible for beliefs (or verbal utterances). On the Quinean view, the connection between epistemology and cognitive science is straightforward. Cognitive science (or its predecessor, behavioral psychology) simply *is* epistemology. I do not endorse this replacement thesis.<sup>1</sup> I view epistemology as primarily a normative discipline. One task of epistemology is to formulate appropriate standards of epistemic appraisal, and a second is to see whether and how these standards can be met. But some of the relevant standards are standards for assessing basic cognitive processes. It therefore turns out that cognitive science indeed has an important connection with epistemology. Only cognitive science can specify what our basic cognitive processes are, and only with its help can we determine which of these processes meet the relevant (mostly truth-linked) standards, or meet them to what degree.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, however, I shall not pursue the relation between cognitive science and epistemology. I want to explore the possible connections between cognitive science and a different branch of philosophy: metaphysics. Of course, on one philosophical taxonomy, metaphysics includes the philosophy of mind. So all contributions that cognitive science might make to philosophy of mind would equally be contributions to metaphysics. But I shall bracket that portion of metaphysics.

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'replacement thesis' is used by Hilary Kornblith, in his introduction to *Naturalizing Epistemology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).

<sup>2</sup> See my *Epistemology and Cognition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1986).



There is another way of viewing metaphysics as offering ready entree to cognitive science which also will not be my primary focus (although my material will certainly engage it). This is a conception that P. F. Strawson<sup>3</sup> calls "descriptive metaphysics," a field he characterizes as trying to describe "the actual structure of our thought about the world." If this is metaphysics, cognitive science certainly seems to have *much* to contribute. Many practitioners in different branches of cognitive science—linguistics, cognitive and developmental psychology, cognitive anthropology<sup>4</sup>—view themselves as trying to identify the basic "ontological categories" in terms of which the mind conceptualizes the world.

There is another conception of metaphysics, however, which Strawson calls "revisionary metaphysics" and which has a different focus. It tries to identify the *real* constituents of the world, the ones to which we *ought* to be ontologically committed, whether or not they coincide with our naive or commonsense conceptual scheme. What I want to begin to explore here is whether cognitive science can make contributions to metaphysics so conceived.

#### I.

A natural approach supporting such a contribution is already present in Hume and Kant, or at least in popular interpretations of them. A familiar line of argumentation goes roughly as follows. Philosophical reflection reveals that certain parts of our conceptual scheme (e.g., space, time, unity, cause, moral value) are really the handiwork of the mind. Therefore, contrary to naive common sense, these are not parts of the "objective" (in Kant's case, transcendental) world. Our initial picture of the world needs revision. A minor amendment to this form of argument could yield a scenario in which cognitive science plays a role. Although Kant thought that the mind's contributions must be identified a priori, contemporary thinking commonly maintains that mental constraints can only be ascertained by familiar scientific methods. This is the mission of cognitive science. Once such constraints are located, metaphysical inferences may be drawn as before. If and when elements of our "manifest image" (to use Wilfrid Sellars' terminology) are found to be products of mental machinery, we may feel forced to transform our manifest image into a more respectable, "scientific" image.

<sup>3</sup> *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> For example, Ray Jackendoff, *Semantics and Cognition* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983); Eleanor Rosch and Barbara Lloyd, eds., *Cognition and Categorization* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978); George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University Press, 1987); Frank Keil, *Semantic and Conceptual Development: An Ontological Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1979); and Susan Carey, *Conceptual Change in Childhood* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).



Various materials from research on the sensory systems might potentially be invoked for the purposes of revisionary metaphysics. Facts about color categorization, contour enhancement, or categorical perception might be adduced in support of the claim that the physical world is not (quite) as we perceive it. I shall select, however, a different area of cognitive inquiry to illustrate and then evaluate the kind of maneuver I have in mind. This inquiry concerns the principles used by the mind to structure the world into units or unities. The choice of the example is not dictated by the most recent or revolutionary developments in cognitive science, but rather by the centrality of the topic in our metaphysical scheme.

II.

Apparently universal principles of grouping or unitizing were originally proposed by the Gestalt psychologists. Most contemporary cognitive scientists still see these principles as fundamentally correct. I shall draw here on the formulation and elaboration of (some of) the principles by Ray Jackendoff.<sup>5</sup> Although the domain of these principles was originally confined to perception, there is evidence that warrants extending the sphere of application.

One of the Gestalt perceptual principles is that of *proximity*, illustrated in Figure 1. (1a) is most naturally seen as three circles to the left of two, (1b) as two circles to the left of three.



Figure 1.

The principle behind this grouping evidently involves relative distance: circles closer together tend to form a visual group. A second perceptual principle is one of *similarity*: elements more similar in internal structure tend to be grouped together. This is illustrated in (2a) and (2b), where circles resembling one another in size tend to be grouped together, in the absence of proximity differences.



Figure 2.

The principles of proximity and similarity are both graded conditions. The effect of proximity can be enhanced by increasing dispar-

<sup>5</sup> *Semantics and Cognition*, especially chs. 3 and 8. For a selected survey of other psychological work on grouping and cognitive constraints, see my *Epistemology and Cognition*, ch. 11.



ities of distance and weakened by reducing them. Analogously, greater relative similarity enhances the appeal of grouping elements together. When proximity and similarity both apply, they can either reinforce each other, resulting in stronger grouping intuitions, or conflict, yielding weak or ambiguous judgments. Different people have strikingly uniform reactions to the same examples, however, whether the cases elicit firm or ambiguous intuitions.

Gestalt principles apply to the temporal as well as the spatial dimension, a point readily illustrated with rhythms. Moreover, the effect of temporal grouping is independent of sensory modality, as can be observed by presenting a given rhythm as beats on a drum, as flashing lights, or as touches of a finger on the back of your neck. Fred Lerdahl and Jackendoff<sup>6</sup> have shown that variants of the Gestalt grouping rules apply in music, where listeners and performers group certain successions of notes (but not others) into a single phrase, certain phrases into a single passage, and so on.

It is not necessary that objects be (wholly) in the perceptual *field* in order for a Gestalt rule to apply. Rather, the mind "reads" the pertinent features into the world. This is especially vivid in the principle of *good continuation*, in both spatial and temporal spheres. Figure 3 represents a range of cases where the mind may or may not see continuity among the shaded regions. In (3a) the shaded regions are quite naturally seen as a single, partly occluded thing, illustrating very good continuity. (3g) represents the opposite extreme. The intermediate cases yield a gradation of judgments, progressing from fairly strong unification in (b) and (c) to quite weak in (e) and (f).




Figure 3.

<sup>6</sup> *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983).



As this figure indicates, Gestalt principles are *creative*, in the sense that one makes applications of continuity even in previously unencountered cases. Furthermore, the operative domain of these principles does not seem to be confined to perception. For example, Stephen Kosslyn<sup>7</sup> postulates their operation in imagery, and several psychologists provide evidence that memory encodings of shapes employ partitions derived from Gestalt rules. I shall make another, very natural extension, viz., that the principles govern our unity intuitions in the sphere of "conceptual imagination" as well as perception and memory.

I suggest that Gestalt principles underlie and shape our spatial and cross-temporal "entification" practices, our propensity to view certain sets of spatial elements as parts of one and the same physical object and certain sets of time slices as stages of one and the same continuant. I shall call them principles of unification or unity principles.<sup>8</sup> At least two other philosophers have also drawn attention to the Gestalt basis of unification principles: Quine and Eli Hirsch.<sup>9</sup> Like them, I shall assume that there are strong innate, psychological constraints on "natural" entification. There are complications, however, which I shall not address. The principles I have been discussing are sortal-independent. But it seems clear that we have different principles for unifying or individuating tables and pieces of wood, or persons and brains. How the general psychological principles are related to sortal-specific principles I shall not attempt to say. I do assume, though, that the choice of (linguistic) sortals is itself sharply constrained by human psychology. (Perhaps I should stress that the phenomena in question are just being used as *illustrative* of a metaphysical stratagem. So it is innocuous for me to make certain assumptions, though they may not in fact hold in detail.)

The "partiality" of our unifying principles is brought out clearly by both Quine and Hirsch. Gerrymandered sets of dispersed particles or stages do not count as natural objects. Hirsch describes a unity scheme, called Contacti, in which persons "switch identities" during any interval where they are in contact. Similarly, we can describe a unity scheme that assembles Tuesday stages of Quine, Wednesday stages of Hirsch, and so on. Obviously, no product of these schemes is naturally regarded as a genuine object.

<sup>7</sup> *Image and Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1980), pp. 187, 263. Some discussion of work on memory encodings is in my *Epistemology and Cognition*, pp. 230-233.

<sup>8</sup> See John Perry, "Can the Self Divide?" this JOURNAL, LXIX, 16 (September 7, 1972): 463-488.

<sup>9</sup> *The Roots of Reference* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1973), pp. 54 ff.; and *The Concept of Identity* (New York: Oxford, 1982), especially ch. 8.



Let me now sketch how this material might be utilized for revisionary metaphysical purposes. The idea is essentially that of Hume's treatment of causation and morals. In connection with causation, he speaks of the mind's propensity to "spread itself on external objects";<sup>10</sup> and, in connection with morals, he speaks of the mind "gilding and staining" all natural objects with colors borrowed from internal sentiment.<sup>11</sup> To use Simon Blackburn's phrase, Hume sees causes and moral values as "projected" onto the world, though they are not "objectively" there.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, some sort of projectivist conclusion might be inferred from the psychological research on unity principles.

How might we best describe the projectivist's view? Consider the kinds of things which satisfy one of the gerrymandered unity schemes, e.g., the scheme that assembles a Tuesday stage of Quine, followed by a Wednesday stage of Hirsch, and so on. Let us call this a "shmerson" scheme. Now our ordinary thought, the projectivist says, is disposed to take a dismissive ontological attitude toward the shmerson scheme. On the one hand, it does not spontaneously think of the shmerson scheme or similar schemes at all. Furthermore, if presented with the shmerson scheme, it is inclined to reject it. True enough, a philosopher might get people to admit that, since the predicate 'shmerson' can be given satisfaction conditions and since there are sets of person stages which meet these conditions, there apparently *are* shmersons. On the other hand, the ordinary person is strongly impelled to add, "But, nonetheless, shmersons are not real *things*; they are not real *objects*." (This is similar to people's initial, and persisting, attitude to Goodman's 'grue' and 'bleen'. These are just gimmicky, nonkosher predicates, people may well say; they do not express genuine properties.) By contrast, people have no such dismissive impulse toward persons (or 'blue' and 'green'). Now the projectivist expresses these facts in the following way. Common sense supposes that there is a property of *entitativity*, such that persons, dogs, etc., have this property, but shmersons, shmogs, etc., lack this property. (Or perhaps what should be attributed to common sense is the view that certain *unity schemes* have entitativity while others lack it.) The projectivist next proceeds to charge common sense with *error*, much as J. L. Mackie<sup>13</sup> charges ordinary moral

<sup>10</sup> *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part 1, Section 14.

<sup>11</sup> *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Appendix 1.

<sup>12</sup> Although I borrow the term "projectivism" from Blackburn—see *Spreading the Word* (New York: Oxford, 1984)—my use of it does not coincide with his. Jackendoff, *op. cit.*, also speaks of a "projected world."

<sup>13</sup> *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp. 48/9.



thought with error. There is no property of entitivity in the natural world, says the projectivist. It is a mistake to suppose that some things (or unity schemes) have entitivity while others lack it. It is just a propensity of the mind to interpret the world this way.

This conclusion, if correct, would not be devoid of significance. I am strongly tempted to suppose that I (the present Alvin Goldman stage) shall not be object unified with a tomorrow stage of Margaret Thatcher, but only with a tomorrow stage of Alvin Goldman. The projectivist tells me, in effect, that this is a mistake. Since the shmer-son unity scheme has complete ontological parity with the person unity scheme, no invidious distinction can be drawn between my unity with tomorrow's Alvin Goldman versus my unity with tomorrow's Margaret Thatcher. This is, ostensibly, a substantial metaphysical conclusion, one at variance with common sense.

What, then, is the justification for the projectivist's conclusion? There are two arguments for it. First, it is puzzling how there could be any facts in the natural world which would dictate that certain conglomerations of elements have entitivity and other conglomerations lack it. Second, and more centrally, there is an "alternate explanation" argument.

In arguments over God, the theist claims that the best explanation of religious experience and belief is the existence of God. The atheist replies that there is an alternate explanation in terms of psychological and cultural mechanisms. We do not need to postulate God in order to explain religious phenomena, since we have the other, much more parsimonious form of explanation. Like the atheist, the projectivist asserts that we do not need to postulate genuine possession and nonpossession of entitivity in order to explain people's preferences for certain unity schemes (or certain objects) rather than others. Those preferences can be explained much more parsimoniously in terms of innate psychological constraints.

#### IV.

I hope I have made enough of a case for unity projectivism to make it seem at least worthy of serious discussion, and hence illustrative of a not-altogether-hollow attempt to put results of psychology to metaphysical ends. But the ramifications of the thesis for the problem of personal identity are unsettling. One might well feel that the indicated invidious distinctions should not be obliterated, as projectivism would do. Can we live with this consequence? If not, how should one respond to unity projectivism?

One natural response is found in reactions to moral projectivism: the secondary-quality response. John McDowell<sup>14</sup> answers Mackie's

<sup>14</sup> "Values and Secondary Qualities," in Ted Honderich, ed., *Morality and Objectivity* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).



projectivism by suggesting that values have the same real, i.e., non-subjective, status that other secondary qualities have, viz., a power to produce certain effects in us. The same maneuver might be extended to the unity problem. Projectivism seems to be a kind of eliminativism. But a secondary-quality view, as McDowell points out, preserves a legitimate ontological niche for the entities in question, indeed, a *not-purely-subjective* ontological niche. For our topic, it would say that the property of entitvity is the ("objective") property of having the power to produce certain effects in human beings. As such, entitvity is secure, even in a scientific image of the world.

Many questions might be raised for the secondary-quality gambit. But suppose for the sake of argument that it succeeds. This might defeat projectivism, but it does not defeat the suggestion that cognitive science can have ramifications for metaphysics, even revisionary metaphysics. This is because the conclusion that entitvity is a secondary quality is already a metaphysical conclusion, plausibly a revisionary metaphysical conclusion. So the kind of connection I have adumbrated between cognitive science and metaphysics would still be exemplified.

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### EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE AGE OF NEUROSCIENCE\*

**I**N a recent archaeological dig through several decades of my papers, I unearthed the graduate student stratum. At that level, I discovered a dusty bundle of final examination papers from Oxford, and, in pondering the test questions, I found myself viewing most of them as old curiosities. Among such curiosities for me are the Gettier problem, the nature of sense data, the nature of incorrigible foundations of knowledge, and the constituents of the corpus of a priori knowledge.

Though the examination papers are in fact less than twenty years old, so much has changed, and changed profoundly, in the field, that it may not be an exaggeration to say that we are in the midst of a

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Grateful thanks are owed to Paul Churchland, Patricia Kitcher, Stephen P. Stich, Terrence J. Sejnowski, and Warren Dow for discussion and advice. The three figures below are adapted from Paul Churchland's *Matter and Consciousness*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, forthcoming).



paradigm shift. Since one cannot accurately speak for the whole field, I should properly speak only for myself (and Paul Churchland). With that proviso, it seems to me that the general frame of reference within which we might hope to discover how humans learn, understand, and perceive is undergoing a major reconfiguration. Most of the questions which used to preoccupy us as graduate students and whose answers seemed necessary to advancing the general program in epistemology, now look either peripheral or misguided, and the general program itself looks troubled.

I am no longer preoccupied with the nature of absolute foundations, because it does not look as if there are any; or with a priori knowledge, because there probably is not any, or with sense data, because that is a mixed-up way of thinking about sensory processing. It is doubtful that knowledge in general is sentential; rather, representations are typically structures of a quite different sort. Whatever reasoning and information processing turn out to be, formal logic is probably not the model, save perhaps for a small part. Decision theory, confirmation theory, the predicate calculus, etc., beautiful and magnificently clever though they are, do not appear destined to play a central part in the theory of how, in fact, human and other nervous systems solve problems and figure things out. Inductive logic does not exist, and does not show any positive signs in that direction; 'inference-to-the-best-explanation' is a name for a problem, not a theory of how humans accomplish some task.

Formal semantics now looks like a thoroughly misbegotten project which cannot even begin to explain how human language is meaningful. Hilary Putnam<sup>1</sup> has provided grounds for this view, and empirical data from linguistics also seriously undermines the general idea.<sup>2</sup> Formal semantics may be invaluable for certain purposes, but, for generating a theory of meaningfulness in human language, it looks like a dismal failure. Surely there is something bizarre about the idea that a theory of meaning that has nothing whatever to do with human psychology or neurophysiology can explain the meaningfulness of language and how representational structures relate to the world. And what of truth? If representational structures are not sentences (propositions), they are not truth-valuable; if they are to be evaluated, it must be in some other way.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the very concept of truth appears to be in for major reconsideration.

<sup>1</sup> *Reason, Truth, and History* (New York: Cambridge, 1981).

<sup>2</sup> George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (Chicago: University Press, 1987).

<sup>3</sup> For a further discussion of the deep problems with truth and rationality, see Stephen P. Stich, *The Fragmentation of Reason* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).



Thus, knowledge and belief, reference, meaning, and truth, and reasoning, explaining, and learning, are each the focus of eroded confidence in "the grand old paradigm," a framework derived mainly from Logical Empiricism, whose roots, in turn, reach back to Hume, Locke, and Descartes. This is certainly not to say that nothing has been achieved, or that everything worked out from within the confines of the old assumptions is bunk. On the contrary, there are surely many enduring results, although at this stage I find it difficult to know how to tell the enduring from the ephemeral.

Moreover, it is not that there has been a decisive refutation of "the grand old paradigm." Paradigms rarely fall with decisive refutation; rather, they become enfeebled and slowly lose adherents. Confirmed practitioners can always continue, secure in the faith that a new wrinkle may yet satisfy the critics. But many of us sense that working within "the grand old paradigm" is not very rewarding. By contrast, there is considerable promise in a naturalistic approach, which draws upon what is available in psychology and neuroscience to inform our research. There are remarkable new developments in cognitive neurobiology which encourage us to think that a new and encompassing paradigm is emerging. Epistemology conceived in this spirit is what W. V. Quine<sup>4</sup> has called *naturalized* epistemology.

#### THE BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The fundamental epistemological question from Plato onward is this: How is it possible for us to represent reality? How is it that we can represent the external world of objects, of space and time, of motion and color? How do we represent our inner world of thoughts and desires, images and ideas, self and consciousness? Since it is, after all, the nervous system that achieves these things, the fundamental epistemological question can be reformulated thus: *How does the brain work?* Less cryptically and more accurately, the question is: *How, situated in its bodily configuration, within its surrounding physical environment, and within the social context it finds itself, does the brain work?* Answers here will be descriptive first and foremost, but the normative dimension of epistemology enters when we can draw on the descriptive basis to compare and evaluate styles of computation and representation, and determine how to improve upon particular computational and representational strategies. Once we understand what reasoning is, we can begin to figure out what reasoning *well* is.

This is a good time to be naturalizing epistemology, and three factors in particular indicate this. First, technological developments

<sup>4</sup> "Epistemology Naturalized," *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia, 1969), pp. 69-90.



in research in the neurosciences during the past twenty years have been spectacular, and a truly impressive amount is now known about the microstructure and micro-organization of nervous systems. For example, we are learning in detail about the pathways for particular neuron types in the visual system, about the physiological properties of different types of neurons, and about the different tasks performed by distinct neural populations. Techniques for addressing nervous systems at a variety of levels of organization have revealed anatomical and physiological data that suggest that the time is ripe for genuine theorizing about how macro effects are the outcome of neuronal properties.<sup>5</sup>

Second, the advent of cheap computing makes it possible to simulate neural networks and, hence, to investigate computational properties at the *circuit* level. Since we do not have physiological techniques to address this level in actual nervous systems, the computer simulation of biological circuits is a crucial adjunct to available neuroscientific techniques. Cheap, fast computing is essential for simulation, because nervous systems have a parallel architecture, and huge numbers of computational events are going on simultaneously in the network. Nevertheless, even new computing technology such as the current-generation connection machine<sup>6</sup> is still far inferior to the human brain in computing capacity. The communications bandwidth of the connection machine is about  $10^{10}$  bits per second, which is extraordinary. But the *average* communications bandwidth used by the human brain is about  $(10^{11} \text{ neurons})(5 \times 10^3 \text{ connections/neurons})(2 \text{ bits/connection/sec})$ , which means that the brain processes on average  $10^{15}$  bits/second.<sup>7</sup>

Third, studies of animal behavior in ethology, psychology, linguistics, and clinical neurology have become increasingly sophisticated and have yielded crucial and often surprising data concerning the capacities of nervous systems. Within clinical neurology, one of the most important discoveries concerns the multiplicity of memory systems in humans and in monkeys.<sup>8</sup> Within psychology, the discoveries that virtually all categories show prototype effects<sup>9</sup> and that images

<sup>5</sup> See my *Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).

<sup>6</sup> W. Daniel Hillis, *The Connection Machine* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).

<sup>7</sup> Terrence J. Sejnowski, review of *The Connection Machine*, *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, xxxi (1987): in press.

<sup>8</sup> This is thoroughly and clearly discussed by Larry Squire in *Memory and Brain* (New York: Oxford, 1987).

<sup>9</sup> Eleanor Rosch, "Human Categorization," in N. Warren, ed., *Studies in Cross-cultural Psychology* (London: Academic Press, 1977).



are prevalent in information processing<sup>10</sup> stand out as particularly important.

Adopting the biological perspective, we find that a number of points have special significance. Not that these points are generally unknown, but from a biological perspective, they acquire distinctive salience, for they shape the way we think about the problems of vision, learning, spatial representation, sensorimotor control, and so forth.

The most fundamental point is that the human brain is a product of evolution. This is worth reflecting on for three reasons: (1) In many important respects, the human brain is very similar in structural components and organization to other primate brains, and not very different from other mammalian brains. Cortical organization, for example, seems generally shared among mammals. Our brains share some basic properties with even the simplest nervous system. Like ours, mammalian nervous systems are networks of connected units; these units, neurons, function basically in the same way in all nervous systems; we share the same neurochemicals. There are bound to be some differences, at least because the human communication capacity appears to be distinctive, but this is probably owed not to a special "wonder lobe" but to subtle, fine-grained wiring differences. The anatomical and physiological similarities are important, because they mean that we should expect that how *we* learn, remember, see, hear, and respect, is not fundamentally different from how other organisms do those things:

(2) Cognition is not neatly detachable from the organism's ecological niche, way of life, and bodily structure. Nervous systems are not general-purpose computers. They have evolved to accomplish a certain range of tasks, and the architecture supports those tasks. There is a fatal tendency to think of the brain as essentially in the fact-finding business—as a device whose primary function is to acquire propositional knowledge. At its best, supposedly, it discovers truth-for-its-own-sake. From a biological perspective, however, this does not make much sense.

Looked at from an evolutionary point of view, the principal function of nervous systems is to enable the organism to move appropriately.<sup>11</sup> Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principal chore of nervous systems is to get the body

<sup>10</sup> Stephen Kosslyn, *Image and Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1980).

<sup>11</sup> J. L. McClelland and D. E. Rumelhart, eds., *Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).



parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Insofar as representations serve that function, representations are a good thing. Getting things right in space and time, therefore, is a crucially important factor for nervous systems, and there is often considerable evolutionary pressure deriving from considerations of speed. Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous *so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival*. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.

(3) We cannot expect engineering perfection in the products of evolution. Improvements in nervous systems are not built by starting from scratch, even though that might yield the best design. They are modifications of structures and patterns that already exist. Evolution has to achieve improved organization by managing with what is there, not by going back to redesign the basics. As we consider research strategy, this is an important consideration. It means that, if we approach the problems of nervous-system function as strictly engineering problems, setting our goals in terms of how a task (for example, stereopsis) could *in principle* be done, we may find a cunning engineering solution which is nothing like the solution the brain has found. In framing hypotheses concerning brain function, it will be essential to consider constraints not only at the behavioral level, but also at the neurobiological level. Unless we go *into* the black box, we run the considerable risk of wasting our time exploring remote, if temporarily fashionable, areas of computational space.

#### WHY CONNECTIONISM IS IMPORTANT

If representational structures are not sentence-like, what are they? If computation is not logic-like, what is it like? And how can we find out? If formal semantics is the wrong approach to explaining meaningfulness, what would work? These seem to me to be the central questions, or at least some of the questions relevant to epistemology. Connectionism (also known as Parallel Distributed Processing, or PDP) is important, because it constitutes the beginnings of a genuine, systematic alternative to the "grand old paradigm." It appears to have the resources to provide neurobiologically plausible answers to these central questions (see McClelland and Rumelhart, *op. cit.*).

Connectionist models illustrate what representations might really be, if not sentence-like, and what neurobiological and psychological computation might really be, if not logic-like. They free us from the conviction that the sentence/logic model is inevitable. Moreover, the design of the models is inspired and informed by neurobiology; so they are more biologically realistic than sentence/logic models.



A connectionist model is characterized by three architectural elements: (1) processing units, (2) connections between processing units, and (3) weights, which are differential strengths of connection between processing units. The processing units, like neurons, communicate with each other by signals (such as firing rate) which are numerical rather than symbolic. In typical models, the units are arranged in layers: an input layer, an output layer, and, intervening between, the layer of so-called "hidden units" which are fully connected to the input and output layers (see Figure 1). The processing units sum the inputs from the connections with other processing units, each input weighted by the strength of connection. The output of each processing unit is a real number that is a nonlinear function of the linearly summed inputs (see Figure 2). The output is small when the inputs are below threshold, and increase rapidly as the total input becomes more positive. To a first approximation, the activity level can be considered the summed postsynaptic potentials in a neuron, and the output can be considered its firing rate.

What is remarkable about such systems is that they can be trained to learn highly complex input-output functions. This learning is not merely a look-up table achievement, because the small number of hidden units makes that impossible. Moreover, the system can gener-

### A SIMPLE NETWORK




Fig. 1: Schematic model of a three-layered network. Each layer is fully connected to the layer adjacent to it.






Fig. 2. Schematic model of a processing unit receiving inputs from other processing units.

alize to new cases, and it can make sensible approximations in early training or when there is no correct answer.

NETtalk<sup>12</sup> is perhaps the most spectacular example of a connectionist network. It learns to convert written text to speech. The network does not have any initial or built-in organization for processing the input, or, more exactly, for mapping letters onto sounds. All such organization emerges during the training period. The values of the weights are determined by using the learning algorithm called "back-propagation of error."<sup>13</sup> The strategy exploits the calculated error between the *actual* values of the processing units in the output layer and the *desired* values, which are provided by a training signal. The error signal is propagated from the output layer backward to the input layer and is used to adjust each weight in the network. The network learns as the weights are changed to minimize the mean squared error over the training set of words. Thus, the system can be characterized as following a path in weight space until it finds an error minimum (see Figure 3). The important point to be illustrated,

<sup>12</sup> Terrence J. Sejnowski and Charles R. Rosenberg, "Parallel Networks that Learn to Pronounce English Text," *Complex Systems*, I (1987): 145-168.

<sup>13</sup> D. E. Rumelhart, G. E. Hinton, and R. J. Williams, "Learning Internal Representations by Error Propagation," in McClelland and Rumelhart, eds., *op. cit.*



## LEARNING: GRADIENT DESCENT IN WEIGHT SPACE




Fig. 3. Schematic drawing of a path followed in weight space as the network finds a global minimum.

therefore, is this: the network processes information by nonlinear dynamics, not by symbol manipulation and rule following. It learns by gradient descent in a complex interactive system, not by generating new rules. Representations in the hidden units turn out to be not symbols, but patterns of activation (see Sejnowski and Rosenberg, *op. cit.*).

The general strategy in connectionism is to model information processing in terms of the trajectory of a complex, nonlinear dynamical system in a very high dimensional space. This structure does not resemble sentences arrayed in logical sequences, but it is potentially rich enough and complex enough to yield behavior that can support semantic and logical relationships.

The connectionist approach is still very new, and many questions remain unanswered, but progress so far is impressive. Some models address specific neurobiological problems and are highly constrained by neurobiological data. Others address a higher level of organization. At this stage, the important thing is that a model suggest experiments, preferably at the neurobiological level, where the results will suggest further modifications in the model. Additionally, it is now imperative that additional information-processing algo-



rithms be devised. Although it may be too soon to say whether any existing models successfully capture how information processing is actually accomplished in nervous systems, the general approach has the right character in so many dimensions that it has to be taken seriously.

The breakthroughs in network modeling, together with new discoveries in neuroscience and psychology, suggest that it really is possible to understand the fundamental principles governing brain function and, thus, to understand the nature of representing and reasoning. It is also clear that finding solutions to these problems is an inescapably interdisciplinary task, requiring networks of researchers: neuroscientists, modelers, ethologists, psychologists, linguists, and philosophers. My hunch is that epistemology will never look the same.

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### THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE\*

The main issue before us concerns the boundary between philosophy and empirical science. Patricia Smith Churchland and Alvin I. Goldman advocate an aggressive empiricist philosophy according to which many fundamental philosophical questions lie within the province of empirical science—specifically, cognitive psychology, physiology, and perhaps experimentally based computer science. The primary problem (not to say the only problem) with this aggressive empiricism concerns modality. Like the answers to questions in pure mathematics, the answers to basic philosophical questions are *necessary if true*. For example, if justified true belief is not knowledge, then necessarily justified true belief is not knowledge. Even if all and only cases of justified true belief were, in fact, cases of knowledge, that would not show that justified true belief is knowledge; for the mere possibility of a case of justified true belief that is not knowledge suffices to show that justified true belief is not knowledge.

\* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, December 28, 1987, commenting on papers by Alvin I. Goldman and Patricia Smith Churchland, this JOURNAL, this issue, 537–544 and 544–553, respectively.



In the history of philosophy, knowledge of necessities has been thought to lie outside the province of empirical science in the following sense: if it is possible to know something to be necessary, it is possible, in principle, to know it to be necessary without the aid of empirical science; when it comes to knowledge of necessities, empirical science is never essential. In recent years, however, scientific essentialists (Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and their followers) have given persuasive arguments that certain things can be known to be necessary only with the assistance of empirical science (for example, that water is  $H_2O$ , that gold is the element with atomic number seventy-nine, and so forth). Is knowledge of philosophical necessities like this, too? Can scientific essentialism be generalized from philosophically uninteresting, naturalistic issues (such as the nature of water or gold) to basic philosophical issues? I will argue that this global generalization is doomed. The reason is that the only satisfactory account of scientifically grounded knowledge of naturalistic necessities (water, heat, etc.) presupposes a circumscribed form of rationalism. This circumscribed rationalism entails the reliability (perhaps after theoretical systematization or dialectical critique) of intuitions concerning the applicability of category and content concepts to hypothetical cases that are characterized exclusively in terms of category and content concepts. Most of the basic questions of philosophy, however, are put exclusively in terms of category and content concepts. These considerations imply a thesis of the *autonomy of philosophy*: for most philosophical questions, if it is possible to know the answers to these questions, it is, in principle, possible to know the answers to them without the aid of empirical science.

Accordingly, when Churchland seeks to learn what "knowledge and belief, reference, meaning, and truth, and reasoning, explaining, and learning" *are*, empirical sciences (empirical psychology, physiology, and computer modeling) are incidental, at best. Our concepts of these items are basic category and content concepts, so necessities involving these concepts are, if knowable at all, knowable without the aid of empirical science.

Similarly, when Goldman tries to understand unity and objectivity, empirical psychology can be incidental, at best; for the concepts of unity and objectivity are category concepts. As such, their analysis (what unity and objectivity are supposed to be) lies outside the province of empirical science. (I believe that the right analysis must be given in terms of a special kind of purely logical theory.) But how is one to decide which items are objective unities, for example, whether persons are and Goldman's "shmersons" (if they exist) are not? We



must certainly consult our best overall theory, which will be partly empirical. Does this show that the question is empirical? Not at all. For independent of any particular empirical considerations, there are transcendental considerations showing that any acceptable comprehensive theory of the world must confer on certain items (for example, the beings who actually construct such theories) special objective status. Persons (but not shmersons) are like this.

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## LIBERTIES, WRONGS, AND REPRESENTATION\*

IT is no small irony that liberal democracies leave some groups of citizens underrepresented. An important reason for preferring liberal representative government is that, without it, some compelling citizen interests can be ignored, and so liberal democracies in which compelling interests can still be ignored seem to fail by their own standard. When we think of philosophers who have taken up this problem, we might well think first of Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. We would not think first of Hegel. In my view that is our misfortune. In what follows, I offer an interpretation and a defense of the Hegelian view.

## I.

The best expression of Hegel's position appeared in his *Rechtsphilosophie* lectures of 1824/5:

Organizing from top downwards has been done for some time, and this organizing has been the main effort. Great efforts have been made to organize chambers and estates, but at the bottom of the whole the masses were carelessly left more or less unorganized, and yet it is of the highest importance that this become organic, for only in this way is it a force and an authority, otherwise it is a heap, a crowd of divided atoms, a crowd which has no rational authority, a blind force.

Legitimate authority is present only in cases where the particular spheres are organized. This side—the particular—is among the most important, and in France the need is becoming ever greater; indeed one still cannot save ministerial direction from bureaucracy. Thus the rest of the constitution hangs in the wind, not having its feet rooted in what is organic, legitimate, and independent.<sup>1</sup>

Three reasons are given here for extending political organization beneath the parliamentary level to the masses below (*das Untere, das Massenhafte des Ganzen*). One reason is that, if they are not so organized, then they have no authority (*Gewalt, vernünftige Gewalt*). Those who are to be organized ought to have some force and authority, which only organization can provide.<sup>2</sup> *Nur so ist es Macht.*

\* To be presented in an APA symposium of the same title, December 29, 1987. Martin J. De Nys will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 565/6.

I am grateful to Frank Cunningham and Calvin Normore for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831*, 6 vols., Karl-Heinz Ilting, ed. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973), vol. 4, pp. 692/3.

<sup>2</sup> As I will show, the reason is this: they have legitimate grievances (concerning poverty, among other things) that it is not safe to entrust solely to parliamentary representatives. Thus, they must retain some separate authority, exercised through nonparliamentary channels.



At first glance, this seems inconsistent with Hegel's second reason for organizing political masses: without such organization, they are a blind force (*eine blinde Macht*). The inconsistency between these two phrases is merely verbal. Any group that can legitimately be called "oppressed" is certain to have legitimate grievances and is likely to be powerless against their cause, and such groups are not unknown to explode violently against the substance and symbols of property and the state. Hegel had this sort of mob action in mind when he called political masses "blind forces." One political pamphlet he wrote threatened that calls for reform, if unheeded, would be followed by "a more frightful outburst, in which the need for reform joins hands with revenge, and the mob, ever deceived and oppressed, visits dishonesty with punishment."<sup>3</sup> It is, in part, because a political mass lacks power (*Macht*) that it becomes a blind force (*eine blinde Macht*). Without political organization members of a political mass are powerless, and, if they were not powerless, they would not explode as a blind force.

Some interpreters claim that Hegel's *only* reason for proposing that political masses be organized was that they would *otherwise* continue to act as a subversive, destabilizing force threatening to undermine the modern state. This is quite incorrect. Hegel's notes for the English Reform Bill essay of 1831 express his objection to rioting and his sympathy with the rioters in two consecutive sentences: (1) "If . . . the government, out of some such motive, were to revolt against the law and let plunder, would this also be excused?"<sup>4</sup> (2) "One must not forget how vexed [the people are]," he went on, "they are [acting] wrong[ly] against the law, but [they are acting] on [a] justified principle" (*ibid.*). Thus, failure to provide political masses with organization and power is responsible, in Hegel's view, for two distinct evils. Without organization and power, they will not infrequently place the security of property and the state at risk; at the same time, their own legitimate grievances will go unresolved.

The third reason we find in this passage for organizing and empowering political masses is that the legitimacy of any modern state that does not do so is in jeopardy. When Hegel says, "Legitimate authority is present only in cases where the particular spheres are

<sup>3</sup> "On the Recent Domestic Affairs of Württemberg, Especially on the Inadequacy of the Municipal Constitution," *Hegel's Political Writings*, Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., T. M. Knox, trans. (New York: Oxford, 1964), p. 243. A similar threat was delivered at the outset of Hegel's 1831 essay on the English Reform Bill, *ibid.*, p. 258.

<sup>4</sup> Hegel, "Zwei Entwürfe zur Reformbill-Schrift," *Werke*, 20 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969-71), vol. 11, p. 553.



organized," I take this to mean that legitimate authority is present only in those *states* in which the particular spheres are organized. In the absence of such organization, the "rest of the constitution hangs in the wind, not having its feet rooted in what is organic, legitimate, and independent."

It is important to distinguish the sort of independence that Hegel prescribes here for legitimate interest groups from the sort of independence that he criticizes elsewhere. "In feudal times," he complained, ". . . the particular functions and powers of the state and civil society were arranged . . . into independent Corporations and societies, so that the state as a whole was rather an aggregate than an organism."<sup>5</sup> To capture the difference between those two sorts of independence, one of which Hegel recommends and the other of which he considers pathological,<sup>6</sup> I want to rename the more valuable form of independence *autonomy*. Both 'independence' and 'autonomy' can be defined in terms of particular interests. If we define any subset of the population by a condition that all and only its members share, then we may find that, *because* they share this condition, there are some outcomes that it is rational for all of them to prefer, but not rational for anyone else to prefer. These outcomes comprise the *particular interests* of that group.

Particular interests conflict when it is in the interests of one group to bring about an outcome that it is in the interests of another group to prevent. Call any group that can make its interests prevail in case of conflict *independent*, and any a group that cannot do so *dependent*. Since it cannot make its interests prevail, the dependent group is forced to revise its conception of where its interests lie. If neither group can make its interests prevail, then each may have to reconsider its interests with a view to compromise. This was the outcome Hegel preferred in cases of conflict between otherwise legitimate interests—"the reconciling affirmation, the 'yes', with which both egos desist from their existence in opposition."<sup>7</sup> In this case, though neither group can achieve its interest independently, we might still say that both are *autonomous*. To have autonomy is to have not the power to impose what is in one's own interests, but rather the power to force a compromise, in case of conflict.

An interest group can be autonomous in the pertinent sense only if it is capable of reconsidering its interests, and, for this capacity,

<sup>5</sup> *Philosophy of Right*, T. M. Knox, ed. and trans. (New York: Oxford, 1952), §278 Zusatz, p. 180.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, "isolation and independence" of the parts of a state "spell disease."

<sup>7</sup> *Phenomenology of Mind*, J. B. Baillie, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 679.



some capacity for deliberation is necessary. Autonomy in this sense is not achievable by a political mass, which lacks the internal organization necessary for group deliberation. Consequently, organization is a necessary condition for autonomy. Any group that needs autonomy needs to be organized.

But does anyone really need political autonomy? As I interpret Hegel, he said that all particular interest groups need political autonomy. His reasons can be distilled from his analysis of the French Revolution. The main question arising in the aftermath of the revolution, he thought, was this: The republican state must enact what is in everyone's interest; but should these acts of the nation also serve particular interests? The Terror of the early 1790s was, in Hegel's view, the practical outcome of answering this question in the negative. Since that answer is self-defeating, shall we answer affirmatively, that the means by which the nation serves the interests of all *may* also serve particular interests? The practical consequence of this alternative is parliamentary factionalism.

If we allow special interests to benefit from the state operations that execute the universal interest, we can be sure that these benefits will be seized. We can also expect a coalition of interest groups to form with the following goals in mind: (a) to hold state power, (b) to ensure that the state apparatus works in ways that coincidentally serve its own particular interests, and (c) to maximize these benefits. Maximization of benefits requires keeping the coalition as small as possible—without sacrificing its hold on power. Even if coalitions shift and power changes hands, it remains possible for some special interest to be excluded from every ruling coalition. It matters not at all whether this is a compelling interest—one that ought not to be ignored. Parliamentary factionalism allows any particular interest to be ignored—unless, of course, that particular interest group has the power to force a compromise.

Consider any interest group that has, among its particular interests, some that are politically compelling—I mean interests that no legitimate state can ignore. Because they are prone to factionalism, parliamentary states cannot ensure that these interests will not be ignored, unless they provide such a group with the power to protect its compelling interests by forcing a compromise upon the ruling faction. If there are any such groups, then a parliamentary state that does not give them political autonomy places its own legitimacy in jeopardy. "Thus the rest of the constitution hangs in the wind."

## II.

Here we encounter a dilemma. How shall we put political autonomy into effect? Either we contrive to give political autonomy only to



those groups which have compelling interests—and which run significant risks that these interests will otherwise be ignored—or else we arrange to give political autonomy to all particular interest groups. In the first option, a principle of equal liberty seems to be violated, since there is a form of political representation from which part of the population is excluded. But the second option is likely to be ineffective in protecting compelling interests *other than* an interest in equal liberty. Either way, some compelling interests seem to be left unprotected.

It is in order to avoid the first horn of the dilemma that one is most likely to entertain the second, the pluralist option—that every particular interest group should have the means to protect its particular compelling interests by forcing a compromise if necessary. What blocks the pluralist option primarily is the nature of these means themselves. Of the compromise-forcing devices that might be used, there are not likely to be any which can be used to protect everyone. The instruments I have in mind include such things as limited veto powers and powers to nominate, confirm, or recall appointed or elected officials. Powers like these must be tightly circumscribed, so as to prevent their abuse. In particular, we should want to prevent anyone from using them to advance or protect additional interests beyond those compelling interests which the state has a vital interest to protect.

Now, some groups share particular interests of which none are compelling. For instance, it strains credibility to think that the legitimacy of any state should depend on the protection it affords to aficionados of cockfighting. A more serious case is that of the *elite group*, by which I shall mean a group whose particular interests are so well entrenched by other means that they do not need the further protection of political autonomy. Since social relations overlap, some members of an elite may also belong to nonelite groups that do require political autonomy. But suppose that some do not; suppose, as is likely, that there is at least one member of an elite group who belongs to no such nonelites. Equal liberty seems to require that the elite should have the protection of compromise-forcing powers, so that *every individual* somehow enjoys this protection. But this is impossible, since the instruments of political autonomy must accord with the group's need, and the elite group's need is by definition nil. Pluralism is impossible unless every elite member gains access to the means of political autonomy by belonging to a protected nonelite. But this is unlikely.

Hegel's corporatism attempts—unsuccessfully—to solve this problem. Hegel wanted to reconstruct the medieval guild and town



organizations as vehicles through which political rights were exercised.<sup>8</sup> Hegel was a modern Cleisthenes, but, instead of giving everyone a tribe, he wished to give everyone a guild.<sup>9</sup> If elite groups comprised minorities within each corporation, then every individual could be represented by a group with political autonomy—the corporation—without requiring the instruments of autonomy to be given to any group that did not need them. For instance, in a corporation including workers, owners, and managers in a single industry, it is the workers who, in virtue of their economic insecurity, have the compelling interests that need protection. On what I presume to be Hegel's analysis, they share with their employers an interest in the economic health of their industry. The worker majority can use the corporation's compromise-forcing powers to block major threats to the health of the industry so as to protect itself from unemployment. Since this incidentally benefits the elite groups of managers and owners, no member of the corporation is deprived of protection by compromise-forcing powers; yet these powers cannot be exploited for the particular interests of the elite, either.

There are, however, two reasons why this solution may not succeed after all. First, it may be true that the interests of labor and capital are in the long run irreconcilable. If so, we can expect the elite within any of Hegel's industry-wide corporations to form coalitions with middle strata, possibly to the disadvantage of those members who are most in need of protection. Unless the interests of the corporation's *members* are nearly all the same, the play of factions can erupt, jeopardizing the compelling interests that were to be protected. Secondly, not all groups who need the protection of political autonomy would form majorities in industrial or municipal organizations. If, unlike Hegel, we recognize women and national minorities as groups that need such protection, then we must recognize that Hegel's corporations will not provide it.

Therefore, we cannot avoid the other horn of the dilemma and, with it, the principle that everyone should be equal in basic liberties. On the face of it, any of our schemes to give compromise-forcing powers exclusively to deserving interest groups offends against this principle. What is especially interesting about the Hegelian view,

<sup>8</sup> Hegel followed legal tradition by including town as well as craft organizations among corporations. See *Philosophy of Right*, §288, p. 189; addition to §252, p. 153; §251, p. 152.

<sup>9</sup> The nobility had no corporation, but they were to have the entire upper chamber to themselves; civil servants were given no corporation, but Hegel may have intended them to join municipal corporations.



though, is its suggestion that equal-liberty considerations may recommend special representation rather than forbid it.

I began this paper speaking of groups with compelling interests, and by these I meant interests of such a kind that a state that could not protect them risked losing its legitimacy. Now I must say more about who these groups are. In some important passages, Hegel says that the state must especially protect groups who are *socially wronged*. He believed that the poor in general and the unemployed in particular were victims of a "wrong done to one class by another."<sup>10</sup> Since rational authority does not allow wrongs to continue, the legitimacy of any state that does allow them to continue is questionable.

Hegel's conception of social wrongs rests on an analogy to civil wrongs, as in the law of torts. In Hegel's book, torts as well as crimes are injurious in two respects. First, they are damaging to one's property, to one's body, or to one's other assets—in short, to things which "exist externally" (*ibid.*, §98, p. 69). Further injury is done to what Hegel calls the "implicit will," the will *an sich* (*ibid.*, §99, p. 69). Here this means that there is some *as yet unexecuted will* that is injured by torts and crimes. He identifies this will as "the right [*das Recht*] or law implicit" (*ibid.*). If pauperization wrongs a social class, then, by analogy, it must not only injure them physically, but it must also injure this mysterious will which is said to be "implicit." To make a long story short, this was, in Hegel's view, the will that came to be executed in the course of history, and, according to his own summaries of the course of history, the object of this will is the equalization of liberty. In the Orient, "Only One is free"; in ancient Greece and Rome, "only Some are free"; in modern Europe, "man as such is free."<sup>11</sup> The discovery that a particular form of cooperation does not promote equal freedom costs the regime its legitimacy, and delegitimation leads ultimately to its demise, on the Hegelian theory.

Hegel had made just such a discovery in connection with the effects of poverty in a market economy. The unemployed are unfree by a standard of self-reliance. Hegel notes not only their "distress" but their "dependency" (*Philosophy of Right*, §243, pp. 149/50), which offends against the "self-respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work and effort" (§244, p. 150). As well, dependency "would violate the principle of civil society and the

<sup>10</sup> *Philosophy of Right*, §278. Cf. Ilting ed., vol. 4, p. 609.

<sup>11</sup> *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction: Reason in History*, Johannes Hoffmeister, ed., H. B. Nisbet, trans. (New York: Cambridge, 1975), p. 130.



feeling of individual independence and self-respect in its individual members" (§245, p. 150). Poverty and unemployment can indeed injure their victims physically, but in addition they commit an intangible injury. Their effect within modern society, and among its members, is unequal freedom.

To the charge that special representation and political autonomy for the unemployed infringe upon the equal liberty of others, Hegel is able to respond that it is a necessary countermeasure against the condition of unequal liberty which unemployment and poverty bring about. But, without further elaboration, this is not an especially cogent response. For, as the libertarian will quickly respond, one alleged infringement on liberty has merely been replaced by another, which is no less pernicious. What is needed to defend Hegel's insight is a device for showing that the liberty that one side gains—here through being protected against unemployment—is *greater than* the liberty that the other side loses—here by not receiving the political autonomy that protects the former.

By saying that someone is freer than someone else, I mean that there is something which could, if desired, be done by the one but not the other. In what respects, then, should people be equally free? What needs to be held equal is not liberty generally, but rather *defensible basic liberty*, which I define as follows. To have a basic liberty is to be free to perform a basic action. Basic actions are those which have the following property: by doing a basic act of a certain type, you enable yourself to do many further things, from which you are disabled if you perform no acts of that type. Some of the broadest types that basic acts exemplify are: (a) procuring goods to meet one's needs, (b) learning, (c) caring for one's health, and (d) doing something that is necessary to achieve self-respect. If one is restricted from performing actions of any one of these types, then there are further consequences, not only for one's welfare, but also for one's freedom. Restriction of basic actions has a multiplier effect on the balance of one's freedom, since it is quite unlikely that one's performance of basic actions can be impeded without also limiting what *else* one is free to do. The effect, then, of a disadvantage in basic liberties is that, whatever one's desires may be, one's chances of satisfaction are diminished.

Now, I want to say something brief and admittedly incomplete about the *defensibility* of basic actions. Basic actions can be divided into three groups. Through some, we develop our useful powers; through others, we arrange to deploy them and to draw some of the benefits. A third group includes things we must do for self-respect. There are, of course, many ways in which to develop, deploy, and



benefit from one's useful powers, not all of which are defensible. The case is even clearer for actions preserving self-respect. No self-respecting mass murderer lets his quarry go unharmed; so homicide is by this criterion necessary for someone's self-respect and, thus, a basic action; from which it follows that murder laws restrict basic liberties. My response is that, although what is not a basic action for some people may indeed be basic for others, still, by recognizing that some pattern of behavior is basic for anyone, we do not imply our consent or approval. It is one thing for behavior to *be* basic for someone and another thing for it to be *defensibly* basic. The principle at stake does not require that everyone's basic liberties be equal. It requires that everyone's defensible basic liberties be equal. That is, all persons must have equivalent opportunities to develop, deploy, and benefit from their useful powers and to preserve self-respect *by defensible means*.

We can easily recognize that it *is* basic to most people, by reason of self-respect, to be economically self-reliant, as Hegel claims. Is this defensible? On the face of it, it must be; for it harms no one else materially, nor can it plausibly be made out to offend against anyone else's dignity. It would not be defensible to link self-respect with a type of act if such acts prevented others from achieving equal self-respect. Thus, it is not defensible to link self-respect either with terrorism or even with *winning*, since both would achieve self-respect by costing others theirs. For the same reason, it is indefensible to require large-scale property acquisition for one's self-respect. But, by achieving economic self-reliance, on the other hand, one makes no one else unable to do so. Thus, we can not only recognize a linkage between self-reliance and self-respect, but we can defend it, too, on grounds of welfare and on grounds of universalizability.

Acts that establish and maintain self-reliance are basic, and defensibly so. To be free to be self-reliant, then, is a basic liberty. By comparison, there is no basic action that is impaired by a regime which withholds political autonomy from interest groups which do not need it. So if, by providing political autonomy to the economically insecure elements of the population, we provide them with a basic liberty, while depriving the others of nothing so basic, then this scheme of differential representation equalizes basic liberties that would otherwise remain unequal. Equal basic liberty may require unequal distribution of power.

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The state, on Hegel's understanding, is the concrete actuality of freedom. It prescribes laws that specify what is fundamentally and comprehensively right, thereby pursuing universal ends. It is also a domain in which citizens, whose actions foster the universal ends of the state, satisfy particular interests as well. And the state is a political community wherein different groups of citizens, distinguished by diverse particular interests which do conflict, find that their interactions can reciprocally serve to satisfy those particular interests as well as universal political ends.

Jay Drydyk is quite correct in his interpretation of Hegel's idea of the modern state in three important respects. First, the state, in pursuing universal ends, must recognize the right of the particular. Second, particular interest groups require the political organization that allows them to pursue their own interests while simultaneously acknowledging the universal ends of the state. Third, the form of political organization that particular interest groups require must institute the type of independence that Drydyk calls "autonomy." Hegel does not speak of autonomy and compromise in just the way Drydyk recommends. But this recommendation enables one to conceive of political interactions among distinct interest groups which, because they resolve in compromise, do reciprocally serve the interests of the groups in question, enabling those groups to recognize their interactions as interdependent, as serving both particular interests and universal ends. This recommendation, then, is a legitimate development of the Hegelian position.

But how is the state to bring about political autonomy? More specifically, can the state allocate to those who risk poverty and unemployment, to those whose defensible basic liberties of self-reliance and self-respect are at risk, special representation and power, for the sake of bringing about a certain kind of equal liberty? Hegel's theory of the state as a concrete domain of freedom may diffuse abstract libertarian objections to this proposal. But Hegel's own views about the relation of the state to civil society seem to pose objections to this proposal.

\* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Liberties, Wrongs, and Representation, December 29, 1987, commenting on Jay Drydyk's paper of the same title, this JOURNAL, this issue, 556-564.



The state, Hegel believes, both grounds and presupposes civil society. The latter is the case because civil society, a system of actions and interactions wherein self-interest is pursued in a market economy, is the social domain in which the right of the particular asserts itself. A market economy is also, Hegel argues, an economy in which unemployment and poverty are systemically unavoidable. If so, then political power, used by the potentially unemployed to ward off the possibility of unemployment and poverty, would be ineffective unless it were aimed at transforming the market economy in some fundamental ways. But this would be an attack on the market economy which the state cannot permit, Hegel believes, since the state has that economy as its own presupposition.

Hegel does, arguably, show that the legitimacy of the modern state follows from the fact that it promotes equality in something like defensible basic liberties. But his own arguments also show that the defensible basic liberties of those who risk unemployment and poverty cannot be ensured through political processes alone. Hegel's own arguments suggest, in spite of his interpretation of those arguments, that the state requires transformations in its economic presupposition if it is to find legitimacy in being the concrete actuality of freedom. The contemporary interpreter of Hegel is challenged to contrive an understanding of the economic domain of social life which allows for the assertion of the right of the particular and which does not systematically lead to poverty and unemployment. The problem of equality in defensible basic liberties is not only political, but also more primitively an economic problem.

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## HOW GOD CAUSES MOTION: DESCARTES, DIVINE SUSTENANCE, AND OCCASIONALISM\*

**I**N his *Traité de l'esprit de l'homme* (1664),<sup>1</sup> Louis de la Forge, one of Descartes's early followers, wrote:

I hold that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, that can change [the position of a body] or that of any of its parts in the second instant of its creation if the creator does not do it himself, since it is he who had produced this part of matter in place A. For example, not only is it necessary that he continue to produce it if he wants it to continue to exist, but also, since he cannot create it everywhere, nor can he create it outside of every place, he must himself put it in place B, if he wants it there, for if he were to have put it somewhere else, there is no force capable of removing it from there (*ibid.*, p. 240).

De la Forge's argument is an interesting one. He begins with two premises. The first is the doctrine of divine sustenance, that God must sustain the existence of every body, indeed, of every thing, mind or body, at every moment of its existence. Secondly, de la Forge assumes as a result, it would seem, that God causes motion in the material world by recreating bodies in different places at different times. From this de la Forge draws the conclusion that *only* God can move a body. When God sustains bodies, he must sustain them in *some* place or other; he cannot sustain them everywhere, nowhere, or in any way independently of some place or other. And so causes of motion beside God, causes of motion like our own minds are supposed to be, are neither possible nor needed; if motion and rest are direct results of God's sustenance of the material world, it would seem that there can be no room for other causes.

The position de la Forge is trying to establish here is a variety of occasionalism, and the argument I have sketched is one among many which Descartes's followers used to establish the claim that God is the only genuine cause in the material world, at least.<sup>2</sup> On this view,

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<sup>1</sup> Pierre Clair, ed, *Louis de la Forge: Oeuvres Philosophiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974). A similar argument is also found in dialogue seven of Nicolas Malebranche, *Dialogues on Metaphysics*, Willis Doney, trans. (New York: Abaris Books, 1980).

<sup>2</sup> For a brief account of occasionalism among 17th Century Cartesians, see ch. 5 of Jean-François Battail, *L'Advocat philosophe Géraud de Cordemoy (1626-1684)* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). There are a number of varieties of



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causal relations between two bodies, or between a mind and body, are not true causal links, but only occasional causal links which depend for their efficacy on God actually to impart the appropriate motion to the appropriate body. What is especially interesting is that de la Forge starts from what many commentators assume to be genuinely Cartesian doctrines to establish his conclusion. Descartes emphasizes in a number of places that "we have no force through which we conserve ourselves," and so for this we must turn to God, who "continually reproduces us, as it were, that is, conserves us" [Pr I 21].<sup>3</sup> Descartes appeals to this doctrine of divine conservation in proving his laws of nature, both in *Le Monde* and in the *Principia Philosophiae*, arguing that God is the first and continuing cause of motion in the world, and that acting with constancy in preserving his material creation, he must necessarily sustain the world in such a way that certain general constraints on motion are satisfied; quantity of motion is thus conserved, as is motion along a straight path [Pr II 36–42]. The close connection between God's sustenance of the world and his role as cause of motion in the inanimate world have led a number of commentators to see something like de la Forge's view in Descartes, the view that God's role as a cause of motion in the world is inseparable from his role as a sustainer of the world, that God causes motion by creating bodies in different places at different times.<sup>4</sup>

De la Forge's premises seem to belong to Descartes as well. But, if so, then it would appear that, like it or not, Descartes too must be committed to de la Forge's conclusion that God can be the *only* cause of motion in his material world, that, contrary to our "most certain and most evident experience," mind cannot really cause mo-

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occasionalism. Here I am only concerned with the claim that God is the only genuine cause of motion in the material world.

<sup>3</sup> The numerous references to Descartes's texts will be given in the body, for the most part, using the following abbreviations. AT: Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., *Oeuvres de Descartes* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964–1978); CSM: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans., *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (New York: Cambridge, 1985); K: Anthony Kenny, trans., *Descartes: Philosophical Letters* (Minneapolis, Minn: University Press, 1981). The original language text in AT will be cited first, followed by a translation in CSM or K (if available). The one exception to this is the *Principia Philosophiae*, abbreviated 'Pr', and cited by part and section number. The original Latin can be found in AT VIII A, and translations in CSM I.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g., Jean Wahl, *Du rôle de l'idée de l'instant dans la philosophie de Descartes* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1920); Martial Gueroult, "The Metaphysics and Physics of Force in Descartes," in Stephen Gaukroger, ed., *Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 196–229, esp. 218–220; G. Hatfield, "Force (God) in Descartes' Physics," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, x (1979): 113–140, esp. 127.



tion in the world [AT v 222 (K 235)]. This is the question I would like to examine in this essay. In the end, I shall argue that, when we understand Descartes's doctrine of divine sustenance and of the way God enters the world as a cause of motion, we shall see that, wherever de la Forge's views lead him, Descartes need not be committed to occasionalism, at least not in this way. When we understand just how God causes motion, we shall see that Descartes's God can leave plenty of elbow room for other causes to produce their effects, indeed, produce them as directly as God himself does.

## I.

It will be helpful to begin the story with a brief discussion of Descartes's doctrine of divine sustenance. Descartes writes in Meditation III:

All of the time of my life can be divided into innumerable parts, each of which is entirely independent of the others, so that from the fact that I existed a short time ago, it does not follow that I ought to exist now, unless some cause as it were creates me again in this moment, that is, conserves me [AT VII 49 (CSM II 33)].

Now, Descartes argues, "plainly the same force and action is needed to conserve any thing for the individual moments in which it endures as was needed for creating it anew, had it not existed" [AT VII 49 (CSM II 33)]. Clearly such a power is not in us; if it were, Descartes reasons, I would also have been able to give myself all of the perfections I clearly lack [AT VII 168 (CSM II 118)]. And so he concludes that it must be God that creates and sustains us [AT VII 111, 165, 168, 369-370 (CSM II 80, 116, 118, 254/5); Pr I 21]. This conclusion, of course, holds for bodies as well as for us. It is not just *souls*, but *all* finite things that require some cause for their continued existence. And, as with the idea of ourselves, "when I examine the idea of body, I perceive that it has no power [*vis*] in itself through which it can produce or conserve itself" [AT VII 118 (CSM II 84); cf. AT VII 110 (CSM II 79)]. And so we must conclude that the duration of bodies, too, must be caused by God, who sustains the material world he created in the beginning.

Descartes conceives of God's continual sustenance of his creatures as their *efficient* cause: "I should not hesitate to call the cause that sustains me an efficient cause" [AT VII 109 (CSM II 79)]. But God's causality here is in one respect importantly different from other efficient causes that we are familiar with from our experience. In reply to Gassendi's *Fifth Objections*, Descartes distinguishes between two sorts of efficient causes, a *causa secundum fieri*, a cause of becoming, and a *causa secundum esse*, a cause of being. Roughly speaking, as Descartes understands the notions, a *causa secundum*



*esse* is a cause which must continue to act for its effect to continue, unlike a *causa secundum fieri*, which produces an effect that endures, even after the cause is no longer in operation or even in existence. An architect, thus, is the cause of becoming with respect to a house, as is a father with respect to his son. But Descartes claims

the sun is the cause of the light proceeding from it, and God is the cause of created things, not only as a cause of becoming, but as a cause of being, and therefore must always flow into the effect in the same way, in order to conserve it [AT VII 369 (CSM II 254/5)].

And, so just as we ordinarily think that the sun must continue its illumination for daylight to persist, so must God continue his activity in order for the world and its motion to be sustained.<sup>5</sup> This continual sustenance is also unlike the more ordinary efficient causes insofar as it requires a kind of power beyond the capacities of created things. Whereas finite things may be able to stand as the efficient causes *secundum fieri* of things in the world, only God, strictly speaking, can stand as their cause *secundum esse*. As we noted earlier, in *Meditation* III Descartes declares that: "plainly the same force and action is needed to conserve any thing for the individual moments in which it endures as was needed for creating it anew, had it not existed" [AT VII 49 (CSM II 33)]. From this Descartes infers that: "it is also one of those things obvious by the light of nature that conservation differs from creation only in reason" [AT VII 49 (CSM II 33)]. That is, the activity and power needed to sustain a thing in its existence is identical to the activity and power necessary to create anything from nothing [cf. also AT VII 165, 166 (CSM II 116, 117)]. Elsewhere he puts the point a bit differently, suggesting that conservation is to be understood as the "continual production of a thing" [AT VII 243 (CSM II 169); cf. Pr II 42], or, more guardedly, suggesting that God *as it were* (*veluti*) continually reproduces his creatures [Pr I 21; cf. AT VII 110 (CSM II 79)].

In the following section, we shall investigate how Descartes's God causes motion while sustaining the world. But, before turning to that question, I would like briefly to discuss an issue closely related to the questions under discussion here, that of temporal atomism. A number of commentators take Descartes's language quite literally when he says that God must continually recreate his creatures. On their view, Cartesian time must, as a result, be a series of discrete timeless instants, created one after another like the frames of a motion pic-

<sup>5</sup> Descartes does concede, under challenge, that the sun may not be an especially good example of a *causa secundum esse*. See AT III 405, 429 (K 115/6).



ture.<sup>6</sup> Such a view seems inevitably to lead to a position like de la Forge's. The cartoonist creating an animated cartoon can cause his creatures to move only by drawing them in different positions in successive frames; so too for God, it would seem, were we to conceive of him as the grand cartoonist with respect to his creation. In this way, God's sustenance would seem to be inseparable from his role as cause of motion, and all genuine causes of motion other than God would seem to be frozen out.

But it is not at all clear that Descartes held such a position. In a recent study, Jean-Marie Beyssade<sup>7</sup> has argued that Descartes's God sustains the continuously flowing time of our experience. On Beyssade's view, time for Descartes is much like body, infinitely divisible and not composed of any ultimate elements, elements like the durationless temporal atoms are supposed to be. Beyssade does not deny, of course, that Descartes is concerned with timeless instants in a number of important contexts, and, indeed, that he even talks about God conserving bodies as they exist at a given instant [AT XI 44 (CSM I 96); Pr II 39]. But, Beyssade argues, such instants are not, strictly speaking, *parts* of duration. A hunk of extended substance can be divided into innumerable parts. But, for these divisions to be genuine *parts* of a body, they must be extended as well. Points, lines, surfaces, and geometrical objects that lack extension in length, width, and breadth, are not *parts* of a body, but *limits* or *boundaries*. So, Beyssade suggests:

In the same way, every duration or part of duration contains a before and after . . . ; the instant is its limit or boundary. If we are not mistaken, Descartes always takes this word ['instant'] and its Latin original '*instans*' in the strict sense of a limit (*ibid.*, p. 348; cf. p. 353).

Durations, no matter how small, can be parts of an enduring world, and thus can be candidates for God's sustaining activity. But, although there may be instants *in* duration as boundaries of finite durations, instants, Beyssade suggests, cannot be *parts* of an enduring world; they cannot compose durations, nor can we intelligibly talk about God creating a single instant by itself without creating the duration it serves to bound, any more than we can talk about God creating a two-dimensional surface, a mode of body, without the body that it bounds [AT VII 250/1, 433 (CSM II 174, 292)].

With this in mind, it is easy to see that there is really nothing in

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., the references cited in note 4.

<sup>7</sup> *La philosophie première de Descartes* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), pp. 129-143.



Descartes's texts that unambiguously implies temporal atomism. The idea that all the parts of time are independent, the view we saw earlier in Meditation III, certainly does not; the parts of time in question there might plausibly be read as genuine parts of time, parts with duration, parts which are independent in the sense that God could create any stretch of time without creating preceding or succeeding portions of time. One can give similar readings to other passages in which Descartes talks about the independence of the present time from other moments or moments from one another. Even where Descartes talks of creating the things anew at every moment, even where Descartes makes it clear that God sustains things as they are in a timeless instant, there is no need to attribute temporal atomism to him.<sup>8</sup> To say that God recreates the world at every instant is to say that every instant can be regarded as the beginning, as the boundary of a newly created world. But, although every instant can be regarded as a moment of creation, it does not follow that what is being created is a bare instant or a sequence of bare instants, or that God could create an atemporal instant without creating a duration for that instant to bound.

But, just as Descartes was not committed to temporal atomism, neither was he committed to its denial; I know of few passages that cannot be plausibly interpreted either way. Indeed, I know of no passage to suggest that Descartes was particularly *interested* in the question of temporal atomism, one way or the other. And so it seems improper to argue from Descartes's supposed temporal atomism to the claim that God causes motion through recreating bodies in different positions at different times. If we want to know how God causes motion for Descartes, we should face the question directly.

## II.

In presenting his account of God as continual sustainer of the world, Descartes did not think he was telling his readers anything they had not already heard. As far as he was concerned, he was appealing to an old and widely accepted doctrine with which his audience could be expected to be both familiar and generally sympathetic. When in the *Fifth Objections* Gassendi challenged his appeal to a conserving God [AT VII 300 (CSM II 209)], Descartes responded: "When you deny that to be conserved we require the continual influx of a first cause, you deny something that all metaphysicians affirm as obvious" [AT VII 369 (CSM II 254); cf. AT VI 45 (CSM I 133)]. And, in defending himself against Gassendi's criticisms, he seems to have turned di-

<sup>8</sup> For the former formulations see AT VII 49, 109 (CSM II 33, 78/9); for the latter see AT XI 44, 45 (CSM I 96/7), Pr II 39.



rectly to his copy of St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>9</sup> God's sustenance of this world of created things is explicitly discussed in the *Summa Theologiae* I, q 104, a 1, and this passage may be the source of Descartes's answer to Gassendi. Like Descartes, Aquinas distinguishes between causes *secundum fieri* and *secundum esse*, and appeals to the same examples Descartes does—the builder of a house, the parent of a child, and the sun as illuminator—to clarify the sense in which God is the cause of the world as enduring [ST I, q 104, a 1 c]. And, although Aquinas does not say exactly that God's activity in sustaining the world is identical with his activity in creating it, many of Descartes's contemporaries would have been happy to agree with Descartes that "this conservation is the very same thing as creation, differing only in reason."<sup>10</sup>

In his monumental commentary on the *Discours*, Étienne Gilson<sup>11</sup> noticed this similarity between Descartes and Aquinas. But Gilson also noted an apparent (and important) difference as well:

The being of the things Descartes's God conserves is so different from that which St. Thomas's God conserves, that there is a profound difference between their two notions of continual creation. The Thomist God conserves the being of a world of substantial forms and essences. . . .

But, on the contrary, in Cartesianism, there are no substantial forms any more . . . (*ibid.*, p. 341).

Gilson goes on to argue that, lacking substantial forms, Descartes, unlike the scholastic, is doomed to a movie-show world of still frames, mocking the continuity of time and motion that the scholastic is genuinely entitled to. Gilson's full argument is too complex to enter into here. But I would like to explore his initial observation a bit.

Descartes does, for the most part, reject substantial forms and this does indeed make a difference, as Gilson emphasizes. But what difference it makes depends upon how the notion is understood, and what it is that takes the place of the absent forms. Now, the notion of a substantial form is a basic notion in Aristotelian thought, and there

<sup>9</sup> In December 1639, Descartes tells Mersenne that he owns "*une Somme de S. Thomas*," though it is not altogether clear to me whether this means a copy of Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* or a summary of Aquinas. See AT II 630 (K 69).

<sup>10</sup> Guilelmus Amesius, *Medulla theologica* (1628), quoted in Heinrich Heppe and Ernst Bizer, ed., *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche* (Neukirchen, Kreis Moers: Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1935), p. 208. For other of Descartes's contemporaries on the question, see Heppe, *Dogmatik*, Locus XII; C. T. Thomson, *Reformed Dogmatics*, Heinrich Heppe, trans. (London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1950), ch. XII; Étienne Gilson, *Index Scholastico-Cartésien* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), §§64, 112.

<sup>11</sup> *Discours de la méthode: texte et commentaire* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967).



are important differences of conception among scholastic thinkers with regard to that notion. But, to understand the importance of the rejection of substantial forms to Descartes's thought, we must begin with an account of what the notion meant to him.

In very general terms, a substantial form is that which, joined to matter (the *materia prima* of the scholastics, ultimately) results in a complete substance. But, more substantively, substantial form is that from which the characteristic behavior of the various sorts of substances derives. And, so Descartes notes, writing to his then disciple Henricus Regius in January 1642, "they [i.e., forms] were introduced by philosophers to explain the proper action of natural things, of which action this form is the principle and the source" [AT III 506 (K 129)]. Or, as the Conimbrian Fathers wrote in a book Descartes likely learned from as a schoolboy,

There are individual and particular behaviors [*functiones*] appropriate to each individual natural thing, as reasoning is to human beings, neighing is to horses, heating to fire, and so on. But these behaviors do not arise from matter. . . . Thus they must arise from substantial form (Gilson, *Index*, §209).

More concretely, Descartes views substantial forms as substances of a sort: "by the name 'substantial form' I have understood a certain substance joined to matter, and with it composing something whole that is merely material" [AT III 502 (K 128)]. And the sort of substances they are is mental substance, Descartes thinks, "like little souls joined to their bodies" [AT III 648 (K 135)].<sup>12</sup> And so Descartes characterizes the scholastic account of heaviness which he himself once held as follows:

But what especially showed that the idea I had of heaviness was derived from that of mind was the fact that I thought that heaviness bore bodies toward the center of the earth as if it contained in itself some knowledge of it [i.e., the center of the earth]. For this could not happen without knowledge, and there cannot be any knowledge except in a mind [AT VII 442 (CSM II 298)].

If substantial forms are supposed to explain the characteristic behavior of bodies of various sorts, then we must be thinking of them as intentional entities, agents of a rudimentary sort, things capable of forming intentions and exercising volition, little souls joined to matter. And so the scholastic doctrine of form and matter is, in a sense,

<sup>12</sup> The remark in question relates to real qualities, strictly speaking, qualities that follow directly from forms. But, in his polemics against the scholastics, Descartes drew no distinction between substantial forms and real qualities.



just the image of the Cartesian human being, an unextended soul united to extended body and projected out onto the material world. Indeed, Descartes often uses the supposed familiarity of the scholastic model of heaviness (which everyone would have learned at school) to persuade those who have trouble with mind-body interaction on his view that they already understand how interaction is possible; if one can understand the scholastic account of heaviness, then one can understand how the soul can move the body, Descartes reasons, since the two cases are just the same.<sup>13</sup>

It should be evident from Descartes's account of substantial form that he does not reject forms altogether. Given that the human mind is the very model of a form, it is not surprising to find Descartes saying from time to time that the human soul is "the true substantial form of man" [AT III 505]; indeed, it is "the only substantial form" he recognizes [AT III 503; cf. AT IV 346, AT VII 356 (CSM II 246)]. Descartes from time to time also uses scholastic terminology and talks of the soul "informing" the body [AT IV 168 (K 158); AT x 411 (CSM I 40)]. In this sense, Gilson perhaps overestimates the difference between the world Descartes's God sustains and that which Aquinas's sustains, insofar as both contain at least some substantial forms.<sup>14</sup>

But it is significant that Descartes's world has many fewer forms than Aquinas's does, that Descartes rejects all forms but those which pertain to human beings.<sup>15</sup> This raises something of a problem for Descartes, however. The substantial form was that in terms of which the characteristic behavior of a body of a certain sort was to be explained. But, without form, what is to explain why horses neigh and fire heats, why cannon balls fall and smoke rises? In one sense, the replacement for explanation in terms of form is explanation in terms of size, shape, and motion—mechanical explanation. Indeed so, but the story does not end there. In order to explain the behavior of a body (say a cannon ball) mechanistically, we must know more than just the size, shape, and motions of its parts and the surrounding medium; we must also know the relevant laws of motion, how a body as such can be expected to behave, what results when two

<sup>13</sup> For a fuller account of this, see §II of Daniel Garber, "Understanding Interaction: What Descartes Should Have Told Elisabeth," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XXI supp. (1983): 15–32.

<sup>14</sup> For a recent discussion of the human soul as substantial form in Descartes, see Marjorie Grene, "Die Einheit des Menschen: Descartes unter den Scholastikern," *Dialectica*, XL (1986): 309–322.

<sup>15</sup> For the still standard account of Descartes' rejection of forms, see Gilson, *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1975), pp. 141–190.



bodies of given sizes, shapes, and motions encounter one another in collision, etc. Descartes replaces the multiplicity of Aristotelian substances, each with its own form and distinct characteristic behavior, with one kind of body which fills the entire universe and behaves everywhere in accordance with the same laws [cf. Pr II 23]. But, in the absence of scholastic substantial forms, Descartes must find some way of explaining the characteristic behavior of material substance, the laws of motion. And it is here that God enters as the "universal and primary [cause of motion], which is the general cause of all motions there are in the [physical] world" [Pr II 36]. God is the cause of motion, what takes the place of the scholastic forms Descartes banished from the inanimate world of nonhuman beings.

But this, of course, leads us back to the question I posed earlier in this paper: How does God cause motion in the world? And how is God's role as cause of motion related to his role as sustainer of body?

To answer this first question, we must, I think, reflect on how souls and the other forms Descartes attributed to the scholastics were thought to cause motion. We must keep in mind here that the issue is under a cloud, so to speak, and it may turn out that, because of an argument like the one de la Forge gave, Descartes is not entitled to hold that the human soul causes motion. But, *prima facie* and despite the doubts of a number of his readers, Descartes certainly thought the question relatively unproblematic. Writing to Arnauld on 29 July 1648, Descartes noted:

That the mind, which is incorporeal, can impel a body, is not shown to us by any reasoning or comparison with other things, but is shown daily by the most certain and most evident experience. For this one thing is among the things known *per se*, which we obscure when we try to explain through other things [AT v 222 (K 235)].

The mind can cause motion in a body, Descartes holds; it is something we know through experience directly, something we cannot explain in other terms. Insofar as we comprehend it, it is because "we have within us certain primitive notions, on the model of which we form all our other knowledge," Descartes explains to Elisabeth [AT III 665 (K 138)]. And, Descartes goes on to explain, we understand the schoolman's substantial forms to work in exactly the same way; indeed, as I noted earlier, the understanding we have of forms derives from the notions we were given to understand how human mind works on body.

Descartes is not very informative about just how mind (or form) moves body; on his view, there is not much that *can* be said, other than to direct our attention to the experience we all have that is



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supposed to make it all clear.<sup>16</sup> But, although there is not much we can say, there is no confusing the sense in which mind causes motion in a body with the way God sustains the body that mind supposedly moves. One of the axioms Descartes uses in the geometrical presentation of his arguments appended to the *Second Replies* reads as follows: "It is greater to create or conserve a substance, than it is to create or conserve the attributes or properties of a substance" [AT VII 166 (CSM II 117)]. The passage is not without its difficulties.<sup>17</sup> But the clear sense is that Descartes wants to distinguish causes that change the modes or properties of a thing (modal causes, as I shall call them) from causes that create or sustain the very being of a substance (substantial causes, perhaps). God, sustaining the world, is clearly a substantial cause. But minds are clearly not; insofar as they cause changes in the motion of bodies, they at best can count as modal causes. And, insofar as substantial forms are understood on the model of souls acting on bodies, Descartes would have had little trouble classifying them, with minds, as modal causes; they are causes of motion, a mode in bodies assumed to be sustained by the divine sustainer who is the unique substantial cause.

God enters Descartes's physics to do the business substantial forms did in the Aristotelian system, as he understood it, to cause bodies to behave in their characteristic ways. And, I claim, when doing the business of forms, Descartes's God is understood to cause motion in just the way forms were taken to do it, that is, on Descartes's account, in just the way that we do it: by way of an impulse that moves matter in a way that we can comprehend only through immediate experience. This is not at all clear as late as 1644 when, in proving his laws of nature in the *Principia*, Descartes's account of God as cause of motion is deeply (and obscurely) intertwined with his account of God as sustainer of the world [Pr II 36–42]. But, by April 1649, Descartes wrote to Henry More:

Although I believe that no mode of acting belongs univocally to God and to his creatures, I confess nevertheless, that I can find no idea in my mind which represents the way in which God or an angel can move matter, which is different from the idea that shows me the way in which I am conscious that I can move my own body through my thought [AT v 347 (K 252)].

<sup>16</sup> This, in any case, is what he insisted on in writing to Elisabeth. See AT III 663–668, 690–695 (K 137–143). What exactly he meant here is not entirely clear.

<sup>17</sup> The passage raises an obvious question about the relation between an attribute and a substance, a question the young Burman raised to Descartes in conversation. See AT v 154, and John Cottingham, trans. and ed., *Descartes' Conversation with Burman* (New York: Oxford, 1976), pp. 15, 77–80.



And, so Descartes suggests to More, God is conceived to move bodies in just the way we do, using the same primitive notion we use to understand how we move our own bodies.

If this is how we conceive of God as a cause of motion, then, it would seem, we are conceiving of him as a *modal cause* when it comes to motion. Conceived as such, there would appear to be a distinction between God as sustainer of the world, a substantial cause keeping things in existence, and God as cause of motion, a modal cause causing bodies to have the particular motion they have, determining, at least in part, their modes. The difference between these two roles God plays for Descartes comes out again in the correspondence with More. In his letter of 5 March 1649, More asked Descartes if "matter, whether we imagine it to be eternal or created yesterday, left to itself, and receiving no impulse from anything else, would move or be at rest?" [AT v 316]. Descartes answers in his letter of August 1649: "I consider 'matter, left to itself, and receiving no impulse from anything else' as plainly being at rest. But it is impelled by God, conserving the same amount of transference in it as he put there from the first" [AT v 404 (K 258)]. The picture that comes through here is a simple one. Bodies can be conserved with or without the divine impulse. Without the impulse, they are at rest; with it, in motion. God's conservation of body seems separable from his role as cause of motion, and as cause of motion, he seems to act as we would in the circumstances; God's motion seems to result from a divine act of will, a divine shove.

### III.

Now that we understand something of how God causes motion, we can return to the question originally posed and offer an answer.

As de la Forge construed Descartes's views on God, continual recreation, and God's role as cause of motion, Descartes seems pushed inevitably toward occasionalism and the view that God is the only genuine cause of motion in the world; if God causes motion by recreating bodies in different places at different times, then there seems to be no room for finite causes to act. But by now it should be clear why Descartes need not be committed to such a view.

I have argued that, for Descartes, God enters as a cause of motion in order to replace the scholastic's substantial forms, and, in that role, he can (and, in the More letters, at least, *is*) construed as acting in just the way forms were thought to cause motion, that is, in just the way *we* cause motion. As such, God both sustains bodies in their being and sustains bodies in their motion. But, it is important to note, *these two activities seem to be quite distinct*; in the one case, God is acting as a modal cause, in the other, as a substantial cause.



This is an extremely important observation. There is no substantial cause but God, nor can there be, since no other being has the ability to create and sustain the universe. But, although God is a modal cause with respect to motion, there is no reason to hold that God is the *only* such cause. God is conceived to act as we do in causing motion; just as the finite cause of motion does not exclude others, so the fact that God causes motion does not seem to exclude other causes. This seems true even when we are talking about causing motion *in the same body*. Just as two human beings can exert their contrary impulses on the same bit of matter, so can we impose an impulse contrary to the one God imposes. Indeed, we do so every time we lift a stone, on which God is imposing an impulse to move toward the center of the earth.

And so Descartes would have to agree with de la Forge that God cannot sustain bodies that are in no place at all or in indeterminate places; the very possibility is absurd. But, I think Descartes might insist, although God sustains bodies that *have* place, it is not the act of sustaining them that *gives* them place. What gives them place and the motion that puts them in different places at different times is impulse or the lack thereof, a cause quite distinct from that by which bodies are sustained. These impulses may come from God himself, but they might come from other causes, like our own minds [cf. AT v 403/4 (K 257)]. And, when they come from God, they are not to be identified with the cause by which he sustains the bodies he moves.

There are a number of important questions relevant to the topic at hand which space will not permit us to discuss. Most importantly, it would be valuable to discuss the relations between the conception of motion and its divine cause which I have been developing with the discussion of motion and rest and their laws in part II of the *Principles* and in ch. 7 of *The World*—the sense in which motion and rest are distinct and the sense in which they are not, the sense in which motion and rest are states, and the way in which motion and rest give rise to forces that come into play at the time of collision. My story will not be complete until we see how the way in which Descartes's immutable God causes motion leads him to the conception of motion (and its associated forces and laws) which underlies his program in natural philosophy.

But, incomplete as my preliminary sketch of Descartes's position may be, it allows us to see one important feature that differentiates Descartes's metaphysic of motion and his use of God as cause of motion from that of his avowedly occasionalist followers. What lies behind occasionalism as advanced by de la Forge and by many Cartesians of his generation is a deep worry about causality in the world



of finite things; what comes up again and again is the view that finite things are incapable of any genuine causal efficacy, that producing an effect is beyond the power of any finite thing. God enters as the *only* being capable of producing any change in the world.<sup>18</sup> Descartes's view is quite different. Descartes *never* rejects finite causes as such; indeed, it is on the model of one particular finite cause, us, that *all* causes are understood, conservation excepted.<sup>19</sup> When God enters as a cause of motion, it is simply on account of the fact that some finite causes needed to do the job are not available. But, even when God undertakes this task, it seems to me that Descartes can quite well hold that finite causes of motion are in no way squeezed out. Mind, indeed, can remain as direct a cause of motion for Descartes as God himself.

DANIEL GARBER

University of Chicago

### DIVINE IMPULSE, VOLUNTARY MOTION, AND INTELLIGIBLE CAUSAL MODELS\*

In his earlier paper, "Mind, Body, and the Laws of Nature in Descartes and Leibniz,"<sup>1</sup> Daniel Garber cleared Descartes of Leibniz's charge that mind-body interaction violated the conservation law. This defense rested on showing the specific way Descartes derived the laws of nature from God. In particular, it was argued that the laws of motion govern the way God acts upon the material world, viz. through continuous creation. Near the end of the paper, Garber raised Malebranche's challenge: If Descartes is committed to the continuous creation doctrine, then he ought to hold the view that, at each instant, God is the only source of any change of place of bodies. Thus, minds, for example, cannot cause motion.

In "How God Causes Motion: Descartes, Divine Sustenance, and Occasionalism," Garber takes up this concern, focusing on Louis de la Forge's version of the argument. Garber reasons that Descartes's

<sup>18</sup> See especially Nicolas Malebranche, *De la recherche de la vérité*, bk. VI pt. II, ch. III, and the XV<sup>e</sup> *Éclaircissement*.

<sup>19</sup> See Garber, "Understanding Interaction," *op. cit.*

\* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Conceptions of Causality in Early Modern Philosophy, December 29, 1987, commenting on a paper by Daniel Garber, this JOURNAL, this issue, 567-580.

<sup>1</sup> *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, VIII (1983): 105-133.



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views imply occasionalism, only if the way God sustains the world from instant to instant is the means by which he causes motion in the inanimate world.

The main argument against de la Forge is right on target: the Cartesian texts *do* imply a distinction between the "impulse" by means of which God moves bodies, and the activity by which God sustains bodies in their being. Although God alone can sustain the world, divine impulse is understood to work just like a finite cause of motion, the impulse of the will. And, since finite causes of motion do not exclude others, divine impulse, then, leaves room for other causes of motion contrary to de la Forge, et al.

Although this defense of Descartes against his occasionalist critics is a position Descartes himself would have, or at least should have, held, the following question still remains: Precisely *how* does God (or the will) cause motion?

In my paper, I shall examine the concept of "impulse," which Descartes uses to characterize the ways God and the mind cause motion in bodies. I shall sketch the connections between "impulse," "impressed force," and "impetus," as they appear in medieval views about projectile motion. The relation of these concepts to that of the "influence or inflowing of species" will also be traced. It will become clear that, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, 'impulses' and 'inflowings of similitude, impression, or species' denote communications of properties or powers such that: (1) there is no contact of substances, (2) the cause loses nothing of its virtue (or power), and (3) the effect exists only so long as there is continual activity of the cause. Examples of such impulses or influences include the communication of alchemical forces like magnetic power, and astrological forces like heaviness. Descartes rejects the account of these phenomena in terms of impulses or inflowings, in favor of purely mechanistic explanations. But he retains the impulse picture of how God and the mind act on matter.

I shall argue, however, that, for Descartes, the impulse and influence picture do not constitute an intelligible causal model. Rather, mechanism alone provides a causal paradigm that is cognitively accessible to us. In the end, divine impulse and voluntary motion remain occult.

In conclusion, I shall raise some questions about motive force and the degree of causal efficacy which Descartes attributes to his "secondary causes."

EILEEN O'NEILL

Queens College and The Graduate Center  
City University of New York



The Department of Philosophy of Rice University is pleased to announce the following appointments: C. Kenneth Waters as Assistant Professor, and Karey Harrison as Visiting Assistant Professor. Paul Warren has been reappointed as Visiting Assistant Professor.

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Vermont is pleased to announce the appointment of David Christensen (UCLA) as Assistant Professor, effective September 1, 1987.

The Department of Philosophy of California State University/Northridge is pleased to announce the appointment of Takashi Yagisawa as Assistant Professor.

The Department of Philosophy of Ohio State University is pleased to announce that Simon Blackburn (Oxford) will be visiting Distinguished Professor during the Spring quarter, 1988.

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Pennsylvania is pleased to announce the following appointments, effective July 1, 1987: Zoltan Domoitor and Scott Weinstein as Professors of Philosophy, and Gary Hatfield as Associate Professor of Philosophy. The Department is also pleased to announce the appointment of Alexander Nehamas as Professor of Philosophy as of July 1, 1986.

The Department of Philosophy of Brown University is pleased to announce that Jaegwon Kim will join the department as the William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy, effective July 1, 1987.

The Society for Women in Philosophy is pleased to announce that its 1987 Honorary Woman of the Year is Elizabeth Flower (Pennsylvania). Elizabeth Beardsley (Temple) was its first honoree in 1984; she was followed by Marjorie Grene (California/Davis) in 1985 and Mary Mothersill (Barnard) in 1986.

The APA Committee on the Status of Women is pleased to announce publication of the *Feminism and Philosophy Newsletter*. The newsletter will provide information about recent work in feminist philosophy, list new publications, and publish book reviews. It will include discussions of how to integrate this material into traditional philosophy courses. The editor, Nancy Tuana (Texas/Dallas), invites contributions: literature overviews, book reviews, suggestions for curriculum revisions, and discussions of feminist pedagogical methods are especially welcome. Manuscripts, proposals, suggestions, and inquiries may be addressed to Nancy Tuana, Editor, Arts and Humanities, JO 31, University of Texas/Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083-0688.



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The editors are pleased to announce a new book series, *Soundings*, to be published by Notre Dame University Press. It will offer scholarly, graduate-level analyses of social and moral issues in business or economics. The scope of the series is interdisciplinary, encompassing work in the social sciences, philosophy, economics, theology, business, political science, and public policy. Thomas Donaldson (Loyola) will edit the series; manuscripts and proposals should be addressed to him at the Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago, 6525 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626.

The Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame announces one senior and two junior fellowships for the 1988–89 academic year. The fellowships will enable holders to pursue research and writing projects in Christian philosophy and the philosophy of religion. Each fellow is asked to teach one class a semester. Those with sabbatical support are welcome to apply. Applicants should submit a complete *curriculum vitae*, three letters of recommendation, a statement (double-spaced) describing the prospective project, and one published or unpublished paper. Submissions and inquiries may be addressed to Alvin Plantinga, Director, Center for Philosophy of Religion, 330 Decio Hall, P.O. Box 1068, Notre Dame, IN 46556.

The North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society announces a call for papers for its Jubilaeumskongress honoring the 200th Anniversary of Schopenhauer's birth. The congress will be held in conjunction with the Eastern Division meeting of the APA in December 1988. Papers on any aspect of Schopenhauer's thought are welcome; deadline for submissions is April 15, 1988. Submissions and inquiries should be addressed to David Cartwright, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Wisconsin, Whitewater, WI 53190.

The editors welcome the announcement of a new quarterly journal, *Cultural Dynamics*, to be published by Brill (Leiden & New York). *Cultural Dynamics* will be a forum both for theoretical and empirical studies focusing on processes, changes, evolutions, and histories of knowledge and of social and cultural phenomena. The editors of *Cultural Dynamics* welcome submissions, which should be addressed to Rik Pinxten, CD, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium. Subscription information may be obtained from Brill Publishers, P.O. Box 9000, 2300 PA Leiden, Netherlands.

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Hawaii/Manoa and the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy are pleased to announce that under their sponsorship, and in cooperation with the East–West Center, a Sixth East–West Philosopher's Conference will be held in Honolulu July 30–August 12, 1989. The general theme of the conference will be "Culture and Modernity," focusing on the principles of cultural change and the meaning of "modernity" and "post-modernity" in both Western and Asian contexts within religion and art, law and ethics, science and technology. For information, write: Director, Sixth East–West Philosopher's Conference, Department of Philosophy, 2530 Dole Street, Honolulu, HI 96822.



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A conference on the topic of Christian/theistic philosophy will be held at the University of Notre Dame from February 25–27, 1988. Principal speakers will include Alan Donagan (California Institute of Technology), Jorge Garcia (Notre Dame), Norman Kretzmann (Cornell), Christopher Menzel (Texas A & M), Richard Purtrill (Western Washington), Eleonore Stump (Virginia Polytechnic Institute), Merold Westphal (Hope College), and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Calvin College). The conference is sponsored by the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion. For further information, write to Alvin Plantinga, Center for Philosophy of Religion, 330 Decio Hall, P.O. Box 1068, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556.

Siena College announces a call for papers for its third annual multidisciplinary conference, this year on the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. While papers on Czechoslovakia and the Munich Conference will be particularly appropriate, papers dealing with Fascism and Nazism, the war in Asia, Spain, literature, art, film, diplomacy, political and military history, popular culture, and women's and Jewish studies are also welcomed. Deadline for submissions is December 15, 1987. Inquiries and submissions may be addressed to Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, Loudonville, NY 12211.

A conference celebrating the 350th anniversary of Descartes's *Discourse on Method* and the attached *Essays* will be held in San Jose, California, on April 15–17, 1988, featuring both invited and contributed papers. A contributed paper should take between 25 and 40 minutes to read. It should focus on some aspect of the publications of 1637 or of the famous "tree of philosophy," consisting of Descartes's metaphysics, physics, mechanics, medicine, and morals. We expect the conference to clarify Descartes's method and its applications, and, also, with the benefit of 350 years of hindsight, to contribute to the assessment of his philosophy. The planning committee must receive contributed papers by December 15. Please send papers and other communications to the conference organizer: Stephen Voss, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, San Jose, CA 95192.

Harvard University's Program in Ethics and the Professions invites applications for Fellowships in Professional Ethics. At least four fellowships will be awarded in 1988–89 to outstanding teachers and scholars who wish to develop their competence to address ethical issues in schools of business, government, law, and medicine. Fellows will participate in the seminar of the program, attend courses in one of the professional schools or in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and conduct their own research on professional ethics. The duration of the fellowship is eleven months, September–July. Applicants should hold a postgraduate degree in business, government/public policy, law, or medicine, or a doctorate in philosophy, political theory, or theology. Application deadline is December 31, 1987. For further information, call or write Dr. Valerie Abrahamsen, Administrator, The Program in Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, 79 J.F.K. Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.



AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION  
EASTERN DIVISION  
EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING

SHERATON-CENTRE HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY  
DECEMBER 27-30, 1987

PROGRAM

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 27

- 1:00 P.M.-10:00 P.M. REGISTRATION, *Sheraton Exhibit Center Foyer*  
1:00 P.M. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, *St. James B*  
8:00 P.M. SOCIETY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS, *Royal Ballroom B*  
8:00 P.M. CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES  
*Versailles Ballroom*  
8:00 P.M. SOCIETY FOR CLASSICAL REALISM, *Senate*  
8:00 P.M. THE SOCIETY OF PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK IN THE WORLD  
*Regency Foyer*

MONDAY, DECEMBER 28

- 9:00 A.M.-7:00 P.M. REGISTRATION, *Rear Main Lobby*  
9:00 A.M.-5:00 P.M. BOOK DISPLAYS, *Sheraton Exhibit Center*

CHILD CARE arrangements may be made on an individual basis with a commercial firm. See the September or November issue of the APA *Proceedings* for further details.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

- For interviewers, 8:00 A.M.-7:00 P.M., *Versailles Terrace*  
For candidates, 9:00 A.M.-7:00 P.M., *Princess Ballroom*

MORNING (9:00-11:00)

Group Meetings (see Appendix for Programs)

- 9:00 NORTH AMERICAN NIETZSCHE SOCIETY, *Royal Ballroom B*  
9:00 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION, *Versailles Ballroom*  
9:00 SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY, *Georgian Ballroom A*  
9:00 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*  
9:00 INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHERS FOR THE PREVENTION OF  
NUCLEAR OMNICIDE and CONCERNED PHILOSOPHERS FOR  
PEACE, *Regency Ballroom*



Monday, December 28, Morning

9:00 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES, *Regency Foyer*

9:00 INTERNATIONAL THOMAS AQUINAS SOCIETY, *Commonwealth*

9:00 SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PROCESS PHILOSOPHIES, *Senate*

9:00 SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY, *Dominion A*

9:00 NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

*Dominion B*

9:00 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Province*

9:00 BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, *Embassy*

9:00 APA COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, SOCIEDAD

FILOSOFICA IBEROAMERICANA, and SOCIETY FOR IBERIAN

AND LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT, *Consulate*

9:00 COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, *St. James A*

LATE MORNING (11:15–1:15)

11:15 SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

*Versailles Ballroom*

11:15 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR VALUE INQUIRY, *Regency Ballroom*

11:15 SARTRE CIRCLE, *Regency Foyer*

11:15 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR NEOPLATONIC STUDIES, *Diplomat*

11:15 ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY AND LIBERATION

*Commonwealth*

11:15 JASPERS SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, *Senate*

11:15 CONCERNED PHILOSOPHERS FOR PEACE, *Dominion A*

11:15 MOORE SOCIETY, *Embassy*

11:15 WORLD PHENOMENOLOGY INSTITUTE, *Monarch*

AFTERNOON

2:00–5:00 Session I

A. Symposium: Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind

*Royal Ballroom A*

*Chair:* Robert McCauley

*Speakers:* Alvin I. Goldman and Patricia S. Churchland

*Commentator:* George Bealer

B. Symposium: Husserl and Frege, *Imperial Ballroom B*

*Chair:* Jitendra Mohanty

*Speakers:* Robert Sokolowski and Ronald McIntyre

*Commentator:* Donn Welton

C. Invited Papers: *Versailles Ballroom*

1. Philosophy and Physics

*Chair:* Peter Machamer

Sylvan S. Schweber, Effective Field Theories and  
Hierarchical Descriptions

*Commentator:* James Cushing



## 2. Skepticism, Old and New

*Chair:* John Heil

Julia Annas, Skepticism Old and New

*Commentator:* Richard H. Popkin

## D. Colloquium: Logic, Probability, and Methodology

*Royal Ballroom B*1. *Chair:* Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.

John M. Vickers, Logic and Thorough Probabilism

*Commentator:* Deborah Mayo2. *Chair:* Rod Stewart

Bernard Kobes, Prototype Theory without Psychologism

*Commentator:* Richard Grandy3. *Chair:* William Harper

W. J. Talbott, Reflections on Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology

*Commentator:* Teddy SeidenfeldE. Colloquium: Time, *Georgian Ballroom A*1. *Chair:* Charles SheroverMary Jeanne Larrabee, Time and Spatial Models:  
Temporality in Husserl*Commentator:* Peter McCormick2. *Chair:* Donald BaxterMichelle Beer, Temporal Indexicals and the Passage of Time  
*Commentator:* Jane Duran3. *Chair:* Patrick HeelanJames Plecha, Is Modern Physics Committed to an Ontology  
of Time?*Commentator:* Kristin Shrader-FrechetteF. Colloquium: Experience, Science and Religion. *Regency Foyer*1. *Chair:* Jaimie FerreiraGary Legenhausen, Religious Experiences Do Not Provide  
Prima Facie Justification for Religious Beliefs*Commentator:* Louis Pojman2. *Chair:* James Harris

Paul Draper, An Evidential Problem of Evil

*Commentator:* Billy Joe Lucas3. *Chair:* Ernan McMullinWilliam L. Craig, The Anthropic Principle versus Divine  
Design*Commentator:* John Earman



Monday, December 28, Afternoon, Session I

G. Special Invited Panel: On the U.S. Constitution (Bicentennial)

*Regency Ballroom**Chair:* Martin Golding*Panelists:* Bruce A. Ackerman, Andrew Reck, and Frank I. MichelmanH. Special Symposium Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation, *Commonwealth**Topic:* Philosophy in AustriaI. *Chair:* Roderick Chisholm

Rudolf Haller, Austrian Philosophy

Reinhard Kamitz, Formal Logic and Intuitive Inference

II. *Chair:* Keith Lehrer

Edgar Morscher, Ontology in Elementary Logic

Paul Weingartner, Philosophy of Science

I. Special Symposium Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women, *Monarch*

I. Business Meeting (Alison M. Jaggar presiding)

II. *Topic:* Feminism and Environment*Chair:* Alison M. Jaggar*Speakers:* Irene Diamond, Ynestra King, and Karen J. Warren*Commentator:* James Cheney

Group Meetings (See Appendix for Programs)

2:00 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*2:00 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PHILOSOPHY TEACHERS, *Diplomat*2:00 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC STUDY OF SOCIETY and INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES, *Senate*

2:00 ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMAL LOGIC AND CRITICAL THINKING

*Consulate*

LATE AFTERNOON (5:15-7:15)

5:15 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION, *Versailles Ballroom*5:15 SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY, *Regency Ballroom*5:15 PEIRCE SOCIETY, *Regency Foyer*

5:15 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THE PARANORMAL

*Diplomat*

5:15 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

*Commonwealth*5:15 GANDHI-KING SOCIETY, *Senate*

5:15 SOCIETY FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY

*Consulate*5:15 SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICS AND ANIMALS, *Dominion A*



7:30 NORTH AMERICAN KANT SOCIETY, *Versailles Ballroom*  
 7:30 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR VALUE INQUIRY, *Regency Ballroom*  
 7:30 SANTAYANA SOCIETY, *Regency Foyer*  
 7:30 LEIBNIZ SOCIETY OF AMERICA, *Senate*  
 7:30 SOCIETY FOR IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT, *Consulate*  
 7:30 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC COUNCIL MEETING

7:30 ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

7:30 PERSONALIST DISCUSSION GROUP, *Embassy*  
7:30 PHILOSOPHERS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, *Monarch*  
7:30 WORLD PHENOMENOLOGY INSTITUTE, *Province*  
7:30 SOCIETY FOR ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY, *Royal Ballroom B*

8:00 RECEPTION, *Imperial Ballroom*

9:00 A.M.-5:00 P.M. REGISTRATION, *Rear Main Lobby*  
9:00 A.M.-5:00 P.M. BOOK DISPLAYS, *Sheraton Exhibit Center*

For interviewers, 8:00 A.M.–5:00 P.M., *Versailles Terrace*  
For candidates, 9:00 A.M.–5:00 P.M., *Princess Ballroom*

## 9:00-11:00 Session II

A. Symposium: Conceptions of Causality in Early Modern Philosophy, *Royal Ballroom A*

*Chair:* Lynn Joy

*Speaker:* Daniel Garber

*Commentator:* Eileen O'Neill

B. Symposium: Liberties, Wrongs, and Representation  
Royal Ballroom B

*Chair:* Joseph Flay

*Speaker:* Jay Drydyk

Commentator: Martin de Nys



Tuesday, December 29, Morning, Session II

C. Invited Paper: Ethics, *Versailles Ballroom*

*Chair:* Alan Goldman

John McDowell, Might There Be External Reasons?

*Commentator:* Thomas Scanlon

D. Colloquium: American Philosophy, *Imperial Ballroom B*

1. *Chair:* Beth Singer

Victorino Tejera, Kulick's Misrepresentations of American Philosophy

*Commentator:* Roland Garrett

2. *Chair:* James Gouinlock

Mark Mendell, Dewey and the Fiction of Corporate Legal Personality

*Commentator:* Raymond Boisvert

E. Colloquium: Ethics, *Georgian Ballroom A*

1. *Chair:* Terrance McConnell

Earl Conee, Why Moral Dilemmas Are Impossible

*Commentator:* Peter Vallentyne

2. *Chair:* Gregory Trianowski

Ferdinand Schoeman, Cognitive Limits and Moral Heuristics: Against Autonomy in Ethics

*Commentator:* Allen Fuchs

F. Colloquium: Friendship, *Regency Foyer*

1. *Chair:* Edward Sankowski

David B. Annis, Emotion, Love and Friendship

*Commentator:* Sander H. Lee

2. *Chair:* Jennifer Whiting

David O'Connor, Two Ideas of Friendship

*Commentator:* Ann Wiles

G. Colloquium: Hegel and Sartre, Aesthetics, *Regency Ballroom*

1. *Chair:* William McBride

Robert R. Williams, Intersubjectivity and First Philosophy: Sartre's Appropriation of Hegel

*Commentator:* Stephen Watson

2. *Chair:* Richard E. Hart

George Bailey, Forging Metaphor

*Commentator:* Gary Shapiro

H. Special Panel Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy, *Monarch*

*Topic:* How to Improve Your Teaching

*Chair:* Karen Hanson

*Panel:* Steven M. Cahn, Chad D. Hansen, and Michael Hooker



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Group Meetings (See Appendix for Programs)

- 9:00 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*  
 9:00 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Diplomat*  
 9:00 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX AND LOVE, *Commonwealth*  
 9:00 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF CREATIVITY, *Senate*  
 9:00 SARTRE CIRCLE, *Embassy*  
 11:15 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION, *Versailles Ballroom*  
 11:30 A.M.—1:30 P.M. BUSINESS MEETING, *Imperial Ballroom A*

## AFTERNOON

2:15–4:15 Session III

- A. Symposium: Relevant Alternatives and Demon Skepticism  
*Royal Ballroom A*

*Chair:* Paul Moser

*Speaker:* Bredo C. Johnsen

*Commentator:* Jonathan Adler

- B. Symposium: Public Policy and the Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources, *Royal Ballroom B*

*Chair:* Dan Brock

*Speaker:* Richard Barber

*Commentator:* Norman Daniels

- C. Invited Paper: Vico on History and Knowledge  
*Imperial Ballroom B*

*Chair:* Richard J. Bernstein

Donald P. Verene, Imaginative Universals and Narrative Truth

*Commentator:* Alasdair MacIntyre

- D. Colloquium: Epistemology, *Versailles Ballroom*

1. *Chair:* C. Thomas Powell

Steven F. Savitt and Morrie Lipson, Information, Reliability, and Knowledge

*Commentator:* Jonathan Vogel

2. *Chair:* Michael Losonsky

William E. Morris, Information and the Ebb of Knowledge:

Fred Dretske's Information-theoretic Epistemology

*Commentator:* Michael Hand

- E. Colloquium: Whitehead and Process Philosophy  
*Georgian Ballroom A*

1. *Chair:* George Allan

Lewis S. Ford, Hartshorne on Perishing in Whitehead

*Commentator:* Bowman Clarke



Tuesday, December 29, Afternoon, Session III-E

2. *Chair*: William Garland

George R. Lucas, Analytic Themes in Whitehead's  
Metaphysics

*Commentator*: Donald Sherburne

F. Colloquium: Plato's *Phaedrus*, *Regency Foyer*

1. *Chair*: Cynthia Hampton

Catherine M. Culver, Method and Madness in Plato's  
*Phaedrus*

*Commentator*: P. Christopher Smith

2. *Chair* Anne Ashbaugh

David A. White, Division and Nature in Plato's *Phaedrus*

*Commentator*: Mark McPherran

G. Colloquium: History of Philosophy, *Regency Ballroom*

1. *Chair*: Arthur S. McGrade

Clyde Lee Miller, Perception and Coniectura in Nicholas of  
Cusa

*Commentator*: Fred Purnell

2. *Chair*: Harry van der Linden

Rosamond Rhodes, Obligation and Assent in Hobbes's  
Moral Philosophy

*Commentator*: Tommy Lott

H. Special Symposium Arranged by the APA Committee on  
Blacks in Philosophy, *Diplomat*

*Topic*: Civil Rights Legislation and Black Programs

*Chair*: Thomas Slaughter

Bernard Boxill, Has Civil Rights Legislation Reached the Point  
of Diminishing Returns?

*Commentator*: Blanche Curry

I. Special Symposium Arranged by the APA Committee on  
Teaching Philosophy at Two-year Colleges, *Province*

*Topic*: The Importance of Philosophy for Two-year Programs

*Chair*: Neil Rossman

*Speaker*: Eric Lindermayer

*Commentator*: Tziporah Kasachkoff

Group Meetings (See Appendix for Programs)

2:15 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*

2:15 SOREN KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY, *Commonwealth*

2:15 CHAIRS' CAUCUS, *Senate*

2:15 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR VALUE INQUIRY, *Monarch*

4:30 Presidential Address: *Imperial Ballroom A*

Introduction by Richard J. Bernstein

Jonathan Bennett, Thoughtful Brutes



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EVENING (6:30–9:30 P.M.)

Group Meetings (See Appendix for Programs)

- 6:30 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION and SOCIETY FOR THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF MARXISM, *Versailles Ballroom*
- 6:30 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Regency Ballroom*
- 6:30 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, *Regency Foyer*
- 6:30 SOCIETY FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY  
*Commonwealth*
- 6:30 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC STUDY OF  
SOCIETY and INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES, *Senate*
- 6:30 JASPERS SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, *Consulate*
- 6:30 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC COUNCIL MEETING  
*Dominion A*
- 6:30 ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMAL LOGIC AND CRITICAL THINKING  
*Embassy*
- 6:30 SOCIETY FOR ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY, *Monarch*
- 6:30 NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, *Province*
- 9:00 RECEPTION, *Imperial Ballroom*

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 30

- 9:00 A.M.–12:00 NOON REGISTRATION, *Rear Main Lobby*
- 9:00 A.M.–2:00 P.M. BOOK DISPLAYS, *Sheraton Exhibit Center*

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

For Interviewers, 8:00 A.M.–12:00 NOON, *Versailles Terrace*  
For Candidates, 9:00 A.M.–12 NOON, *Princess Ballroom*

MORNING

9:00–11:00 Session IV

- A. Symposium: Feminist Perspectives on Individual Choice  
*Royal Ballroom A*

*Chair:* Wendy Donner

*Speaker:* Diana T. Meyers

*Commentator:* Kathryn Pyne Addelson

- B. Symposium: Mind Matters, *Royal Ballroom B*

*Chair:* Terry Horgan

*Speakers:* Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer

*Commentator:* Jerry Fodor

- C. Invited Paper: American Philosophy (Mead), *Imperial Ballroom B*

*Chair:* John McDermott

Hans Joas, Meadian Pragmatism and Social Theory

*Commentator:* James Campbell



Wednesday, December 30, Morning, Session IV

D. Colloquium: Political and Social Philosophy, *Versailles Ballroom*

1. *Chair:* Gerard Elfstrom  
Reidar K. Lie, Dworkin on External Preferences  
*Commentator:* Geoffrey Sayre McCord
2. *Chair:* Roger S. Gottlieb  
Douglas Ehring, Cohen, Exploitation, and Theft  
*Commentator:* Scott Arnold

E. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language, *Georgian Ballroom A*

1. *Chair:* James Higginbotham  
Lawrence Roberts, Quantifier Order, Reflexive Pronouns,  
and Quasi-indexicals  
*Commentator:* William J. Rapaport
2. *Chair:* Margaret Crouch  
Roy A. Sorensen, Vagueness Implies Cognitivism  
*Commentator:* Kelly Alberts

F. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy, *Georgian Ballroom B*

1. *Chair:* Scott Austin  
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socrates's  
Elenctic Mission  
*Commentator:* Richard Kraut
2. *Chair:* Daniel C. Shartin  
Robin Smith, The Educative Function of *Metaphysics* Gamma  
*Commentator:* Tom Upton

G. Colloquium: History of Philosophy, *Regency Ballroom*

1. *Chair:* Mark Bernstein  
David G. Stern, Wittgenstein's Phenomenology and the  
"Remarks on Logical Form"  
*Commentator:* Grant Luckhardt
2. *Chair:* Nicholas Capaldi  
Thomas C. Vinci, Distinct Ideas and the Benevolence  
Principle in Descartes  
*Commentator:* Susan Bordo

H. Special Symposium Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-college Philosophy, *Diplomat*

*Topic:* Teaching Thinking Skills: The North Carolina Model

*Chair:* Gareth B. Matthews

*Speaker:* Anthony G. Rud, Jr.

*Commentators:* Harvey Siegel and Paul Wagner



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Group Meetings (See Appendix for Programs)

9:00 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES, *Commonwealth*

9:00 NORTH AMERICAN NIETZSCHE SOCIETY, *Senate*

11:15 A.M.-12:15 P.M. BUSINESS MEETING (Second Session, if needed)  
*Imperial Ballroom A*

#### AFTERNOON

1:30-4:30 Session V

A. Symposium: Enlightenment and Rationality

*Royal Ballroom A*

*Chair:* Raymond Geuss

*Speakers:* Fred Dallmayr and Axel Honneth

*Commentator:* Tom Rockmore

B. Symposium: Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Royal Ballroom B*

*Chair:* John Anton

*Speakers:* Edward Halper and Charlotte Witt

*Commentator:* Sarah W. Broadie

C. Invited Papers: *Imperial Ballroom B*

1. Philosophy of Religion (Occasionalism)

*Chair:* Daisie Radner

Philip Quinn, Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and  
Occasionalism

*Commentator:* John Fischer

2. Oriental Philosophy (Confucian Ethics)

*Chair:* Ellen Chen

Antonio Cua, The Concept of *Li* (Proper Behavior) in  
Confucian Moral Theory

*Commentator:* Lik Kuen Tong

D. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind, *Versailles Ballroom*

1. *Chair:* Robert van Gulick

Susan Brison, On Fodor's A Priori Defense of the  
Language-of-thought Hypothesis

*Commentator:* Ivan Fox

2. *Chair:* Andrew C. Ward

William Bechtel, Connectionism and Rules and  
Representation Systems: Are They Compatible?

*Commentator:* Dan Lloyd

3. *Chair:* Brian McLaughlin

Rosalind Hursthouse, A New Argument against the Causal  
Theory of Intentional Actions

*Commentator:* Richard Liebendorfer



Wednesday, December 30, Afternoon, Session V

E. Colloquium: Moral Psychology, *Georgian Ballroom A*

1. *Chair*: Jacob Owensby  
Richard F. Galvin, Does Kant's Psychology of Morality  
Need Basic Revision?  
*Commentator*: Roger Sullivan
2. *Chair*: Gary Watson  
Judith M. Hill, Reason and Motivation  
*Commentator*: Christine Korsgaard
3. *Chair*: O. Harvey Green  
John Christman, In Defense of Autonomy  
*Commentator*: Joel Marks

F. Colloquium: Applied Ethics, *Regency Ballroom*

1. *Chair*: Raymond Belliotti  
Sara Ann Ketchum, Selling Babies and Selling Bodies:  
Surrogate Motherhood and the Problem of  
Commodification  
*Commentator*: Heidi Malm
2. *Chair*: Raphael Sassower  
Patricia Illingworth, The Friendship Model of Physician/  
Patient Autonomy  
*Commentator*: David James
3. *Chair*: Jonathan Schonsheck  
Richard B. Miller, A Meritocratic Argument for  
Preferential Treatment  
*Commentator*: Judith Decew

G. Discussion of Recent Notable Books: *Georgian Ballroom B*

1. *Foundations of Space-Time Theories* by Michael Friedman  
*Chair*: Adolf Grünbaum  
*Discussant*: Lawrence Sklar  
*Respondent*: Michael Friedman
2. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* by Paul Guyer (Kant  
Bicentennial)  
*Chair*: Francis Wilson  
*Discussant*: Patricia Kitcher  
*Respondent*: Paul Guyer

1:30 SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY, *Regency Foyer*  
1:30 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, *St. James B*



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PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS  
EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING

|                                                                |                      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| ACKERMAN, Bruce A., Columbia University Law School             | I-G                  |
| ADDELSON, Kathryn Pyne, Smith College, Massachusetts           | IV-A                 |
| ADLER, Jonathan, Brooklyn College, City University of New York | III-A                |
| ALBERTS, Kelly, University of Wyoming                          | IV-E                 |
| ALLAN, George, Dickinson College, Pennsylvania                 | III-E                |
| ANNAS, Julia, University of Arizona                            | I-C                  |
| ANNIS, David B., Ball State University, Indiana                | II-F                 |
| ANTON, John, University of South Florida                       | V-B                  |
| ARNOLD, Scott, University of Alabama/Birmingham                | IV-D                 |
| ASHBAUGH, Anne, Colgate University                             | III-F                |
| AUSTIN, Scott, Boston University                               | IV-F                 |
| BAILEY, George, East Carolina University, North Carolina       | II-G                 |
| BARBER, Richard, University of Louisville                      | III-B                |
| BAXTER, Donald, Princeton University                           | I-E                  |
| BEALER, George, Reed College, Oregon                           | I-A                  |
| BECHTEL, William, Georgia State University                     | V-D                  |
| BEER, Michelle, Florida International University/Miami         | I-E                  |
| BELLIOTTI, Raymond, State University of New York/Fredonia      | V-F                  |
| BENNETT, Jonathan, Syracuse University                         | Presidential Address |
| BERNSTEIN, Mark, University of Texas/San Antonio               | IV-G                 |
| BERNSTEIN, Richard J., Haverford College, Pennsylvania         | III-C                |
| Introduction, Presidential Address                             |                      |
| BOISVERT, Raymond, Siena College, New York                     | II-D                 |
| BORDO, Susan, Le Moyne College, New York                       | IV-G                 |
| BOXILL, Bernard, University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill      | III-H                |
| BRICKHOUSE, Thomas C., Lynchburg College, Virginia             | IV-F                 |
| BRISON, Susan, Dartmouth College, New Hampshire                | V-D                  |
| BROADIE, Sarah W., Yale University                             | V-B                  |
| BROCK, Dan, Brown University                                   | III-B                |
| CAHN, Steven M., Graduate Center, City University of New York  | II-H                 |
| CAMPBELL, James, University of Toledo                          | IV-C                 |
| CAPALDI, Nicholas, Queens College, City University of New York | IV-G                 |
| CHEN, Ellen, St. John's University, New York                   | V-C                  |
| CHENEY, James, University of Wisconsin/Waukesha                | I-I                  |
| CHISHOLM, Roderick, Brown University                           | I-H                  |
| CHRISTMAN, John, Virginia Polytechnic Institute                | V-E                  |
| CHURCHLAND, Patricia Smith, University of California/La Jolla  | I-A                  |
| CLARKE, Bowman, University of Georgia                          | III-E                |
| CONEE, Earl, University of Rochester                           | II-E                 |
| CRAIG, William L., Westmont College, California                | I-F                  |
| CROUCH, Margaret, Eastern Michigan University                  | IV-E                 |
| CUA, Antonio, Catholic University of America                   | V-C                  |



|                                                             |       |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| CULVER, Catherine M., Florida State University              | III-F |
| CURRY, Blanche, Shaw University                             | III-H |
| CUSHING, James, University of Notre Dame                    | I-C   |
| DALLMAYR, Fred, University of Notre Dame                    | V-A   |
| DANIELS, Norman, Tufts University                           | III-B |
| DE NYS, Martin, George Mason University                     | II-B  |
| DECEW, Judith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology        | V-F   |
| DIAMOND, Irene, University of Oregon                        | I-I   |
| DONNER, Wendy, University of Regina, Canada                 | IV-A  |
| DRAPER, Paul, University of Wisconsin/Oshkosh               | I-F   |
| DRYDYK, Jay, University of Toronto, Canada                  | II-B  |
| DURAN, Jane, University of California/Santa Barbara         | I-E   |
| EARMAN, John, University of Pittsburgh                      | I-F   |
| EHRING, Douglas, Southern Methodist University              | IV-D  |
| ELFSTROM, Gerard, Agnes Scott College, Georgia              | IV-D  |
| FERREIRA, Jaimie, University of Virginia                    | I-F   |
| FISCHER, John, Yale University                              | V-C   |
| FLAY, Joseph, Pennsylvania State University/University Park | II-B  |
| FODOR, Jerry, Graduate Center, City University of New York  | IV-B  |
| FORD, Lewis S., Old Dominion University                     | III-E |
| FOX, Ivan, Yale University                                  | V-D   |
| FRIEDMAN, Michael, University of Illinois/Chicago           | V-G   |
| FUCHS, Allen, College of William and Mary, Virginia         | II-E  |
| GALVIN, Richard F., Texas Christian University              | V-E   |
| GARBER, Daniel, University of Chicago                       | II-A  |
| GARLAND, William, University of the South                   | III-E |
| GARRETT, Roland, Montclair State College, New Jersey        | II-D  |
| GEUSS, Raymond, Columbia University                         | V-A   |
| GOLDING, Martin, Duke University                            | I-G   |
| GOLDMAN, Alan, University of Miami, Florida                 | II-C  |
| GOLDMAN, Alvin I., University of Arizona                    | I-A   |
| GOTTLIEB, Roger S., Worcester Polytechnic Institute         | IV-D  |
| GOUINLOCK, James, Emory University                          | II-D  |
| GRANDY, Richard, Rice University                            | I-D   |
| GREEN, O. Harvey, Tulane University                         | V-E   |
| GRÜNBAUM, Adolf, University of Pittsburgh                   | V-G   |
| GUYER, Paul, University of Pennsylvania                     | V-G   |
| HALLER, Rudolf, Graz University, Austria                    | I-H   |
| HALPER, Edward, University of Georgia                       | V-B   |
| HAMPTON, Cynthia, Ohio University                           | III-F |
| HAND, Michael, University of Oklahoma                       | III-D |
| HANSEN, Chad D., University of Vermont                      | II-H  |
| HANSON, Karen, Indiana University/Bloomington               | II-H  |
| HARPER, William, University of Western Ontario, Canada      | I-D   |
| HARRIS, James, College of William and Mary, Virginia        | I-F   |
| HART, Richard E., Bloomfield College, New Jersey            | II-G  |



|                                                              |       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| HEELAN, Patrick, State University of New York/Stony Brook    | I-E   |
| HEIL, John, Davidson College, North Carolina                 | I-C   |
| HIGGINBOTHAM, James, Massachusetts Institute of Technology   | IV-E  |
| HILL, Judith M., George Mason University                     | V-E   |
| HONNETH, Axel, Frankfurt University, West Germany            | V-A   |
| HOOKER, Michael, University of Maryland/Baltimore            | II-H  |
| HORGAN, Terry, Memphis State University, Tennessee           | IV-B  |
| HURSTHOUSE, Rosalind, Open University, England               | V-D   |
| ILLINGWORTH, Patricia, McGill University                     | V-F   |
| JAGGAR, Alison M., University of Cincinnati                  | I-I   |
| JAMES, David, Longwood College, Virginia                     | V-F   |
| JOAS, Hans, Erlangen-Nürnberg University, Sociology          | IV-C  |
| JOHNSEN, Bredo C., University of Houston                     | III-A |
| JOY, Lynn, Vanderbilt University                             | II-A  |
| KAMITZ, Reinhard, Graz University, Austria                   | I-H   |
| KASACHKOFF, Tziporah, Borough of Manhattan Community College | III-I |
| KETCHUM, Sara Ann, Harvard Law School                        | V-F   |
| KING, Ynestra, Institute for Social Ecology, Vermont         | I-I   |
| KITCHER, Patricia, University of California/San Diego        | V-G   |
| KOBES, Bernard, Arizona State University                     | I-D   |
| KORSGAARD, Christine, University of Chicago                  | V-E   |
| KRAUT, Richard, University of Illinois/Chicago               | IV-F  |
| KYBURG, Henry E., Jr., University of Rochester               | I-D   |
| LARRABEE, Mary Jeanne, DePaul University                     | I-E   |
| LEE, Sander H., Keene State College, New Hampshire           | II-F  |
| LEGENHAUSEN, Gary, Texas Southern University                 | I-F   |
| LEHRER, Keith, University of Arizona                         | I-H   |
| LEPORE, Ernest, Rutgers University/New Brunswick             | IV-B  |
| LIE, Reidar K., East Carolina University, North Carolina     | IV-D  |
| LIEBENDORFER, Richard, University of Louisville              | V-D   |
| LINDERMAYER, Eric, Suffolk Community College, SUNY           | III-I |
| LIPSON, Morrie, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada          | III-D |
| LLOYD, Dan, Trinity College, Connecticut                     | V-D   |
| LOEWER, Barry, University of South Carolina/Columbia         | IV-B  |
| LOSONSKY, Michael, University of Minnesota/Duluth            | III-D |
| LOTT, Tommy, University of Massachusetts/Boston              | III-G |
| LUCAS, Billy Joe, Manhattanville College, New York           | I-F   |
| LUCAS, George R., Clemson University                         | III-E |
| LUCKHARDT, Grant, Georgia State University                   | IV-G  |
| MACHAMER, Peter, University of Pittsburgh                    | I-C   |
| MACINTYRE, Alasdair, Vanderbilt University                   | III-C |
| MALM, Heidi, University of Nebraska/Lincoln                  | V-F   |
| MARKS, Joel, University of New Haven                         | V-E   |
| MATTHEWS, Gareth B., University of Massachusetts/Amherst     | IV-H  |
| MAYO, Deborah, Virginia Polytechnic Institute                | I-D   |
| MCBRIDE, William, Purdue University/West Lafayette           | II-G  |



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|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| McCAULEY, Robert, Emory University                                | I-A   |
| McCONNELL, Terrance, University of North Carolina/Greensboro      | II-E  |
| McCORD, Geoffrey Sayre, University of North Carolina/Durham       | IV-D  |
| McCORMICK, Peter, University of Ottawa, Canada                    | I-E   |
| McDERMOTT, John, Texas A & M University                           | IV-C  |
| McDOWELL, John, University of Pittsburgh                          | II-C  |
| McGRADE, Arthur S., University of Connecticut/Storrs              | III-G |
| McINTYRE, Ronald, California State University/Northridge          | I-B   |
| McLAUGHLIN, Brian, Rutgers University/New Brunswick               | V-D   |
| McMULLIN, Ernan, University of Notre Dame                         | I-F   |
| McPHERRAN, Mark, University of Maine                              | III-F |
| MENDELL, Mark, University of Pennsylvania                         | II-D  |
| MEYERS, Diana T., University of Connecticut/Storrs                | IV-A  |
| MICHELMAN, Frank I., Harvard Law School                           | I-G   |
| MILLER, Clyde Lee, State University of New York/Stony Brook       | III-G |
| MILLER, Richard B., East Carolina University, North Carolina      | V-F   |
| MOHANTY, Jitendra N., Temple University                           | I-B   |
| MORSCHER, Edgar, University of Salzburg, Austria                  | I-H   |
| MORRIS, William E., University of Cincinnati                      | III-D |
| MOSER, Paul, Loyola University of Chicago                         | III-A |
| O'CONNOR, David, University of Notre Dame                         | II-F  |
| O'NEILL, Eileen, Queens College, City University of New York      | II-A  |
| OWENSBY, Jacob, Jacksonville University                           | V-E   |
| PLECHA, James, Oak Park, Illinois                                 | I-E   |
| POJMAN, Louis, University of Mississippi                          | I-F   |
| POPKIN, Richard H., Washington University, St. Louis              | I-C   |
| POWELL, C. Thomas, Guilford College, North Carolina               | III-D |
| PURNELL, Fred, Queens College, City University of New York        | III-G |
| QUINN, Philip, University of Notre Dame                           | V-C   |
| RADNER, Daisie, State University of New York/Buffalo              | V-C   |
| RAPAPORT, William J., State University of New York/Buffalo        | IV-E  |
| RECK, Andrew, Tulane University                                   | I-G   |
| RHODES, Rosamond, Bronx, New York                                 | III-G |
| ROBERTS, Lawrence, State University of New York/Binghamton        | IV-E  |
| ROCKMORE, Tom, Duquesne University                                | V-A   |
| ROSSMAN, Neil, LaGuardia Community College, CUNY                  | III-I |
| RUD, Anthony G., Jr., Western Carolina University, North Carolina | IV-H  |
| SANKOWSKI, Edward, University of Oklahoma                         | II-F  |
| SASSOWER, Raphael, University of Colorado/Colorado Springs        | V-F   |
| SAVITT, Steven F., University of British Columbia, Canada         | III-D |
| SCANLON, Thomas, Harvard University                               | II-C  |
| SCHOEMAN, Ferdinand, University of South Carolina/Columbia        | II-E  |
| SCHONSHECK, Jonathan, Le Moyne College, New York                  | V-F   |
| SCHWEBER, Sylvan S., Brandeis University                          | I-C   |
| SEIDENFELD, Teddy, Carnegie-Mellon University                     | I-D   |
| SHAPIRO, Gary, University of Kansas                               | II-G  |
| SHARTIN, Daniel C., Clark University                              | IV-F  |



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|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| SHERBURNE, Donald, Vanderbilt University                       | III-E |
| SHEROVER, Charles, Hunter College, City University of New York | I-E   |
| SHRADER-FRECHETTE, Kristin, University of South Florida        | I-E   |
| SIEGEL, Harvey, University of Miami, Florida                   | IV-H  |
| SINGER, Beth, Brooklyn College, City University of New York    | II-D  |
| SKLAR, Lawrence, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor             | V-G   |
| SLAUGHTER, Thomas, Bentley College, Massachusetts              | III-H |
| SMITH, Nicholas D., Virginia Polytechnic Institute             | IV-F  |
| SMITH, P. Christopher, University of Lowell                    | III-F |
| SMITH, Robin, Kansas State University                          | IV-F  |
| SOKOLOWSKI, Robert, Catholic University of America             | I-B   |
| SORENSEN, Roy A., University of Delaware                       | IV-E  |
| STERN, David G., University of California/Berkeley             | IV-G  |
| STEWART, Rod, Austin College, Texas                            | I-D   |
| SULLIVAN, Roger, University of South Carolina/Columbia         | V-E   |
| TALBOTT, W. J., Seattle, Washington                            | I-D   |
| TEJERA, Victorino, State University of New York/Stony Brook    | II-D  |
| TONG, Lik Kuen, Fairfield University                           | V-C   |
| TRIANOWSKI, Gregory, University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill  | II-E  |
| UPTON, Tom, Gannon University                                  | IV-F  |
| VALLENTYNE, Peter, University of Western Ontario, Canada       | II-E  |
| VAN DER LINDEN, Harry, Colgate University                      | III-G |
| VAN GULICK, Robert, Syracuse University                        | V-D   |
| VERENE, Donald P., Emory University                            | III-C |
| VICKERS, John M., Claremont Graduate School                    | I-D   |
| VINCI, Thomas C., Dalhousie University, Canada                 | IV-G  |
| VOGEL, Jonathan, Amherst College, Massachusetts                | III-D |
| WAGNER, Paul, University of Houston/Clear Lake                 | IV-H  |
| WARD, Andrew C., University of Minnesota/Minneapolis           | V-D   |
| WARREN, Karen J., Macalester College, Minnesota                | I-I   |
| WATSON, Gary, University of California/Irvine                  | V-E   |
| WATSON, Stephen, University of Notre Dame                      | II-G  |
| WEINGARTNER, Paul, University of Salzburg, Austria             | I-H   |
| WELTON, Donn, State University of New York/Stony Brook         | I-B   |
| WHITE, David A., DePaul University                             | III-F |
| WHITING, Jennifer, University of Pittsburgh                    | II-F  |
| WILES, Ann, James Madison University                           | II-F  |
| WILLIAMS, Robert R., Hiram College, Ohio                       | II-G  |
| WILSON, Francis, Bucknell University                           | V-G   |
| WITT, Charlotte, University of New Hampshire                   | V-B   |



## APPENDIX: PROGRAMS OF GROUP MEETINGS

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 27

## I. EVENING (8:00-11:00)

1. 8:00 SOCIETY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS, *Royal Ballroom B*  
*Topic:* Religion and Technology  
*Chair:* Clement J. Dore  
 I. John Post, On Reenchanting the World  
 II. Submitted Essay  
*Commentator:* Frederick Ferré
2. 8:00 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES, *Versailles Ballroom*  
*Topic:* Workshop on Philosophy and the Holocaust  
*Chair:* Sander H. Lee  
 I. Berel Lang, Genocide and Kant's Enlightenment  
 II. Ronald Aronson, Responsibility for the Holocaust  
 III. Business Meeting
3. 8:00 SOCIETY FOR CLASSICAL REALISM, *Senate*  
*Topic:* An interdisciplinary Approach to the Nature of Truth  
*Chair:* Mary Carmen Rose  
 I. Gertrude R. Schmeidler, Truth: Does It Keep Changing?  
 II. Christopher Russell, Truth and Evolution  
*Commentator:* James Kelly
4. 8:00 THE SOCIETY OF PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK IN THE WORLD  
*Regency Foyer*  
*Co-chairs:* Jean Campbell and Nance Cunningham Butler  
 I. *Topic:* Philosophers' Perspectives on Project Management  
 in the Trenches  
 II. Business Meeting

MONDAY, DECEMBER 28

## II. MORNING (9:00-11:00)

1. 9:00 NORTH AMERICAN NIETZSCHE SOCIETY, *Royal Ballroom B*  
*Chair:* R. J. Hollingdale  
 I. Robin Small, Absolute Becoming and Absolute Necessity  
*Commentator:* John Richardson  
 II. Richard White, Nietzsche contra Kant and the Problem of  
 Autonomy  
*Commentator:* Mark Fowler  
 III. Daniel Conway, A Moral Ideal for Everyone and No One:  
 Nietzsche's Oblique Promotion of Virtue  
*Commentator:* Lester Hunt  
 IV. Business Meeting (Executive Secretary: Bernd Magnus)



2. 9:00 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION, *Versailles Ballroom*  
*Topic:* Education and Critical Consciousness  
*Chair:* Leonard Harris
  - I. Gene James, Paolo Freire's Philosophy of Education
  - II. Paula Rothenberg, Teaching Gender, Race, and Class*Commentator:* Otto Begus
3. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY, *Georgian Ballroom A*
  - I. Business Meeting  
*Chair:* Elizabeth Potter
  - II. In Honor of Distinguished Women Philosophers  
*Chair:* Ernan McMullin  
*Honoree:* Elizabeth Flower
    - a. *Speaker:* Kathleen Wright  
*Commentator:* Anne Ashbaugh
    - b. *Speaker:* Marilyn Friedman  
*Commentator:* Virginia Held
4. 9:00 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*
5. 9:00 INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHERS FOR THE PREVENTION OF  
NUCLEAR OMNICIDE AND CONCERNED PHILOSOPHERS FOR PEACE  
*Regency Ballroom*  
*Topic:* Philosophical Perspectives on the Quest for Peace  
between East and West  
*Chair:* Howard Friedman
  - I. Lyle V. Anderson, Preventing Accidental Nuclear War
  - II. Barry L. Gan, Pacifism: A New Perspective for the Super  
Powers
  - III. George H. Hampsch, Peace, Coexistence, and the  
Ideological Struggle
6. 9:00 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES, *Regency Foyer*  
*Topic:* Workshop on Philosophy and the Holocaust  
*Chair:* John Abbarno
  - I. Sander H. Lee, The Law and Morality in Crime Trials
  - II. Gray Cox, The Holocaust from a Gandhian Perspective
7. 9:00 INTERNATIONAL THOMAS AQUINAS SOCIETY, *Commonwealth*  
*Chair:* Mary Rose Barral  
Mark Jordan, The Evidence of the Transcendentals and the  
Place of Beauty
8. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PROCESS PHILOSOPHIES, *Senate*  
*Topic:* Allan's *Importance of the Past*
  - I. Charles Sheroover, The Future of the Past
  - II. Joseph Grange, Norms, Transition, and Value*Commentator:* George Allan



Monday, December 28, Morning, II

9. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY, *Dominion A*  
*Chair:* Paul T. Durbin  
 Don Ihde, Technology and the Life-World  
*Commentator:* Robert Ackerman
10. 9:00 NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, *Dominion B*  
*Topic:* The American Constitution: Prospects and Retrospect  
*Chair:* Blanche Curry
  - I. James Gould, Privacy versus Liberty in *Roe vs. Wade*  
*Commentator:* Eugene Kelly
  - II. Sterling Harwood, Should Judges Follow Precedent?  
*Commentator:* James P. Friel
  - III. Christopher P. Gray, On Amending the United States Constitution
11. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Province*  
*Topic:* Symposium on Contemporary Antifoundationalism and the Prospects for Systematic Philosophy: Analytic Perspectives  
*Chair:* Kevin Clark
  - I. Bill Martin, Why Go Transcendental when You Can Simply Triangulate? (Why Davidson Does Not Need Transcendental Arguments)
  - II. William Maker, Davidson's Transcendental Arguments  
*Commentator:* Frank Farrell
12. 9:00 BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, *Embassy*
  - I. Jan Dejnozka, Russell's Robust Sense of Reality: A Reply to Butchvarov
  - II. Russell Wahl, On What Is Denoted
13. 9:00 APA COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, SOCIEDAD FILOSOFICA IBEROAMERICANA, and SOCIETY FOR IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT, *Consulate*  
*Topic:* Philosophy in Latin America Today  
*Chair:* Ernest Sosa
  - I. Ezequiel de Olaso, Some Considerations on Latin American Philosophy Today
  - II. León Olivé, Cultural Relativism and Conceptual Relativism
  - III. Enrique Villanueva, Relativism and Philosophy in Latin America Today
  - IV. Jorge J. E. Gracia, Philosophy and Cultural Identity
14. 9:00 ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS, *Diplomat*
  - III. EARLY AFTERNOON (11:15-1:15)
1. 11:15 SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY  
*Topic:* Metaphysics after Pragmatism  
*Chair:* John Lachs  
*Speaker:* David Weissman  
*Commentator:* John Ryder  
*Versailles Ballroom*



2. 11:15 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR VALUE INQUIRY, *Regency Ballroom*  
*Chair:* Lisa Newton  
*Presidential Address:* Patricia Werhane, Moral Realism  
*Business Meeting*
3. 11:15 SARTRE CIRCLE, *Regency Foyer*  
*Topic:* Sartre on the Emotions  
*Chair:* Phyllis S. Morris  
*Speakers:* Peter Caws, Jennifer Church, and Robert C. Solomon  
*Commentators:* Frithjof H. Bergmann
4. 11:15 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR NEOPLATONIC STUDIES, *Diplomat*  
*Topic:* The Place of the Individual in Neoplatonic Thought  
*Chair:* William J. Carroll
  - I. John Jones, Whither Timothy: Individuality and the Quest for *Henosis* in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite
  - II. Arthur Madigan, Plotinus on Personal Individuality: Early/Late
5. 11:15 ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY AND LIBERATION, *Commonwealth*  
*Chair:* Vincent Punzo  
James L. Marsh, The Bishops' Pastoral on Economic Justice: A Neo-Marxist Interpretation  
*Commentator:* Martin De Nys
6. 11:15 JASPERS SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, *Senate*  
*Chair:* Robert S. Corrington
  - I. Gregory J. Walters, Karl Jaspers on the Role of "Conversion" in the Nuclear Age  
*Commentator:* Michael Quirk
  - II. William Kluback, Idolatry in the Political Thought of Karl Jaspers  
*Commentator:* Harold Oliver
7. 11:15 CONCERNED PHILOSOPHERS FOR PEACE, *Dominion A*  
*Chair:* Barry L. Gan
8. 11:15 MOORE SOCIETY, *Embassy*  
*Topic:* The Early Moore  
*Chair:* Dennis A. Rohatyn  
Tom Regan, Moore: The Liberator  
*Commentators:* Abraham Edel, Jaakko Hintikka
9. 11:15 WORLD PHENOMENOLOGY INSTITUTE, *Monarch*  
*Topic:* Social Justice and the Moral Sense
  - I. William McBride, Social Justice on Trial: The Verdict of History
  - II. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Is Social Justice Possible? The Return to Moral Sense



MONDAY, DECEMBER 28

## IV. AFTERNOON (2:00–5:00)

1. 2:00 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*
2. 2:00 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PHILOSOPHY TEACHERS, *Diplomat*  
*Chair:* Rosalind Ekman Ladd  
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Education as Initiation into Conflict  
*Commentator:* Donald Reed
3. 2:00 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC STUDY OF  
 SOCIETY and THE INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES, *Senate*  
*Chair:* Douglas B. Rasmussen  
 I. J. Roger Lee, Friendship and the Self  
 II. Neera Badhwar, Utilitarianism and Friendship  
 III. Lester Hunt, Friendly Relations and the Basis of Character
4. 2:00 ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMAL LOGIC AND CRITICAL THINKING  
*Consulate*  
*Chair:* Mark L. Weinstein  
 I. Bertram Bandman, The Role of Belief in Critical Thinking  
*Commentator:* Donald Hatcher  
 II. Gordon E. Whitney, Analysis of a Dialogue on  
 Determinism and Free Will  
*Commentator:* Philip A. Pecorino

## V. LATE AFTERNOON (5:15–7:15)

1. 5:15 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION, *Versailles Ballroom*  
*Topic:* Equality and Difference: Issues in Race and Gender  
*Chair:* Clifford Durand  
 I. Sara Begus, Portia's Dilemma: Feminist Jurisprudence and  
 the Politics of Identity  
 II. Lucius Outlaw, The Politics of Equality: A Double-edged  
 Sword  
*Commentator:* Iris Young
2. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY, *Regency Ballroom*  
 Merrill Hintikka Symposium  
*Topic:* Women's Education  
*Panel:* Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Jane Martin, Elizabeth  
 Spelman, and C. J. B. MacMillan  
*Moderator:* Jaakko Hintikka
3. 5:15 PEIRCE SOCIETY, *Regency Foyer*  
*Chair:* John Lachs  
 I. H. P. Joswick, Peirce's Semiotic: Logic as a Theory of  
 Reasoning  
*Commentator:* Robert W. Burch  
 II. Peirce Society Essay Contest: Award Paper



4. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THE PARANORMAL *Diplomat*  
*Topic:* How Para Are Parapsychological Powers?  
*Chair:* Lewis Foster  
I. Hoyt Edge, Parapsychology or Anomalies Research?  
II. Frank B. Dilley, Mind-Body Interaction and Parapsychological Powers
5. 5:15 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR CHINESE PHILOSOPHY *Commonwealth*  
*Topic:* Habermas and Chinese Philosophy  
*Chair:* Chung-ying Cheng  
I. Chung-ying Cheng, On Communicative Rationality from the Confucian Point of View  
II. Yu hui Park, Habermas and Confucius  
III. Lauren Pfister, Habermas and the Concept of Great Unity
6. 5:15 GANDHI-KING SOCIETY, *Senate*  
*Chair:* Newton Garver  
*Discussion:* Can There Be Justice without Peace?
7. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY, *Consulate*  
I. Peter King, Peter Abelard's Philosophy of Mind  
II. Allan Bäck, Anselm on Perfect Islands
8. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICS AND ANIMALS, *Dominion A*  
*Chair:* Harlan B. Miller  
I. Evelyn B. Pluhar, Speciesism: A Form of Bigotry or a Justified View?  
*Commentator:* Steve F. Sapontzis  
II. Roberta Kalechofsky, Metaphors of Nature: Pornography and Vivisection  
*Commentator:* Laura Westra
9. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR CLASSICAL REALISM, *Embassy*  
*Chair:* Mary Carmen Rose  
I. Earle Coleman, Beauty and the "I" of Buber's Beholder  
II. Xavier Monasterio, Dramatic Realism
10. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF MARXISM, *Monarch*  
*Topic:* The U.S. Constitution and Historical Materialism  
*Chair:* John Neumeier  
I. Terry di Filippo, On the Importance of Enlightenment Romanist Legal History for Marxist Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution  
II. Bertell Ollman, Founding Finaglers: Toward a Marxist Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution  
III. John Ryder, Private Property and the U.S. Constitution



Monday, December 28, Late Afternoon, V

11. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Province*  
*Topic:* Symposium on Contemporary Antifoundationism and  
the Prospects for Systematic Philosophy: Analytic Prospectives  
*Chair:* Robert Berman  
I. Kenley R. Dove, Minding Our Language  
II. Joseph C. Pitt, Sellarsian Antifoundationalism  
*Commentator:* George Lucas
12. 5:15 SOCIETY FOR BUSINESS ETHICS, *Dominion B*  
*Topic:* Corporate Ethics  
*Chair:* Michael Hoffman  
I. R. Edward Freeman, Corporations and Capitalism: A  
Stakeholder Approach  
II. Thomas Donaldson, Economic Injustice and Corporate  
Takeovers
13. 5:15 ASSOCIATION OF PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL EDITORS  
*Royal Ballroom B*  
*Topic:* What Journals Owe Philosophers and Vice Versa.  
*Chair:* Arnold Wilson

#### VI. EVENING (7:30–10:30)

1. 7:30 NORTH AMERICAN KANT SOCIETY, *Versailles Ballroom*  
*Speaker:* Hilary Putnam, Realism and the Life of Reason  
*Commentator:* Gordon Brittan
2. 7:30 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR VALUE INQUIRY, *Regency Ballroom*  
*Chair:* Sander H. Lee  
Robert Ginsberg, The Value of Philosophy: A Dialogue
3. 7:30 SANTAYANA SOCIETY, *Regency Foyer*  
*Chair:* Paul G. Kuntz  
John Lachs, The Enduring Value of Santayana's Philosophy  
*Commentator:* Herman J. Saatkamp
4. 7:30 LEIBNIZ SOCIETY OF AMERICA, *Senate*  
*Chair:* Margaret Wilson  
I. François Duchesneau, Leibniz on Architectonic Principles  
and Analysis  
II. Business Meeting  
Presiding: Margaret Wilson, President
5. 7:30 SOCIETY FOR IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT, *Consulate*  
*Chair:* Jorge J. E. Gracia  
I. Anton Donoso and Roberto J. Vichot, Dewey, Ortega, and  
Pragmatism  
II. Ezequiel de Olaso, Ideas for the Critical Edition of  
Ortega's Works



6. 7:30 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Dominion A*  
Council Meeting  
*Chair:* Michael Morley
7. 7:30 SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, *Dominion B*  
*Chair:* Diana T. Meyers  
Christina Hoff Sommers, The Philosopher's War against the Family  
*Commentators:* Alison M. Jaggar and Kathryn Jackson
8. 7:30 PERSONALIST DISCUSSION GROUP, *Embassy*  
*Chair:* Thomas O. Buford  
Eugene Fontinelle, Personal Immortality: Life-enhancing or Life-eroding?
9. 7:30 PHILOSOPHERS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, *Monarch*  
*Topic:* Pornography
10. 7:30 WORLD PHENOMENOLOGY INSTITUTE, *Province*  
*Topic:* Social Justice and Moral Sense  
I. David Doyle, The Justice of Mercy  
II. William Hamrick, Rules of Law and Substantive Justice
11. 7:30 SOCIETY FOR ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY, *Royal Ballroom B*  
*Topic:* Aristotle's Ethics  
*Chair:* Anthony Preus  
I. Robert Bolton, Aristotle's Ethics  
II. Daniel Devereux, Theoria and Praxis in the *Eudemean* and *Nicomachean Ethics*

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 29

VII. MORNING (9:00-11:00)

1. 9:00 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*
2. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Diplomat*  
*Symposium:* Apropos the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution  
*Chair:* Deborah Chaffin  
I. Richard Dien Winfield, Constitutionality and Political Foundationalism  
II. Frank Bryce McCluskey and George Teschner, Deconstructing the First Amendment: Philosophical Presuppositions for the City in Speech
3. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX AND LOVE, *Commonwealth*  
Alan Soble, On the Coherence of Love (Tenth Anniversary Presidential Address)
4. 9:00 SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF CREATIVITY, *Senate*  
*Chair:* Paul G. Kuntz  
*Topic:* Paul Weiss on Creativity  
*Speaker:* Paul Weiss  
*Commentators:* Charles Hartshorne, Carl Hausman, William Desmond, and Peter A. Y. Gunter



Tuesday, December 29, Morning, VII

5. 9:00 SARTRE CIRCLE, *Embassy*I. *Chair*: Debra Bergoffen

Ronald E. Santoni, The Cynicism of Sartre's Bad Faith

*Commentator*: Joseph S. CatalanoII. *Chair*: Philip L. Peterson

Eleanor Kuykendall, Sartre's Linguistic Phenomenology

*Commentator*: Robert V. Stone

## VIII. EARLY AFTERNOON (11:15-1:15)

1. 11:15 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION, *Versailles Ballroom**Topic*: Science, Gender, Race, and Class*Chair*: Val Dusek

I. Anthony Appiah, Social Forces/Natural Kinds

II. Nancy Holmstrom, Biologism, Essentialism, and Feminism

*Commentators*: Anne Fausto-Sterling, Gena Porto, and Lorenzo

Simpson

## IX. AFTERNOON (2:15-4:15)

1. 2:15 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Georgian Ballroom B*2. 2:15 SOREN KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY, *Commonwealth**Topic*: Kierkegaard and Deconstruction*Chair*: Merold Westphal*Speakers*: John Caputo, Louis Mackey, and Mark Taylor3. 2:15 CHAIRS' CAUCUS, *Senate**Topic*: The Next Decade: What Will It Mean for Philosophy Programs?*Chair*: Frank B. Dilley*Panel*: Samuel Gorovitz, David A. Hoekema, and Anita Silvers4. 2:15 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR VALUE INQUIRY, *Monarch**Chair*: Robert Ginsberg

Charles Hornbeck, The Square of Opposition Vindicated

*Commentators*: Stephen F. Barker

## X. EVENING (6:30-9:30)

1. 6:30 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION and THE SOCIETY FOR THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF MARXISM, *Versailles Ballroom**Topic*: Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*Chair*: Ed D'Angelo*Panel*: Don Hodges, Martin Vega, and Phil Berryman



2. 6:30 SOCIETY FOR SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY, *Regency Ballroom*  
*Symposium: Apropos the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution*  
*Topic: The Dialogical Turn in Constitutional Interpretation*  
*Chair: David A. Duquette*
  - I. Bruce A. Ackerman, Does the American Constitution Make Sense?
  - II. Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Democracy and the American Constitution
  - III. Frank Michelman
  - IV. Drucilla Cornell
3. 6:30 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES, *Regency Foyer*  
*Topic: Workshop on Philosophy and the Holocaust*  
*Chair: Alan Rosenberg*
  - I. Joan Ringelheim, Politics of Memory and Remembrance
  - II. Roger S. Gottlieb, Marxism, Feminism, Holocaust
  - III. Discussion: Establishment of a Philosophical Society on the Holocaust
4. 6:30 SOCIETY FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY  
*Commonwealth*
  - I. Allan B. Wolter, The Ethics of John Duns Scotus
  - II. Daniel H. Frank, Humility as a Virtue: A Maimonidean Critique of Aristotle's Ethics
5. 6:30 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC STUDY OF SOCIETY and INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES, *Senate*  
*Topic: Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments*  
*Chair: Douglas den Uyl*
  - I. Charles Griswold, The Impartial Spectator
  - II. Eugene Heath, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Spontaneous Order
  - III. Jeremy Shearmur, From Brother Sense to Brother Man
6. 6:30 JASPERS SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, *Consulate*  
*Chair: Raymond E. Gogel*  
 Alan M. Olson, *Philosophical Faith and Revelation: Twenty-five Years Later: A Reassessment*  
*Commentator: George Pepper*  
 Business Meeting
7. 6:30 ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC, *Dominion A*  
 Council Meeting  
*Chair: Michael Morley*
8. 6:30 ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMAL LOGIC AND CRITICAL THINKING  
*Embassy*  
*Chair: John Hoaglund*
  - I. J. Anthony Blair, Premise Adequacy of Cogent Arguments  
*Commentator: Dennis A. Rohatyn*
  - II. Open Forum: Priorities for Theory and Practice
  - III. Business Meeting



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 Tuesday, December 29, Evening, X

9. 6:30 SOCIETY FOR ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY, *Monarch*  
*Chair and Commentator:* David L. Hall
  - I. Joel Kupperman, Not in So Many Words: Taoist Strategies of Communication
  - II. Lee Siegel, Laughing Matters: Philosophical Humor and Humorous Philosophy in India
10. 6:30 NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, *Province*  
*Topic:* American Social Philosophy  
*Chair:* Eugene Kelly
  - I. Victorino Tejera, Kuklick's Misrepresentation of American Philosophy  
*Commentator:* Armen Marsoobian
  - II. Lucius Outlaw, American Philosophy: The Unfinished American Revolution  
*Commentator:* Blanche Curry

### WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 30

#### XI. MORNING (9:00-11:00)

1. 9:00 CONFERENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES, *Commonwealth*  
*Topic:* The Range of American Philosophical Practice  
*Chair:* John A. Loughney  
*Speakers:* Nicholas Capaldi, Robert C. Neville, John A. Loughney, and Charles Scott
2. 9:00 NORTH AMERICAN NIETZSCHE SOCIETY, *Senate*  
*Symposium:* Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, Published Corpus and Thought, 1883-89  
 In Honor and Memory of Mazzino Montinari  
*Chair:* Arthur Danto  
*Participants:* Peter Heller, R. J. Hollingdale, Bernd Magnus, and Richard Schacht

#### XII. AFTERNOON (1:30-4:30)

1. 1:30 SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY, *Regency Foyer*  
*Topic:* Simone de Beauvoir Symposium  
*Chair:* Joan Ringelheim
  - I. Carol Asher, Beauvoir on Death and Dying
  - II. Deidre Bair, Beauvoir on Politics and Philosophy



(See Appendix)

|                                                                         |             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| ABBARNO, John, D'Youville College, New York                             | II-6        |
| ACKERMAN, Bruce A., Columbia University Law School                      | X-2         |
| ACKERMAN, Robert, University of Massachusetts/Amherst                   | II-9        |
| ADDELSON, Kathryn Pyne, Smith College, Massachusetts                    | V-2         |
| ALLAN, George, Dickinson College, Pennsylvania                          | II-8        |
| ANDERSON, Lyle V., University of San Diego                              | II-5        |
| APPIAH, Anthony, Cornell University                                     | VIII-1      |
| ARONSON, Ronald, Wayne State University, Michigan                       | I-2         |
| ASHBAUGH, Anne, Colgate University                                      | II-3        |
| ASHER, Carol, New York                                                  | XII-1       |
| BÄCK, Allan, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania                        | V-7         |
| BADHWAR, Neera, University of Oklahoma                                  | IV-3        |
| BAIR, Deidre, University of Pennsylvania                                | XII-1       |
| BANDMAN, Bertram, Long Island University/Brooklyn                       | IV-4        |
| BARKER, Stephen F., Johns Hopkins University                            | IX-4        |
| BARRAL, Mary Rose, Gannon University                                    | II-7        |
| BEGUS, Otto, Morgan State University, Maryland                          | II-2        |
| BEGUS, Sarah, Johns Hopkins University                                  | V-1         |
| BERGMANN, Frithjof H., University of Michigan/Ann Arbor                 | III-3       |
| BERGOFFEN, Debra, George Mason University                               | VII-5       |
| BERMAN, Robert, Lang College, New School for Social Research            | V-11        |
| BERRYMAN, Phil                                                          | X-1         |
| BLAIR, J. Anthony, University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada               | X-8         |
| BOLTON, Robert, Rutgers University/New Brunswick                        | VI-11       |
| BRITTAN, Gordon, Montana State University                               | VI-1        |
| BUFORD, Thomas O., Furman University                                    | VI-8        |
| BURCH, Robert W., Texas A&M University                                  | V-3         |
| BUTLER, Nance Cunningham, Applied Analysis Associates, Denver, Colorado | I-4         |
| CAMPBELL, Jean, Brown Brothers Harriman, New York                       | I-4         |
| CAPALDI, Nicholas, Queens College, City University of New York          | XI-1        |
| CAPUTO, John, Villanova University                                      | IX-2        |
| CARROLL, William J., Coppin State College, Maryland                     | III-4       |
| CATALANO, Joseph S., Kean College of New Jersey                         | VII-5       |
| CAWS, Peter, George Washington University                               | III-3       |
| CHAFFIN, Deborah, San Diego State University                            | VII-2       |
| CHENG, Chung-ying, University of Hawaii/Manoa                           | V-5         |
| CHURCH, Jennifer, Vassar College, New York                              | III-3       |
| CLARK, Kevin, Pennsylvania State University                             | II-11       |
| COLEMAN, Earle, Virginia Commonwealth University                        | V-9         |
| CONWAY, Daniel, Stanford University                                     | II-1        |
| CORNELL, Drucilla, University of Pennsylvania Law School                | X-2         |
| CORRINGTON, Robert S., Pennsylvania State University/University Park    | III-6       |
| COX, Gray, Middle Tennessee University                                  | II-6        |
| CURRY, Blanche, Shaw University                                         | II-10, X-10 |
| D'ANGELO, Ed, University of Bridgeport                                  | X-1         |
| DANTO, Arthur, Columbia University                                      | XI-2        |
| DEJNOZKA, Jan, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis                            | II-12       |
| DE NYS, Martin, George Mason University                                 | III-5       |



|                                                                 |             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| DEN UYL, Douglas, Bellarmine College, Kentucky                  | X-5         |
| DE OLASO, Ezequiel, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina       | II-13, VI-5 |
| DESMOND, William, Loyola College, Baltimore                     | VII-4       |
| DEVEREUX, Daniel, University of Virginia/Charlottesville        | VI-11       |
| DI FILIPPO, Terry, Rutgers University                           | V-10        |
| DILLEY, Frank B., University of Delaware                        | V-4, IX-3   |
| DONALDSON, Thomas, Loyola University of Chicago                 | V-12        |
| DONOSO, Anton, University of Detroit                            | VI-5        |
| DORE, Clement J., Vanderbilt University                         | I-1         |
| DOVE, Kenley R., State University of New York/Purchase          | V-11        |
| DOYLE, David, La Trobe University, Australia                    | VI-10       |
| DUCHESNEAU, François, University of Montreal, Canada            | VI-4        |
| DUQUETTE, David A., St. Norbert College, Wisconsin              | X-2         |
| DURAND, Clifford, Morgan State University, Maryland             | V-1         |
| DURBIN, Paul T., University of Delaware                         | II-9        |
| DUSEK, Val, University of New Hampshire                         | VIII-1      |
| EDEL, Abraham, University of Pennsylvania                       | III-8       |
| EDGE, Hoyt, Rollins College, Florida                            | V-4         |
| FARRELL, Frank, State University of New York/Purchase           | II-11       |
| FAUSTO-STERLING, Anne, Brown University                         | VIII-1      |
| FERRÉ, Frederick, University of Georgia                         | I-1         |
| FLOWER, Elizabeth, University of Pennsylvania                   | II-3        |
| FONTINELLE, Eugene, Queens College, City University of New York | VI-8        |
| FOSTER, Lewis, College of William & Mary, Virginia              | V-4         |
| FOWLER, Mark, College of William & Mary, Virginia               | II-1        |
| FRANK, Daniel H., University of Kentucky                        | X-4         |
| FREEMAN, R. Edward, University of Virginia                      | V-12        |
| FRIEDMAN, Howard, University of Connecticut/Waterbury           | II-5        |
| FRIEDMAN, Marilyn, Bowling Green State University, Ohio         | II-3        |
| FRIEL, James P., State University of New York/Farmingdale       | II-10       |
| GAN, Barry L., St. Bonaventure University                       | II-5, III-7 |
| GARVER, Newton, State University of New York/Buffalo            | V-6         |
| GINSBERG, Robert, Pennsylvania State University/Delaware County | VI-2, IX-4  |
| GOGEL, Raymond E., Drew University                              | X-6         |
| GOROVITZ, Samuel, Syracuse University                           | IX-3        |
| GOTTLIEB, Roger S., Worcester Polytechnic Institute             | X-3         |
| GOULD, James, University of South Florida                       | II-10       |
| GRACIA, Jorge J. E., State University of New York/Buffalo       | II-13, VI-5 |
| GRANGE, Joseph, University of Southern Maine                    | II-8        |
| GRAY, Christopher P., Concordia University, Quebec, Canada      | II-10       |
| GRISWOLD, Charles, Howard University                            | X-5         |
| GUNTER, Pete A. Y., North Texas State University                | VII-4       |
| HALL, David L., University of Texas/El Paso                     | X-9         |
| HAMPSCH, George H., College of the Holy Cross, Massachusetts    | II-5        |
| HAMRICK, William, Southern Illinois University                  | VI-10       |
| HARRIS, Leonard, Morgan State University, Maryland              | II-2        |
| HARTSHORNE, Charles, University of Texas/Austin                 | VII-4       |
| HARWOOD, Sterling, Cornell University                           | II-10       |
| HATCHER, Donald, Baker University                               | IV-4        |
| HAUSMAN, Carl, Pennsylvania State University/University Park    | VII-4       |
| HEATH, Eugene, Yale University                                  | X-5         |
| HELD, Virginia, Graduate Center, City University of New York    | II-3        |



|                                                                      |                  |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
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
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
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
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
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
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

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